PATRICK COLM HOGAN

Imagining Kashmir

Emplotment and Colonialism

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Frontiers of Narrative

SERIES EDITOR

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PATRICK COLM HOGAN

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This book is dedicated to the author of
Shalimar the Clown.

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Introduction

Kashmir, Narrative, and the Complexity of Colonialism

Why Kashmir?

Kashmir is an important topic today primarily because of the great human tragedy that has been unfolding there—intensively over the past twenty-five years and, in a more attenuated form, for decades before that. Seema Kazi reports that at the time she was writing (in 2008), the death toll was estimated at 80,000–100,000 (xi; the numbers vary, as shown by the estimate of 70,000 cited by Waheed [305] in 2011). Kashmir had become "the most heavily militarised region in the world" (Kazi 85); in 2004, there was "one soldier for every ten civilians" (Kazi 97). The suffering of the people is only partially revealed by the death tolls. The conditions of life itself have been suffocating. Consider, for example, "The imposition of indefinite twenty-four hour curfews in Srinagar during the early 1990s, for months on end," which made it "impossible for ordinary citizens to buy daily supplies, [and] prevented those needing medical attention from reaching a hospital," among other debilitating consequences (Kazi 100). The populace has been terrorized by both the military (who are largely immune from prosecution [see Kazi 98 and 105] and therefore have little reason not to act cruelly on the basis of anger or fear) and the militants, who are of course not subject to ordinary laws. Moreover, the vast majority of the Indian military and a large percentage of the militants (Swami estimates "over a third" [194]) are not Kashmiri. In consequence, they often treat Kashmiri people as enemies, though both the soldiers and the militants are putatively fighting on behalf of the Kashmiri people.

The ethnic and linguistic difference just mentioned is related to the nature of the conflict. As Kazi explains, "According to an independent poll conducted in the Kashmir Valley in 1995, 72 per cent of respondents

were in favor of independence" (103). A 2010 poll showed 66 percent favoring independence ("Two Thirds"). A poll from 2009 (published in 2010) put the desire for independence in the valley at 74–95 percent by district (Bradnock 16; for a summary of the report, see "Kashmir Mulls"), with the desire for merger with Pakistan ranging from 2 percent to 7 percent (17) and that for merger with India ranging from 2 percent to 22 percent (16). But it seems unlikely that the people will have self-determination. They are currently caught between what are in effect two colonialist powers—India and Pakistan. Almost no one who has any authority seems to take seriously the idea of Kashmiri independence. The real options seem to be incorporation into Pakistan or continued incorporation into India, perhaps with some degree of regional autonomy.[1]

This international aspect to the Kashmir issue has two components, both with further consequences. First, there is the bilateral, state conflict between India and Pakistan. This poses a global danger due to the fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers and have fought three wars over Kashmir. As Wajahat Habibullah notes, Kashmir is widely recognized as a possible nuclear "flash point" (3). The second international aspect to the Kashmir issue bears on jihādi movements, such as al-Qaeda. In the Muslim world, and particularly among militants, Kashmir is widely seen as a prime instance of the oppression of Muslims and threat to the *ummah*, or community of faith. In this way, the situation of Kashmir is not entirely unlike that of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The intensity of the militant Islamist commitment to Kashmir may be less, but it is of the same general sort. As such, it has the potential to expand beyond Kashmir, not only to other parts of India (as has repeatedly occurred), but elsewhere as well. Indeed, these two aspects of internationalization are interrelated as the Pakistani secret service has repeatedly supported jihādi groups as part of their conflict with India (see Swami; Jamal; and Tankel). This has, in turn, caused problems for Pakistan, which has suffered violent attacks from some of the fundamentalist groups it has nurtured (see Tankel 189–92). Stephen Tankel claims that one such group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) "threaten[s] the US and its Western allies at home and abroad" (266).

However, the following chapters are not a sociological, political, military, or historical discussion of the situation in Kashmir. They bear on literature and film or, more broadly, imagination. As such, they point to

another way in which Kashmir merits our attention. Kashmir is not only a politically consequential region. It is a region with narrative importance as well—importance in stories. This, too, has two aspects. First, and perhaps most obviously, Kashmir has been the topic of stories from ancient times to the present. In modern India, it has been a repeated focus of attention in film, particularly, where it is highly romanticized for its physical beauty (a point stressed by writers such as Kabir). More generally, Kashmir has had a prominent place in the imagination of South Asian people. As almost every author writing on Kashmir points out, it is widely represented as a paradise on earth, most famously in Emperor Jahangir's statement about the valley, "If there is a paradise on earth, it is this; it is this; it is this" (see, for example, Douglas). Part of this imagination has been social as well. Kashmir has been envisioned as a place of unusual harmony between Hindus and Muslims, and thus a source of optimism for social peace and friendship. For example, after the murderous terrors of partition, when roughly one million people lost their lives in religious violence (see Wolpert 348), Mahatma Gandhi asserted that "in an India which had become dark all round, Kashmir was the only hope" (Bamzai 669; however, see Puri on "religious polarization" and communal "killings" in Jammu and Kashmir outside the Kashmir Valley proper [2–3]). Since the beginning of the insurgency in 1988, this image of Kashmir has of course changed. But the valley remains an object of intense imaginative interest in a range of narratives directed at a variety of audiences.

In addition to being the topic of representation, Kashmir is also the source of literature. It has one of the richest literary traditions in all of South Asia, extending back to the great collection of tales, *The Ocean of the Streams of Story*, as well as through Sanskrit drama and poetry. The Indian tradition of literary theory developed largely in Kashmir. Vernacular poetry flourished in the writings of Hindu and Muslim mystics over several centuries (for an overview, see Raina). This literature provides one of the richest bodies of anticommunal writing in South Asia and has helped foster the (somewhat mythical) view of Kashmir as a heavenly land of intercommunity friendship. Though Kashmiri-language literature has not had the broad impact of some other Indian language literatures (e.g., Bengali or Hindi/Urdu), it constitutes a substantial body of work. Moreover, Kashmiris are among the most important Anglophone Indian

writers today. Undoubtedly, the most significant Indian Anglophone writer is Salman Rushdie, an Indian of Kashmiri descent who has also treated Kashmir in his writings, particularly *Shalimar the Clown*. Another Kashmiri, Agha Shahid Ali, was arguably the most important Anglophone Indian poet of the twentieth century. Kashmir was a primary subject of his poetry.

As both the topic and the source of art, then, Kashmir calls out for intensified attention. Given the significance of the political and human issues at stake, the urgency of that call is only increased. Despite this, there has been only very limited attention to the Kashmir crisis through its literature. Moreover, that has largely taken up a poststructuralist approach, leaving aside the more obviously relevant research on social psychology, emotion, and human cognition.

The mention of social psychology brings us to yet a third area in which Kashmir is an important object of study today. The theoretical analysis of colonialism has had an important place in literary study for several decades. Indeed, some of the most influential works of "Postcolonial Theory"—such as Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* and Edward Said's *Orientalism*—have been largely literary analyses. What makes Kashmir significant in this context is that, as colonialism, it is a highly theoretically complex case. At least prima facie, the Indian presence in Kashmir is an atypical colonialism (see McLeod 73). Atypical cases are valuable for challenging our presuppositions about colonialism and for refining our theoretical treatments of it. No less importantly, the apparently atypical quality of the situation may reveal to us aspects of other cases of colonialism that have been underappreciated. In other words, one value of an atypical case is that it may indicate how other cases of colonialism, even paradigmatic cases, are perhaps not as "typical" as we previously imagined.

In this respect, there are some relevant features of the past and current condition of Kashmir. First, there is a layered history of colonialism that manifests itself in majority-minority relations within the valley itself—the history of Mughal, Afghan, and Dogra domination that has affected the religious demographics of the valley and the relations between the Muslim majority and the Hindu minority. Second, there is the vexed relation between the valley itself—with its domination of the state government—and other regions of the state, such as (heavily Bud-

dhist) Ladakh. This relation itself has some features of colonialism (as, for example, Behera's analyses indicate). We might refer to these as *internal* or *majoritarian* colonialism. Both points suggest complications in the issue of self-determination (clearly a central issue in defining colonialism and anticolonial nationalism), prominently in the relation of self-determination to minority rights. Moreover, in connection with this, the case of Kashmir raises issues of revolutionary and state violence in perhaps particularly salient ways given the diversity of agents involved. Specifically, the violence is not only a matter of state versus militant or state versus Kashmiri sympathizer (or putative sympathizer) but also militant versus Kashmiri civilians with different political views or cultural practices, foreign or Islamist militant versus Kashmiri and semisecular militant, and so on.

Moreover, as I have already noted, the issue of self-determination in Kashmir tends to be usurped by the claims of competing "external" colonialisms (Indian and Pakistani). In other words, there is not simply one external colonialism at issue here but at least two, though one is dominant in the sense that India is exercising direct colonial control. (I say "at least" as international Islamist jihād has elements of colonialism. Whether it has enough elements to count as colonialism seems to be a matter of how capacious one chooses to make the concept of colonialism.) Other complicating factors include the provenance of the colonialisms at issue, since they are to a great extent derivative of earlier, European colonialism. Specifically, the British Empire largely defined the successor states.

Finally, there is the peculiarity that the colonialism of India particularly does not appear to be significantly connected with exploitation.[2] It has been highly oppressive, but it does not appear to have significantly extracted resources or labor from Kashmir. For example, the percentage of Jammu and Kashmir state's "total revenue" coming from the national government in 1950 (shortly after independence and the accession of Kashmir to India) was under 4 percent. In 1987–88, just before the explosion of the insurgency, it was 72 percent (see Ganguly 74). There are, of course, problems with this. But these are not problems of exploitation, which should lead revenue to travel in the opposite direction (i.e., from the colony, Kashmir, to the colonial power, India). As Šumit Ganguly explains, "The resources devoted to the state did improve the

material standards of the Kashmiri populace; dispassionate observers have commented on the tremendous economic transformation produced in the region" (74).[3] In this respect, the colonial occupation of Kashmir is not only *derivative* (i.e., an at least partial result of former colonialism) but also, at least to some extent, *anomalous* (i.e., not following the usual pattern of economic exploitation). The Indian government probably does perceive there to be some economic and strategic benefit to union with Kashmir. However, there is no reason to see, for example, the facilitation of trade as exploitation. Indeed, if anything, Kashmir has exploited other regions of Jammu and Kashmir state. Thus, Navnita Chadha Behera reports, "Although Jammu contributed more than 70 percent of the state's revenue, it received less than 30 percent of budgetary allocations for its development." Moreover, "Among the state's large power projects, only one was installed in the Jammu region" (122).

The apparent absence of exploitation, and thus economic benefits from the colonial relation, makes the sustaining force of Indian colonialism more difficult to explain than paradigmatic colonialism. It also makes the development of the insurgency more difficult to account for. Of course, once there is massive killing, torture, rape, and other violence by the Indian military against Kashmiris, the Kashmiri desire for independence needs no explanation. But the question is—given the apparent lack of economic benefit of colonialism on one side and independence on the other—how did the situation develop to this point initially? While this situation is in a sense atypical, it may also reveal something about the social psychology of colonialism, since it presents a sort of "pure" case, largely unaffected by mercantile motives.

Thus, there are three main reasons for addressing narratives of Kashmir at this time—the human importance of the crisis, the literary significance of the place, and the theoretically consequential nature of this somewhat atypical situation. In keeping with this, the following chapters have three main purposes. The simplest and most straightforward purpose is literary—to explicate the narratives discussed in the course of the book. Sometimes (as in the case of Mani Ratnam's film *Roja*) these are ideologically consequential works. At other times (as in the case of Rushdie's novel *Shalimar the Clown*) they are, at least in my assessment, works of great literary accomplishment. In still other cases

(e.g., that of Agha Shahid Ali), they may be symptomatic of the feelings and ideas of a significant part of the population. In any of these cases, they are works that merit careful interpretation.

The interpretation of these works is, to a certain extent, an end in itself. It is also important for what it reveals about Kashmir—both what is really happening there and how it is imagined ideologically. This brings us to the second purpose. If successful, the following analyses will present ways of conceiving of the multiple, complex, changing causes and consequences of this tragic situation. This is not to say that the book presents anything like a definitive explanation of the situation in Kashmir or its development. It does not. Its contribution in this respect is necessarily more modest. The enormous complexity of the Kashmir crisis and its history defies a unified, global account. Perhaps the best one can do—and certainly all I have tried to do in the following pages—is to present some aspects of that complexity, adding to our comprehension of the crisis by treating different components and presenting the problems from different angles.

This is related to the final purpose of the present book. One understands a particular case in part by reference to general patterns that extend beyond that case, patterns that are themselves grounded in some theoretically well-specified field (e.g., social psychology or systems theory). In examining the situation in Kashmir, the following chapters also set out to formulate more broadly applicable theoretical concepts, principles, and variables within principles. The chapters seek to relate conditions and events to what we know about the human mind and human interaction, while at the same time extending and complicating accounts of cognitive, affective, and social psychology in relation to this particular case. Here too, however, the book does not lead to a single, unified and complete theory of colonialism. One may say a good deal about colonialism that is theoretically integrated and generalizable. But colonialism cannot be subsumed under a limited set of overarching or definitive principles drawn primarily from one or two disciplines (in this case, cognitive science and social psychology). If the single case of Kashmir resists a simplified account, how much more must all cases of colonialism collectively do so.

Needless to say, a central component of the cognitive and social psychology treated in the book is the human practice of emplotment. As

we will see over and over, narrative is crucial to the way in which people understand colonialism and anticolonialism—and indeed to the way they experience and enact the daily events and conditions of these conflicting identifications. In keeping with this, the theoretical purpose of this book is to a great extent a matter of advancing our comprehension of the interrelations between colonialism and narrative. Specifically, my hope is that the book will advance our knowledge about the operation of emplotment in colonialism, and indeed our knowledge about the constancies and variabilities of emplotment generally.

Explaining Kashmir, Explaining Colonialism

The preceding points about the diversity of explanation for complex social phenomena may seem commonplace. Yet they are not. At least the most influential theories often attempt to subsume very large phenomena under limited rubrics, systematizing problems in a way that one is tempted to call reductive, in the popular sense of the term (where it refers to a loss of nuance and complexity, and thus an excessive simplification). The most extreme case of this is in the use of master concepts (such as *hybridity*), a popular form of literary theory—often a form of sloganeering that substitutes for theorization. But even more multicomponential and genuinely theoretical approaches to postcolonial theory often seem to assume that everything must fit together organically. We find this, for example, in classical Marxist approaches that seek to give an ultimate explanation of colonialism in terms of the economic base. (This does not mean that a Marxist approach is not extremely valuable. It is. A nuanced understanding of the economic conditions enabling colonialism is crucial—if also difficult and distressingly infrequent. But it is not all there is to explaining colonialism.)

We also find this problem in accounts of the Kashmir crisis, including such illuminating accounts as Ganguly's explanation of the problem in terms of political awareness without democratic outlets. As Ganguly explains, "modernization exposed young Kashmiris to the possibilities of alternative futures, but the political process largely choked off such opportunities. With democratic dissent curbed, violent and separatist sentiments came to the fore" (xiv). Ganguly is undoubtedly correct that this is part of the problem. Indeed, he does an excellent job of showing that it is one factor distinguishing different periods in Kashmir's recent

history. Nonetheless, there are at least two problems with this sort of argument, which takes various periods and ties divergent outcomes to a single factor. First, there are undoubtedly other differences across the periods discussed, which singly or collectively may have produced the effects of interest (in this case, a popular insurgency). Second, any of these differences may simply have had a "tipping point" effect. In other words, it may have been the case that other, preexisting factors had much more causal influence than events in the late 1980s. But those events—perhaps the most important being the blatantly rigged election of 1987—were required to shift the state of the system. The rigged election may have directly affected only a limited number of people (e.g., the election workers who were arrested and maltreated), such that their increased activism was enough to alter the entire situation. As Habibullah explains, "Many of the young men who were election and polling agents" for the Muslim United Front (the victims of the vote fraud) "went on to lead the insurgency in 1989. At the time of the 1987 elections, these men were imprisoned without bail for months under the state's draconian Public Safety Act and treated inhumanely" (62). One of the main candidates who was deprived of a seat—and then, after he "protested," was "arrested and beaten" (Stern 207)—became head of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Habibullah 63). To take an example from physics, cold temperatures are not enough to freeze water. There must be some "nucleation," something local within the water that initiates the phase shift from liquid to ice. This is often some external item, such as a speck of dust (see Ball 163, 321). However, finding that a speck of dust entered the water before it froze, we would not wish to explain the freezing primarily by reference to the speck of dust. Of course, the factors isolated by Ganguly are far more important than a speck of dust—but the system he is trying to explain is also far more complex.

Indeed, Ganguly's work shows the extent to which other accounts of the crisis tend to seek uniformity in what is certainly a complex system where many partially overlapping and partially divergent factors enter in ephemeral configurations. Thus he divides treatments of the crisis into the following categories: "Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism" (15); "India's denial of self-determination" (16); "Ethnonational fervor" (17); and miscellaneous "Circumstantial accounts," which stress sequences of historically contingent events. These accounts all have valuable points,

as Ganguly acknowledges. But they are not only in themselves partial; they arguably suffer from an aspiration to give a unified, overarching explanation when that is almost certainly impossible. Such a mistaken aspiration may narrow the vision of interpreters and lead not only to an occlusion of complexity and loss of nuance but to more severe distortions.

Put more simply, one does not want to have contradictions or theoretical incompatibilities; however, it is important to recognize that not everything in a colonial situation is a function of a single factor or set of factors. Different fields of research, and thus principles of explanation, necessarily enter into accounts of real colonialisms in complex and changing ways. The point is highlighted by research in "situated cognition" (even if adherents of this school sometimes overstate the extent of fluidity and contingency in actions and events).

Situated cognition is an approach within cognitive science that is commonly associated with three principles (see, for example, Robbins and Aydede, "Short Primer"): (1) cognition is embodied; (2) cognition is embedded; and (3) cognition is distributed. To say that cognition is embodied is to say that it is involved with action and with external and internal perception; our thoughts are inseparable from what we are doing and feeling. To say that cognition is embedded is to say that it is involved with our ongoing interactions with the world; our thoughts—as well as our feelings and actions—are continually altering and being altered by the conditions in which we find ourselves. Finally, to say that cognition is distributed is to say that our interactions with the world are not simply a matter of a single agency (our own) faced with a passive world (e.g., a rock that we might move out of the path). They equally involve other agents and one's own cognitive operations are commonly intertwined with those of other people. This occurs most obviously in joint activities, cooperative or competitive, but it is found also in more apparently individual activities. For example, driving a car involves reliance on the cognitions and actions of the people who designed and made the car, as well as the (predictable) behavior of other drivers.

For our purposes, the most important aspect of situated cognition is that it stresses the degree to which all our actions and interactions are highly particular. They are not simply a matter of general principles encountering particulars (e.g., the idea of a cat in my mind encountering

this particular cat before my eyes). Rather, even abstract concepts and principles are continually altered, reshaped, given different emphases and nuances, by interaction with particulars. In keeping with this, our understanding of those particulars is constantly changing, with further consequences for our principles. Put somewhat crudely, when I am hammering a nail, I slightly change the swing of my arm, the grip of the handle, the angle of the head, and so on, with each blow. My hammering the nail is not a uniform activity but a constantly changing one. Moreover, that hammering will be different on different occasions—and none of these will be identical with the hammering engaged in by other people. The point about complex particularity applies even more clearly to such socially multifarious phenomena as colonialism and anticolonialism. In these cases, we again have many complex actions, which involve complex cognitive and affective reactions. The actions of individual colonialists or anticolonialists will vary; those (variable) actions for one agent will further vary across agents; the aggregation of those actions and agents will vary across aggregations (and thus across different cases of colonialism). In short, there will be great diversity both within and across colonialisms. Not only will British colonialism in Kenya be different from that in India. British colonialism in one part of India will be different from that in another part; British colonialism in one part of India will be different from one time to another; and British colonialism in one time and place will differ depending on the precise individuals involved. It is important to keep this diversity in mind when considering any case of colonialism or when developing a theoretical account of colonialism. It discourages facile generalization and excessive simplification.

On the other hand, despite the claims of some more enthusiastic proponents of situated cognition, not all generalization is facile and not all simplification is excessive. Consider the physical world. In judging the trajectory of a projectile, we need to take account of contingent and changing conditions, such as wind direction and velocity, which may shift abruptly and unpredictably. In other words, one could argue that mere mechanical motion is "situated" in roughly the same sense as cognition. But that hardly means that physicists are misguided in formulating such generalizations as the law of universal gravitation. Situationists make important points, but they often wish to throw out the

baby with the bathwater. Generalizations simplify. They abstract from particularity, and outside physics they to some extent misrepresent particularity as more uniform than it is. But to make any sense of particularity, we need the generalizations. We should of course avoid forcing everything into the procrustean bed of a single master concept or small set of putatively all-encompassing principles (including the three defining principles of situated cognition). But we still need to recognize and isolate patterns, abstracting generalizations that are accurate and complete enough for our purposes.

In keeping with these guidelines, the following analyses will focus on a few areas of explanation—primarily narrative analysis, cognitive and affective science, and the social psychology of group definition. These are, perhaps, the main fields constituting cognitive cultural study. I set out to isolate useful and broadly valid general principles, but do not assume that every phenomenon of importance in colonialism will fall into those areas of explanation or will conform to a limited set of precepts. In this way, the book has a further purpose as well (roughly a subgoal of the third purpose listed above)—to illustrate how an account of colonialism may avoid asserting great uniformity without falling into mere particularism.

The Framework of the Present Analysis

In short, the isolation of principles is necessary for understanding, even if these involve some simplification. When dealing with complex social phenomena, such as colonialism and anticolonialism, these principles are necessarily selective, since a single study cannot cover anything even approaching all the elements. Moreover, when one is writing a book on a topic, one seeks a certain degree of consistency in focus. Thus I have selected topics that give some shape to the account of colonialism, and to the interpretation of individual works.

The most general principle I have followed is to interrelate an account of motivational systems with a treatment of causal cognition and, to a much lesser extent, the dynamics of complex systems. Motivational systems, or emotions, are clearly crucial.[4] One does not get colonialism, anticolonialism, or any other human phenomenon without motivation of some sort. However, the activation of particular emotion systems, crucially including the consequent orientation of action, does not occur

on its own. It is inseparable from causal cognition—even in such a simple matter as recognizing the source of one's fear and inferring which direction to flee (e.g., away from the bear, not toward it). Human causal cognition bearing on social phenomena does sometimes involve law-like generalizations. In some cases, these are reasonable, such as, "Ready availability of firearms is likely to increase the use of firearms in crime"; in other cases, they are vague, but innocuous and broadly plausible, such as, "Power corrupts"; at times, they are false and destructive, such as, "Muslims [have] no loyalties" (to quote one common opinion of Sikh communalist characters in Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan* [121]). But, whatever their nature, such generalizations are not the most important form of causal cognition. Law-like generalizations are usually far less consequential than the *narrative* connections that guide particular emplotments. Even law-like generalizations tend to have their force only as the conclusion—the so-called moral—of narratives. For example, "Muslims have no loyalties" has motivational consequences insofar as it is linked with the salient story of, say, betrayal by a friend. Moreover, recurring stories have their own generic patterns that operate in many ways as an implicit equivalent of law-like generalizations. For example, we will see how Pakistan and India emplot the events of 1947 in different ways, while using very similar ("heroic") genre structures. Such emplotment has consequences even without abstract generalizations.

Some Basic Principles of Emplotment

The importance of narrative has not been ignored in the literature on Kashmir. However, the terms of the discussion have often been left far too vague. Indeed, the point holds for the general relation between nationalism and narrative, as in Homi Bhabha's famous collection *Nation and Narration*. Bhabha's volume stresses the intertwining of the two concepts in the title, but does little to clarify the nature of that interrelation. The problem arises not only in literary theory (such as Bhabha's collection), but in political psychology as well. For instance, Ronald Fisher, Herbert Kelman, and Susan Nan stress the importance of "each group's national narrative" (500), but do little to clarify what constitutes such a narrative. Daniel Bar-Tal and Eran Halperin note that intractable conflicts "are organized around narratives" that have specific

functions—justifying the origin of the conflict, elevating the in-group, and delegitimizing and blaming the opponent. This list is significant and valuable. Yet it does not indicate how narratives themselves operate to satisfy these desiderata, or what the relevant narrative patterns are.

In the case of Kashmir, this common lack of theoretical precision is illustrated by Chitralekha Zutshi's contention that "political solutions to the 'Kashmir problem' will be abortive until nationalist narratives—Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri—that are primarily responsible for its intractability, are dismantled" (332). Zutshi has written a highly scholarly and very insightful book. Moreover, I obviously agree that emplotment is very important in understanding colonialism in general and the Kashmir crisis in particular. However, the idea of narrative here remains excessively vague. As such, it not only fails to further our understanding of the situation but may also actually inhibit subsequent analysis. There are distinguishing characteristics of emplotment and specifiable types of emplotment, and these are deeply important. Of course, the historical and cultural conditions in any particular case serve to specify and in some cases alter those types of emplotment. Thus, in the case of Kashmir, the social context uniquely determines the particularity of emplotments. But to have any sense of that particularity, we need to comprehend the general principles—just as we need to know the general laws of physics before we make claims about the particular events occurring in a specific context. In short, we need to set out what the distinguishing characteristics and relevant types of narrative are if our claims about emplotment and nationalism or colonialism are to have any explanatory value.[5]

In keeping with this, one main concern of the following pages is to develop the account of cross-cultural modes of emplotment outlined in my earlier works, *The Mind and Its Stories*, *Affective Narratology*, *Understanding Nationalism*, and elsewhere. That account draws on findings of cognitive and affective science and social psychology as well as a range of literary narratives from different western and eastern, northern and southern traditions. On the other hand, in developing that account, the following analyses do not simply repeat and respecify the general principles from those earlier works. They challenge and revise those principles—for example, by considering cases in which traumatic

events deform standard narrative structures. In short, an examination of narrative and Kashmir should enrich our understanding of both topics. Indeed, given the peculiar status of Kashmir in the history of colonialism and anticolonialism, it should be especially consequential for our understanding of what is sometimes called "postcolonial narrativity."

At a very basic level, a story is any particular causal sequence, usually a sequence defined by an agent's goal pursuit and obstacles to that pursuit. In itself, this may seem trivial. But it already tells us that stories are inseparable from emotion. Emotions are what define goals. We pursue goals because they will satisfy the desires associated with particular emotion systems. More exactly, we commonly use "desire" to refer to a specific sort of longing—the longing for sexual relations. In that case, we are actually referring to the desire associated with the goals of the sexual system. Similarly, if one desires to eat, one desires the goal of the motivation system of hunger. A desired goal of the attachment system is proximity to the attachment object, and so on. Needless to say, particular goals differ for particular people (e.g., not everyone loves the same person, fortunately). Which goals are prominent at any given time is a function of biological, contextual, and other matters (e.g., eating is an important goal when blood sugar and other factors promote a feeling of hunger). However, the general types of goal people can have are determined by the emotion systems, which are of the same sorts in almost all people. One person's attachment system will differ from another's in, say, degree of attachment security, but virtually everyone will have an attachment system and presumably no one has some wholly idiosyncratic emotion system.

This is, then, already a good case of the ways in which there may be great individual diversity and great diversity in situation, but still important, isolatable patterns. These patterns become more evident when we look further at the ways in which emotion systems guide story formation. As I have argued in *The Mind and Its Stories*, *Affective Narratology*, and elsewhere, there are story genres that recur across unrelated narrative traditions. Most important, the more prominent or "major" genres are romantic, heroic, and sacrificial. But there are also less pervasive or "minor" genres of family reunion, revenge, criminal investigation,

and seduction. All these genres are produced by the desires and goals associated with particular emotion systems.

The romantic genre is produced by the goals of the attachment and sexual systems (which conjointly define romantic love). The heroic genre is produced by the motivation system that governs the desire for dominance—the "will to power," in Friedrich Nietzsche's terminology, "pride" in more ordinary speech—along with anger at threats to dominance. The sacrificial genre is produced by the desire to satisfy hunger and the desire for, roughly, forgiveness (the desire bearing on the feeling of guilt) or the eradication of shame. In each case, the details of the genre are produced by other emotional (and to a lesser extent cognitive) factors. Specifically, stories are generally more appealing to the extent that they intensify the emotional outcome. That intensification is most likely to occur when there is a significant and sharp change in the condition of the protagonist. In comedy, that is a change from near certain loss of the desired goal or state to possession of that state. For instance, the impact of lovers' marriage is stronger if it is preceded by the apparent separation of the lovers (e.g., through death) than if everything proceeds smoothly. In a heroic plot, the hero's (rightful) domination is most rewarding when it is preceded by his or her apparent defeat. Thus, standard romantic and heroic genres involve, respectively, separation of the lovers before their reunion and defeat of the hero prior to his or her enduring triumph. Moreover, there are emotional aspects of our relation to space and time that affect the development of story structures. These lead to such motifs as exile (bearing on the relation to space).

These cross-cultural genres are, like many other cognitive structures, defined by prototypes, not strict necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus the romantic structure prototypically involves two lovers who encounter obstacles due to social interference, commonly from parents. The attribution of the interference to parents is due both to the real occurrence of parental interference in life and to the emotional intensification of conflict by placing it between attachment figures. These prototypical properties need not all be present in any given case. Indeed, they can be significantly and systematically violated in particular cases. Moreover, prototypes are context sensitive,[6] so that what constitutes a prototypical case will change somewhat in different contexts. Our prototype for a romantic comedy in the context "Elizabethan the-

ater" is not precisely the same as our prototype for romantic comedy in the context "Bollywood cinema."

To a great extent, it appears that prototypes are a function of instances or "exempla." We have more or less detailed, more or less complete, more or less salient memories of many particular stories. Those memories converge on certain features, producing a pattern. Thus, many instances of interfering parents make the feature of parental interference important in the prototype of romantic narrative. However, changes in context may change the configuration of those memories. Moreover, in different contexts—for example, in different traditions—some particular exempla may have far greater force than others. In the English tradition, William Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*, and perhaps a few other works have disproportionate weight in defining our romantic prototypes. In the Indian tradition, it happens that these works are important as well. In addition, there are Indian works, such as the *Rāmāyaṇa* that are of central importance. In a given context, the *Rāmāyaṇa* paradigm may be particularly activated, skewing one's prototype further in that direction.

Individual works also figure importantly in nationalist emplotments. The specific case of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is particularly germane to our present concerns as it is the paradigm for emplotting India's relations with its military enemies. In keeping with this, it is not only a romantic story but also a heroic story. As we will see, Ratnam's film *Roja* uses this paradigm to emplot the relations of Kashmiri militants to India and to foster a particular emotional response to those militants.

The narrative importance of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is most obviously consequential for our understanding of Indian nationalism and its relation to the Kashmir situation. But it is no less consequential for narrative theory. Narrative theory has been fairly pervasively Eurocentric (on the Eurocentrism of mainstream literary theory, see my "Ethnocentrism," and discussion in Krishnaswamy). That is predictable and even unobjectionable in the early stages of theoretical development. After all, narrative theorists necessarily discussed the works with which they were familiar. However, if we wish to develop narrative theory that is not parochial, it is necessary to broaden the scope of our studies. The following study of Kashmir part of such an undertaking.

Some Basic Principles of Identity

As the preceding reference to Kashmiri militants suggests, not all aspects of emotion and emplotment concern individuals as individuals. Indeed, there is a social division of individuals that is prior to our consideration of them as individuals and that is central to both emotional response and emplotment, including the definition of genres. This is the division between in-group and out-group, a division based on identity categories. Identity categories are, first of all, simple labels for groups along with some sort of minimal inclusion criterion that defines who is part of which group—or, more often, some sort of pragmatic identification marker that allows one to recognize who is a member of which group. An identity division produces in-group preferences. Thus in-group members tend to evaluate their fellow in-group members more positively than out-group members on a range of measures. They tend to wish for the in-group to receive greater rewards than the out-group, in some cases even if that reduces their own absolute level of reward (that is, even if both groups would be better off if they received equal rewards [Duckitt 85]). We may see such preferences as a matter of pride in a broad sense—in this case, group pride rather than individual pride.

The in-group/out-group division applies to such persistent social categories as sex, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and nationality. But the effects of identity categorization can be produced even by ad hoc, blatantly arbitrary, and ephemeral categorizations. For example, research has shown that the same evaluations and reward preferences may be produced simply by dividing strangers into two groups in an overtly random way (see Hirschfeld 1 and Duckitt 68–69). The important point here is that identity categories are easy to form. Moreover, they are changeable. At one point, one identity category may be definitive; at another time, this may shift to a second identity category. Thus Iqbal may at one time define himself as Indian, at another time as Kashmiri, at another time as Muslim, at another time as Ṣūfī, at another time as a Kulgam villager. The point is directly relevant to the case of Kashmir. Here, as elsewhere, no particular set of identity categorizations has some sort of natural priority. For example, the categories Hindu and Muslim may seem to be the key subnational categories in India—and, arguably, they are. But that is a contingent, not a necessary fact. The

point is illustrated by the fact that "Sunni-Shia riots were far more common in British India than Hindu-Muslim ones" (Jha xi).

In *Understanding Nationalism* I argued that there are specifiable variables that govern the hierarchization of identity categories, and thus which ones are more important or consequential either generally or at a particular time for a particular person. Those variables include salience (continual or contextual), functionality (e.g., consequentiality in law), durability (i.e., difficulty—perhaps impossibility—of change), minimal opposability (i.e., opposition to one or two out-group identities, rather than many), and affectivity (i.e., involvement of motivation systems).[7] For example, in the United States, race is likely to be more important than state residency since it is often salient (linked with skin color), enduring (one can change state residency, but not race), minimally opposable (in the United States, at least for many people, a basic racial opposition is white/nonwhite, whereas there are forty-nine other states where one can reside), and so on.

A key feature of in-group/out-group divisions is that they systematically affect our emotional responses to people. For example, Lawrence Barsalou cites research showing that, "As participants view the faces of people from in-groups, their own faces adopt positive expressions; as participants view people from out-groups, their faces adopt negative expressions" (252). Susan Fiske, Lasana Harris, and Amy Cuddy explain that "Categorization of people as interchangeable members of an out-group promotes an amygdala response characteristic of vigilance and alarm and an insula response characteristic of disgust or arousal" (1482–83).

Indeed, we may conceive of identity divisions as, fundamentally, a matter of emotional orientation. That emotional orientation may be understood in two ways. First, it may be seen as bearing on trust. Research on racial identification and response indicates what might be called "trust habituation" occurs with in-group members, but not with out-group members. Our first response to strangers is mild fear or alarm. However, with repeated exposure to unfamiliar in-group members, that fear response dissipates. That does not occur with out-group members (at least for ethnic in- and out-groups; see Oatley, *Emotions* 73). What may be going on here is that strangers evoke fear while in-group members evoke mild trust. These produce ambivalence in response to in-group

strangers, with the fear initially inhibiting the trust, in a manner we would anticipate for evolutionary reasons. (To protect against threat, we would expect avoidance emotions to be somewhat stronger than affiliative or approach emotions, other things being equal.) Repeated exposure to in-group strangers thus operates on a prior ambivalence that already includes an element of trust. In contrast, response to out-group strangers may begin in a less dynamically complex and unstable state. Something along these lines may be suggested by research showing that white test subjects judge a videotaped nudge from a black person to a white person as aggressive, but not the reverse (Kunda 347). This at least appears to suggest an initial emotional orientation of trust of the in-group member and distrust of the out-group member, though there are other possible explanations.

A second way of thinking about emotion and identity categorization is in terms of parallel versus complementary emotional responses. When we perceive someone's emotion, we may have one of three reactions. We may have no emotional response; we may share the person's emotion (parallel); or we may have a different, in some degree contradictory, response (complementary). As Michael Gazzaniga points out, we are more likely to "mimic" or have a parallel response to the negative emotions of in-group members than to those of out-group members (*Who's in Charge?* 164; see also Keestra 237 and citations). Thus, when a fellow in-group member is sad, I may mirror his or her sorrow; this is far less likely with an out-group member. More important, there is research that shows test subjects experienced stronger empathic pain (specifically, anterior insula activation) when they witnessed in-group members receive painful shocks than when they witnessed out-group members in the same situation; moreover, reward system activation was found among some subjects faced with members of a rival out-group receiving those shocks, suggesting schadenfreude at the pain of out-group members (see Hein et al. 155; see also Klimecki and Singer 542). In other words, the response to in-group members was more parallel and that to out-group members often more complementary. It seems likely that the point is generalizable. In other words, it seems likely that, in real situations and depending on the emotion at issue, one's response to out-group members' emotions would frequently be complementary. Consider anger directed at a third party (thus not at

the observer). Depending on the situation, it may be that, other things being equal, a white observer has a greater tendency to share the anger of a white target but to feel fear in response to the anger of a black target.

Either difference in trust or in parallelism/complementarity may, in turn, be a function of perspective taking through simulation, at least in part. Simulation is one's imaginative tracing out of possible trajectories of events, including mental events, such as how someone else might feel if one makes a particular comment or engages in a particular action. Simulation crucially includes one's imaginative adoption of other people's point of view, a subjective envisioning of their experiences, intentions, and interests; it involves a degree of subjective assimilation into that point of view that is absent in mere inference. (On the difference between simulation and inference in understanding other people's mental states, see, for example, Gazzaniga, *Ethical* 173–78.) Identity categories may orient one's spontaneous simulation such that one implicitly adopts the point of view of an in-group member. Jennifer Gutsell and Michael Inzlicht report that "a spontaneous and implicit simulation of others' action states may be limited to close others and, without active effort, may not be available for outgroups" (841). Generalizing the point from action to attitude, we would expect white observers to experience distrust and complementary emotion at a black person's anger toward a white person, but trust and parallel anger at a white person's anger toward a black person. In the case of the shove experiment, the observer's action-related simulation—and thus his or her own emotional response—would vary depending on whether he or she adopted the perspective of the shover or the shovee. Another way of putting the same point is that in-group identification fosters empathy (thus simulative perspective taking and emotional parallelism), while out-grouping tends to inhibit empathy.

It is important to stress that identity categorizations are individual. I may respond to a particular female professor primarily as a professor (thus, an in-group member) or as female (thus, an out-group member). Moreover, I may respond to different people according to different categorial definitions—one as black, one as female, one as a professor (for three black, female professors). In addition, different people in my department may employ different categorial definitions than I do in specific

cases (e.g., for one colleague the female professor in question may be categorized first of all as Catholic). Beyond this, our individual relations include individuating information, which often supersedes identity categorization (see Holland et al. 219, 221). Thus in-group/out-group emotional complementarity is not a matter of some objective categorization, but of individual response.

On the other hand, this is not to say that our analyses must remain confined to individuals. Individuals form intricate, dynamic, and disparate interrelations or networks that we may examine as complex systems, thus as forms of "collective behaviour" that "cannot be predicted by looking at the single elements" in isolation (Caldarelli and Catanzaro 2). This leads us to a final main component of the following analyses (though again this will be a much more restricted topic in the following pages). For our purposes, a crucial law governing many complex systems is that changes introduced into the system may result in a limited number of specifiable states. For example, in particular conditions, water shifts from liquid to steam. The motion of particular water molecules will vary in the liquid state and in the gaseous state. But, for a certain range of conditions, any sample of water will be in one state or the other. These are the only "stable states" available (see Ball 85). We can think of the aligning of identity categorization in similar terms. When factors of salience, functionality, affectivity, perceived durability, and opposability are right, then the diversity of identity responses may converge across individuals. Thus the "phase space" of possible stable states for groups in India always includes Hindu and Muslim categorization. In ordinary circumstances, that categorization is local and temporary, affecting some people's emotions and actions at some times and other people's at other times (as the motion of water molecules will vary individually). However, given the right conditions, it may become the predominant categorization—leading to, for example, Hindu-Muslim riots.

Genre

Of course, identity-based conflict is not simply a matter of spontaneous emotional response based on a contingent alignment of categorization tendencies within a particular group. It is sustained both by causal understandings of particular past events and by simulations of possible

future trajectories. Again, these typically take the form of emplotments, often in the major, cross-cultural genres, which themselves centrally involve in-group/out-group divisions. This is most obvious in the heroic genre. This genre (prototypically) has two components—a usurpation component and an invasion component. The usurpation component concerns the hierarchy of authority within the in-group society (e.g., who should lead the group). It treats an illegitimate—and often temporarily successful—challenge to that hierarchy. The invasion component portrays a threat to the in-group society from some out-group—prototypically, a (temporarily successful) military invasion. Since the usurper is often allied with the invader, even he or she is often linked with in-group/out-group divisions. Note that the heroic narrative treats invasion or usurpation as an absolute origin, for which the opponent is to be blamed. This is how the heroic emplotment satisfies the functions of justifying the conflict and delegitimizing and blaming the out-group, as mentioned by Bar-Tal and Halperin. The correlated elevation of the in-group is treated in various ways, prominently including the common association of the in-group with divine preference (see Hogan, *Understanding Nationalism*, 118–23).

The sacrificial genre concerns some sin committed by the in-group or a representative of it (e.g., a ruler) and the punishment visited upon the group for that sin. The punishment commonly requires a sacrifice to atone for the guilt. In-group/out-group relations often enter into the sacrificial plot by way of a tempter figure who seduces the group or representative into sin. This figure is often from an out-group. Moreover, the sacrificial narrative comes in two versions. In one (the "penitential" version), the sacrificial victim is an innocent member of the in-group society. In the other (the "purgative" version), however, the victim or victims are the guilty parties, prominently the out-group tempter. Finally, in the romantic narrative, the obstacles to the lovers' union often result from their division into different identity groups (e.g., different social classes). This may be resolved by discounting the identity group division or by discovering that the lovers are not really members of different identity groups after all.

Clearly, emplotment and genres bear on literary and cinematic fictions. In *Understanding Nationalism*, I have argued that they bear crucially on the imagination and understanding of history, policy, and

other social phenomena, prominently nationalism, as well. Thus many Indians and some Kashmiris tacitly take up the heroic genre to structure the events of 1947 in Kashmir, construing them as an alien (Pakistani) invasion of a sovereign nation (Kashmir; see, for example, Jha 2–3 on the Indian emplotment). Many Pakistanis and Kashmiris take up the same structure to emplot the broader history of Kashmir as a usurpation of the nation by British colonialists and (non-Kashmiri) Dogra maharajas. In this emplotment, the "invasion" is construed as a revolt against the illegitimate rule of the then-current maharaja. A complex case of heroic emplotment may be found in a speech to the United Nations Security Council in February 1948 by the preeminent Kashmiri political leader, Sheikh Abdullah. In keeping with his role as a member of the Indian government, Abdullah stressed the invasion/defense scenario (see, for example, his reference to "tribesmen from across the border . . . pour[ing] into my country" [17]) and the associated usurpation ("revolt . . . against the lawful authority" [17]). The complexity comes from the fact that, in keeping with his role as a nationalist leader, he also suggests that there was an earlier usurpation, which established the maharaja.

In each of these cases, the genre allows a degree of flexibility in the precise construal of events—thus, Pakistanis can emplot events one way and Indians another, despite taking up the same structure. In consequence, we see that the genre does not simply determine the story. Rather, the genre may be accommodated to at least some basic historical facts as well as ideological presuppositions. However, the genre is highly selective in which facts it acknowledges, the ways it construes those facts, and the manner in which it interrelates the facts. In consequence, the plot structure on its own leads to sometimes severe distortions in the ways that causal sequences are defined and in the ways that the resulting stories foster emotions. One distortive aspect of the heroic emplotment of 1947 is its reliance on individual heroes and villains. A still more distortive aspect is its appeal to identity categories and its linking of heroes and villains with in-groups and out-groups.

As the narratives of 1947 suggest, the heroic structure has a special place in nationalist emplotment. Specifically, that structure directly treats *national* identity categories, since it concerns an in-group society with a structure of authority (a state) and an associated land—

distinguishing features of a nationalist in-group. Moreover, it systematically enhances affectivity in ideologically functional ways. In the invasion plot it draws on and intensifies fear and distrust responses to out-group members, thus producing a stronger overall emotional effect. In its usurpation sequence, it often fosters moral disgust at in-group betrayal. In its characterization of in-group perseverance and eventual triumph, it cultivates national pride. For these reasons, the heroic genre is commonly the default genre for construing national belonging and national relations. The heroic genre—and specific paradigms for that genre, such as the Indian *Rāmāyaṇa*—provide structures for understanding the past (e.g., for construing the 1947 events as an invasion), for understanding oneself and one's enemy (e.g., seeing Pakistanis as *rākṣasas*, or demons, drawing on the *Rāmāyaṇa* model), and for simulating the future (e.g., in imagining military defeat of the enemy; the heroic genre does not typically celebrate negotiated settlements, for example).

However, as already noted, current conditions alter just what cognitive structures are dominant and when. The point holds not only for identity categories but for emplotments of any given category. For example, when internal divisions within an in-group are more salient than in-group/out-group divisions, the romantic genre may become prominent. Specifically, it is common for writers to use the romantic genre to present false internal divisions (e.g., in civil war) as separating lovers. A Kashmir-related case may be found in Shoojit Sircar's 2005 film . . . *Yahaan* (. . . Here), in which a Kashmiri woman and an Indian soldier fall in love. In works of this sort, the lovers often stand in allegorical relation to the different subnational groups whose divisions prevent national unity.[8] (This is the one use of a standard genre that has been recognized in the scholarship; see Sommer.)

The third, sacrificial genre comes into play when a heroic emplotment no longer seems possible. The national in-group has been devastated and is not in a position to defeat the out-group or restore legitimate authority by the usual heroic means. In this context, there is often a sense that the in-group is suffering for some past sin or sins. Sacrificial emplotment suggests that a sacrifice is required to alleviate that guilt. Again, the sacrifice may involve an innocent victim, an out-group seducer, or both. In a nationalist context, it is unsurprising that the

sacrificial genre would be combined with the heroic genre, yielding sacrifice in battle. This scenario fits nonstate militancy well and, in the case of Kashmir, converges with Islamic ideas of jihād and martyrdom. Specifically, in Islamic theology, Muslims are called upon to bear witness for the faith. In some cases, they may be faced with a *fitnah*, or obstacle to witnessing (see Maulana Muhammad Ali 81n241). This trial requires struggle, or jihād. In some (highly prototypical) cases, the struggle may be a military struggle against an infidel opposing Islam or harming the community, thus a form of heroic conflict. That jihād may lead to the death of the *mujāhid*, or one who struggles. Death in the service of jihād makes one a *shahīd*, a witness or martyr, and thus a sacrificial victim—prototypically, a sacrificial victim whose sacrifice has been integrated into an encompassing heroic structure. In keeping with the principles of situated cognition, one would expect that some Muslim nationalists facing a far more powerful military force would emplot their activism in terms that combine nationalist sacrificial structure with religious sacrificial structures. One possible result of this in asymmetrical conflicts (such as that in Kashmir) is the cult of the *shahīd*, particularly among Islamist militants.[9] (Of course, here too there are complications as the celebration of the *shahīd* may be more a matter of rhetoric than of actual understanding and emotional response. For example, it is commonly the case that the leaders who most vociferously advocate self-sacrifice do not engage in that self-sacrifice themselves.)

Revenge, criminal investigation, and other minor genres are likely to find their way into nationalist emplotments of the Kashmir situation as well. These genres do not usually have the same overarching, structural function. They tend to bear more on particular events and conditions. Thus, revenge turns up frequently as a personal motive in Kashmir terrorism films. Moreover, the usual prototype is altered so that the target of the revenge is typically not the person who committed the initial atrocity but instead some other members of the same identity group. Narratives of this sort are certainly not something we should dismiss. Part of the Kashmir problem is precisely a matter of cycles of category-based (as opposed to personal) revenge. Thus, we will consider work of this sort in the following chapters. Moreover, there are some cases of broader, nationalist emplotment involving minor genres, as we will see.

Categorial Identity and Pseudo-Identity

To recapitulate, the following analyses will stress emotion systems, the integration of emotion systems with emplotment, the centrality of identity categorization to both emplotment and emotion (particularly in defining an emotional orientation to others as parallel or complementary), the guidance of the emplotment of nationalism by major genres, and the more localized organization of relevant stories by the minor genres. There will also be some use of systems theory and recurrence to principles of situated cognition, primarily to soften excessive rigidity in the account of emotional or narrative structures.

The primary identity categories at issue will be Kashmiri/Indian (which may involve a secondary opposition of Kashmiri/Pakistani), Pakistani/Indian (in which Kashmiris may class themselves in either category), and Hindu/Muslim. Ancillary categories will of course enter as well, particularly gender categories, which significantly inflect other identity categories. For example, as we will see in *Roja*, female Muslims are represented very differently from male Muslims in mainstream Indian ideology. The suggestion is that the opposition between Indian and Kashmiri is really an opposition between Indian plus female Kashmiri versus male (and Muslim) Kashmiri. (The point is in keeping with observations on gender and political psychology, such as "evidence supporting the . . . hypothesis that . . . discrimination against out-group males tends to be significantly more common than . . . discrimination against out-group females" [Sidanius and Kurzban 224], though this hypothesis probably simplifies the situation by failing to adequately distinguish different types of discrimination.)

In some cases, identity categorizations are self-consciously elaborated in the discourse surrounding Kashmiri nationalism or Indian or Pakistani colonialism, though it is sometimes difficult to tell if these self-conscious elaborations have significant motivational or cognitive consequences. For example, the idea of *Kashmiriyat*, or Kashmiriness, is certainly important in discussions of Kashmiri nationalism. It establishes an in-group of inclusive, anticommunal Kashmiris, opposing that in-group to exclusive, communalist groups—Indian, Pakistani, or Kashmiri. Undoubtedly many Kashmiris, both Muslim and Hindu, wish to think of themselves as proponents of *Kashmiriyat*. However, it is far

from clear that this is a truly functional identity category. It may operate far more in people's self-understanding than in their actual motivation and cognition. People today like to think of themselves as antiracist or, in the South Asian context, anticommunalist. That does not mean that antiracism or anticommunalism really has much of an effect on their identity categorizations and their consequent thought and action. Put differently, they may be rationalizing pseudo-identity categories—or simply advertising themselves as anticommunalist. For example, Praveen Swami's overview indicates that religious identity was central to Kashmiri nationalism from the beginning, even in its supposedly secular versions. Indeed, Swami argues convincingly that "competitive communalism" (131) or "competitive religious chauvinism" (146) has been a recurring feature of Kashmiri electoral politics. Competitive communalism occurs when a putatively secular leader or party makes appeals to communal sentiments in order to draw the electorate away from an explicitly religious competitor.

A mixed case may be found in the identity group division between Ṣūfī Islam and Orthodox Islam. This is a real and motivationally consequential division for actual practitioners of Ṣūfīsm, as well as the genuinely orthodox. Part of the discourse of *Kashmiriyat* is the celebration of encompassing Ṣūfī tolerance and nondiscrimination between Muslims and Hindus. However, it is not always clear that the people who claim Ṣūfī spirituality are genuinely animated by Ṣūfī identifications. As with *Kashmiriyat*, it seems to be less a functional identity category for most people and more a pleasing self-representation. Though it is only anecdotal, I may illustrate the point from personal experience. In discussing mystical poetry with Kashmiri Muslim academics, I have often found them anxious to assert their own noncommunalist Ṣūfīsm. When we turn to Lal Ded—generally seen as the great poet of Kashmiri Hindu mysticism (thus, non-dualistic Śaivism)—some of these Ṣūfī opponents of communal distinctions are insistent that Lal Ded was really Muslim. In other words, they want to claim her for their own in-group and deny her to the Hindu out-group.

Identity and Emotion

As already noted, the main narrative genres at issue in nationalism are heroic, sacrificial, and romantic, with some importance of revenge, as

well as criminal investigation, seduction, and family separation and reunion. The emotions associated with the major and minor genres—particularly the pride that guides the heroic plot, as well as the hatred that drives the revenge plot—are certainly important for understanding the Kashmir situation. However, perhaps the most politically significant emotion is the negation of pride in shame and humiliation. Wajahat Habibullah, a former government official in Kashmir, sees humiliation as a central concern in Kashmiri politics. He goes so far as to state that "It has been clear to me from early on that resolution in Kashmir could come only with the restoration of Kashmiris' dignity" (30), which is to say the restoration of their pride that has been battered by humiliation and consequent shame.

Shame and humiliation are crucial for understanding the disturbed pride of militants and the emotional reasons for a sense of hopelessness leading to a sacrificial emplotment of nationalism—as well as the despair that is often part of a willingness to sacrifice one's own life. (See Stern 32–62 on the centrality of humiliation to terrorism generally and suicide bombing—a clearly sacrificial act—in particular.) Shame and humiliation spark bouts of rage and may drive revenge as much as the loss of loved ones. Following James Gilligan, Julian Walker and Victoria Knauer argue that "humiliation and shame are the core trigger and vulnerability for violence" (725; on some evidence, as well as complications, see Scheff). Revenge for humiliation is not confined to the individuals responsible, but is readily extended to identity groups—including vulnerable minorities, as in racist violence (on shame, rage, and racist violence, see Ray, Smith, and Wastell; the point will have particular bearing on the mistreatment of the Hindu minority in Kashmir by some members of the majority community).

Humiliation is a recurring result of the severe distortion of human relations in Kashmir, which has been turned into a sort of prison, with a massive security apparatus that dwarfs that of any actual prison. The humiliating disdain is just what we would expect in what is in effect a statewide version of Philip Zimbardo's famous Stanford Prison Experiment. In that study, one group of students became cruel when assigned the role of prison guards, shaming the students who were assigned the roles of prisoners (see Zimbardo 189). Humiliation is almost continual in the cordon and search operations, where ordinary people are ordered

out of their homes and forced to pass before concealed informants for possible denunciation, the scarring torture, sexual molestation, or rape, causing the necessity of repeatedly adopting a meek and pleading attitude toward officers who have absolute authority to decide one's fate even without evidence of any malfeasance. Kazi quotes one member of Kashmir's State Human Rights Commission, who says straightforwardly, "The military want to use the situation to humiliate us" (103). She also quotes two women, raped by the security forces, who assert that they wish to die, unable to "live this life of shame" (184n70). Sadly, their case is far from unusual.

Humiliation is not significant only for the person humiliated but for those who witness or learn about the humiliation. In other words, both egocentric and empathic humiliation and shame are important. Here as with other emotions, empathic response appears to be intensified by an attachment relation. Thus it is distressing to see anyone humiliated, particularly anyone from an in-group. However, it is profoundly disturbing and potentially enraging to see an attachment figure humiliated. Moreover, the rage may be bound up with terrible feelings of guilt as well—prominently guilt over being unable to protect the attachment figure. These points suggest that that conditions of pervasive and intense humiliation are likely to give rise to sacrificial emplotments of nationalism for at least three reasons. First, they suggest the hopelessness of heroic struggle while intensifying the anger that is an important contributory emotion for heroic plots and thus a strong motivation for such struggle. Second, they promote feelings of guilt, which are central to the sacrificial genre. Finally, the feelings of hopelessness and guilt can foster a suicidal despair that may lead individuals to sacrifice themselves, particularly in a context where such a sacrifice is socially approved for religious or other reasons. (On the suicidal inclinations of suicide bombers, see Lankford.[10])

Shame is, of course, an emotion felt by the victims of colonial denigration. It is produced by the humiliating actions of the colonizers and their military representatives. But what about the feelings of the colonizers themselves? What prevents empathy in the case of Indian soldiers humiliating Kashmiris, not to mention causing them terrible pain, both physical and psychological? Clearly, there is inhibition of empathy from ordinary processes of out-grouping and the consequent emotional

orientation toward complementarity. But this is not entirely adequate. First of all, as Grit Hein and colleagues note, empathic responses still occur for out-group members. Moreover, reward system activation, and thus schadenfreude, is not inevitable; it is not found uniformly for test subjects in response to out-group suffering.

There are presumably several factors operating here. For example, in chapter 1 we will consider the role of moral rationalization in stifling empathy. But perhaps the most important factors concern the inhibitory operation of emotion systems. Mild alarm or anxiety will tend to inhibit one's empathy with a target, and presumably that is what one feels toward most out-group members. However, an even fuller suppression of empathy may come through the activation of disgust. As Gazzaniga points out, neurological research shows that medial prefrontal cortex is activated "in social encounters." However, this area does not respond when faced with people who are objects of disgust (*Who's in Charge?* 204). The suggestion of this research is that disgust does more than simply inhibit empathy. It in effect removes the target of disgust entirely from human response. (The connection is discussed at length by Harris and Fiske; see also Nussbaum 347–49).[11]

This disgust is undoubtedly a component of the Indian military response to Kashmiri Muslims. In Europe, the most notorious case of such disgust was anti-Semitism. That disgust was related to the obsession with Jewish circumcision. In Hindu and Sikh attacks on Muslims, there has been a similar focus on circumcision. (See, for example, Bhatt's report on attacks against Muslims in India—"There was no certainty that they wouldn't pull down my trousers and check whether I was a Muslim"—or the events in Khushwant Singh's novel on partition violence, where one character asks, "Where on earth except in India would a man's life depend on whether or not his foreskin had been removed?" [164]. Singh clearly intends to suggest a parallel between European anti-Semitism and Hindu and Sikh violence against Muslims.) Of course, the killings go in both directions. Moreover, militants kill not only soldiers but Muslim and Hindu civilians. The Muslim civilians are probably often viewed as having collaborated with the enemy and thus betrayed the in-group. Such putative betrayal is likely to provoke the strongest forms of moral disgust. For example, Stern notes how Jewish extremists rationalize assassination by appeal to the principle that "the most

despicable crime imaginable" is "the betrayal of [one's] fellow Jews" (91). (On the relation between moral and physical disgust, see Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley. The connection between the two is not simply a matter of a common name.) But this betrayal is particularly repulsive because it involves association with an out-group that may themselves be viewed with disgust—Hindus.

Though I have only anecdotal evidence for the point, it seems clear that some Kashmiri Muslims feel disgust for Hindus. This is at least in part because they view Hindu culture—with its erotic temple carvings, phallus worship, and history of erotic writings (most famously, the *Kāma Sūtra*)—as sexually lax and, so to speak, "dirty." To give one illustration, I was recently guest editing a special issue of an academic journal of postcolonial literary studies. The issue (which never appeared) was to be devoted to Kashmir. I received very few submissions. More than one of these made reference to the putatively decadent sexual practices of the valley before the arrival of Islam. One referred to this as sexual "rot" that was cleaned up by the Islamization of Kashmir. I pointed out to the author that this was a standard colonialist stereotype. The subject population appears to be always seen as sexually decadent—hence the supposed "lechery" and "debauchery" of the East examined by Edward Said in *Orientalism* (62) or Arthur Miller's more general observation, "Our opposites are always robed in sexual sin" (373). I also pointed out that such demeaning comments about the ancestral culture of the minority Hindu population had no bearing on the author's argument. He replied that he was just reporting the facts, which had been established by a professor at a Kashmiri university. The disgust—signaled by the label "rot"—was so deep and unself-conscious that the author could not even recognize that this was a highly judgmental comment and not simply an objective report of facts.[12]

Of course, I do not wish to overstate this. Probably the great majority of Kashmiri Muslims do not commonly feel disgust toward Hindus, and the great majority of Hindus and Sikhs do not commonly feel disgust toward Muslims. The point, however, is twofold. First, there probably is a significant minority of both communities who regularly feel disgust toward the other. These are the ones who most readily engage in the brutalization of the out-group. Second, in keeping with the lessons of situated cognition, it is probably the case that many ordinarily non-

hateful people may at one or another time have feelings of disgust toward the relevant out-group. Those periodic and temporary feelings may be adequate to foster acceptance of policies that they would not themselves pursue. For example, many Hindus would never initiate or take part in torture or extrajudicial killing. Nonetheless, their ambivalence and periodic bouts of disgust would be likely to inhibit their active opposition to such practices by Indian security forces, leading them to acquiesce in those practices. The same point holds for Kashmiri Muslims who would not initiate or participate in attacks on Hindus, attacks that led Hindus to flee the valley in terror.[13] They too may find themselves ambivalent enough, and prone enough to bouts of disgust, that they end up acquiescing in the practices.

Practical Identity

It is important to introduce one final theoretical concept before concluding—practical identity. Discussions of identity commonly assume that social, cultural, or religious identity is primarily a matter of beliefs and practices. In fact, as already indicated, empirical research indicates that categorization is the crucial factor in defining in- and out-groups, with all their social and political consequences. But this is not to say that patterns of behavior are absent. Clearly, it is the case that, in any given society, there are routine ways of interacting, common practices in cooperative or competitive behavior. These are sometimes referred to as "participation structures," which is to say "patterns of interaction in which the people in the group coordinate their behaviors as they participate in their joint activity" (Sawyer and Greeno 354). Cases range from driving to language. Members of a given society follow the same rules of the road (e.g., in driving on the appropriate side) and they use words in roughly the same ways. In short, people have internalized principles of social behavior, and those internalized principles enable their interaction with others. Those internalized principles, with particular configurations and idiosyncratic nuances, constitute those people's *practical identities*.

In terms of situated cognition theory, practical identity is what allows cognition to be socially embedded (while of course developing through the interactions of that embedment as well). Contrary to common assumptions, however, practical identity is only partially aligned

with categorial identity. This is true for two reasons. First, practical identity extends across identity categories. For example, in a village in Kashmir, Muslim and Hindu villagers will interact in ways that are widely coordinated across their religious identity divisions. Indeed, there will be relatively few elements of practical identity that are shared by Muslim Kashmiris but are not shared also by Hindu Kashmiris. In other words, if an element of practical identity is shared by Muslim Kashmiris, it will almost certainly be shared by Hindu Kashmiris as well. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that Muslim (or Hindu) practical identities are more similar than, say, the practical identities shared by shopkeepers, teachers, or farmers, whatever their religion. This leads us to the second reason for nonalignment. There are differences of practical identity within identity categories. This is due to the fact that there are different sorts of activity in society. The point is not confined to professions. Any society relies on various divisions of competence and activity, what writers in situated cognition refer to as distributed cognition. Thus, even one identity category includes a range of practical identities that are not uniform but complementary.

Earlier, I linked *Kashmiriyat* with a national identity category. There is another sense of the word also. This is the interleaved sets of practical identity that bind individuals to one another in Kashmiri society. This practical interleaving may be seen as providing a counterweight to categorial divisions. Indeed, research suggests that an effective way of overcoming categorial oppositions is through cooperative work toward common goals in shared tasks (see Duckitt 98, 252, 256). There are several problems with this in the case of Kashmir, however. First, as already noted, much of the violence is perpetrated by non-Kashmiris, soldiers or militants, who are not and have not been part of *Kashmiriyat* practical identity. Second, with respect to Kashmiris themselves, the early conflicts of the militancy, including the assassination of Hindus, have led to the flight of Hindus from the valley, and thus the virtual elimination of *Kashmiriyat* in the sense of cooperative engagement through shared practical identity between Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus. Third, daily life in Kashmir has been so severely disrupted that the practical identity of ordinary people has, arguably, been severely deformed. A quarter century of oppressive military occupation and antigovernment militancy has almost certainly produced routine behaviors

and cognitive and emotional orientations that are guided by fear, shame, and rage, as well as the very real pragmatic concern of avoiding being killed. Due, for example, to extended curfews, cooperative engagement in shared tasks becomes difficult outside of one's own immediate family—or one's military or paramilitary unit. This is part of the well-known fact that violence tends to breed violence. This is not merely the result of cycles of revenge (though that is, of course, important); it is also because, in traumatically violent conditions, practical identity no longer operates as a curb on violence. Indeed, to the contrary, it tends to become involved with violence itself. The consideration of violent options and the commission or expectation of violent actions become part of one's practical identity. Thus it is not only categorial identity, emplotment, and the other factors mentioned above that make the crisis intractable. Routines of practical identity are a crucial part of the problem as well.

A Note on Universalism, Narrative, and Vivek Chibber's Critique of Postcolonial Theory

Several readers of draft manuscripts for the present volume have asked about its relation to Chibber's influential critique of mainstream postcolonial theory. There are some significant connections with Chibber's work. Moreover, I would largely endorse Chibber's arguments and, with some qualifications, his conclusions. But we are largely treating different topics. I share Chibber's dissatisfaction with much current postcolonial theory, including his distress over its deconstructive and related premises. He rightly complains, "Owing in large measure to their roots in poststructuralist theory and its anti-foundationalism, many postcolonial intellectuals have eschewed developing the kind of clearly constructed propositions that would normally accompany a research agenda" (3). More important, I applaud his compelling argument that the claims such theorists do articulate, when clear enough to be evaluated, are often empirically implausible.

For example, Chibber presents a compelling case that some of the most influential writers of the subaltern studies orientation misunderstand the social forces behind the development of political liberalism and democracy in the West. He is no less effective in arguing that these writers have misconstrued the nature of peasant and worker activism

in India. These arguments are important for our purposes because they are consistent with the universalism of the present project. Specifically, some subaltern studies theorists have argued that Indian peasants and workers have an entirely distinct psychology from Western peasants and workers (see chapters 7 and 8 of Chibber for examples). Chibber offers, to my mind, a virtually irrefutable case that there are fundamental psychological continuities across human beings generally—crucially including peasants and workers in different parts of the world. He plausibly, but more controversially, suggests that a "universal narrative of capital" (126) may be applicable to social development across societies.

This brings me to the differences between Chibber's arguments and the analyses in the present volume. First, one might be tempted to associate my references to cross-cultural—alternatively, universal—narrative prototypes with Chibber's references to a "universal narrative." In fact, they are entirely different. My narrative universals are cognitive prototype structures by which we shape our understanding and imagination (or simulation) of events and actions. The universal narrative spoken of by Chibber putatively describes a recurring causal trajectory of events and actions themselves, as they actually occur in the world. The two ideas are not incompatible with one another. However, they are entirely unrelated, except in name.

A second difference is that Chibber appears to accept the view of some subaltern studies writers that we must explain human behavior by reference to reasons that would have been available to the people themselves. In my account, following some common principles of cognitive and social psychology, a person's putative reasons for his or her actions are only more or less good hypotheses about the causes of those actions. (See, for example, Bargh on the "deep and fundamental dissociation between conscious awareness and the mental processes responsible for one's behavior" [560].) In simple cases, one's self-conscious reasons are probably correct. In more complex cases, they are often mere confabulations. In intermediate cases, self-conscious reasons are likely to tell part of the causal story, but in a simplified form.

One such intermediate case comes up with Chibber's important argument that Indian peasants and workers are able to reason about their well-being and act in accordance with that reasoning. This is largely correct. However, the process is not simply one of thinking dispassion-

ately about a topic, then proceeding to act on one's conclusions for purely rational reasons. Rather, it appears that, if action is to result, some emotion system needs to be engaged by the reasoning process, perhaps by way of concrete simulation. By this account, then, a peasant who does not take part in a militant, antilandlord action has not simply reasoned that it is too risky. Rather, he or she has simulated likely outcomes of action and inaction and responded to those simulations emotionally, in part on the basis of his or her prior emotional response to the actual situation. His or her final decision is of course related to the reasoning, but it is motivated by the overall profile of the emotional experience. (For a fuller analysis of motivation along these lines, see Hogan, *What Literature* ch. 2.)

This difference is important in that the more complex and indirect account (presupposed in the following pages) gives greater weight to the sorts of motivation stressed by subaltern studies writers, without their cultural relativism. For example, Partha Chatterjee sees communal relations as crucial for Indian peasants. Chibber is completely convincing in his argument that Chatterjee is simply wrong to discount individual self-interest on the part of Indian peasants. But Chatterjee also appears to be simply wrong in effectively discounting communal relations for European peasants. In both cases—the communal relations of Indian peasants and those of European peasants—we are dealing with identity categories. Once again, a great deal of research indicates that our emotional responses to other people and our cognitive understanding of them is significantly shaped by such categories.

Chibber makes a strong case that, for many Indian workers, communal relations were highly functional (e.g., networks of Muslim workers helped one another). This is important. But he seems to believe that this functionality simply provides the rational reason for communal commitments. It seems much more likely that the functionality he isolates gives the identity category in question (e.g., *Muslim*) greater cognitive and motivational consequence. This seems to better explain the communalism isolated by Chatterjee. Specifically, "available evidence seems to suggest that the crucial element which deflected peasant agitations into anti-Hindu movements was not that most zamindars [landlords] were Hindu . . . but the fact that Muslim rent-receivers . . . were considered part of the community"—thus part of the in-group, defined

by the identity category—"whereas Hindu zamindars . . . were not" (Chatterjee 11). An emotion-based account also helps to explain why *negative* functionality may lead to enhanced categorial identification, as when oppressed minorities become more strongly committed to their minority identity, which may be against their self-interest. Moreover, as already noted, functionality is only one of the factors contributing to enhanced categorial identification (along with saliency, durability, and so forth). Both the complexity of function and the multiplicity of factors in categorial identification will prove important for understanding the situation in Kashmir, which is caused in only limited ways by rational self-interest.

In sum, Chibber's views and mine converge in many ways. We particularly share a strong commitment to universalism, based on empirical evidence. However, we are largely treating different topics. We certainly agree that agents—African, Chinese, European, Indian, and so on—are capable of considering their individual self-interest rationally. Even so, we differ in the way we see that consideration producing motivational effects. The differences are consequential in a case such as that of Kashmir.

An Outline of the Chapters

Salman Rushdie is undoubtedly the most important and influential Kashmiri author today. His novel *Shalimar the Clown* is also the most important fictional work treating the current conflict in the region. In Rushdie's usual manner, the novel is not strictly realistic. First, it contains more or less blatant violations of physical possibility—for example, in Shalimar's magical escape from the California state prison at San Quentin toward the end of the work. More significantly, it in some ways ludicrously misrepresents daily life in Kashmir from its rival cities of cooks and of actors to its ever-dancing young Kashmiri women. Still, there is a larger, more abstract realism about the book that makes it perhaps the most accurate large-scale literary analysis of the situation.

One might contrast Rushdie's in many ways bizarre representation of daily life in Kashmir with the more obviously "authentic" presentation of Mirza Waheed. If one wishes to get a sense of the particulars of daily life in Kashmir over the past twenty-five years, one is better off reading Waheed. But Waheed's novel arguably distorts the larger pic-

ture, for all its veracity in details. As I will discuss in chapter 4, Waheed's presentation seems to have been tailored to a political agenda. Despite Rushdie's well-known political stances (e.g., on the invasion of Afghanistan; see Rushdie, "No"), in *Shalimar the Clown* he seems to be concerned primarily with trying to understand the situation in the valley. This is not to say that his conclusions are always correct. But it is to say that there is an openness and honesty in the larger explanatory design of the work, as well as an insight into the psychology of violence and communalism, that is (I believe) missing from most other writings on Kashmir.

More exactly, treatments of Kashmir tend to suffer from what might be called ideological, solidarity, or theory bias. Indeed, the biases are so severe that it is often difficult to make any sense out of the situation, even to determine just what has happened when—not to mind why it happened or what patterns there are in events and actions. As Ganguly remarks, "In the course of my research, I found that seemingly reliable accounts of specific incidents frequently turned out to be wildly inaccurate and partisan" (xiv–xv). For these reasons, reading about Kashmir is a disheartening experience. When one reads only one or two works on the topic, one feels that one understands the situation quite well. But as one reads more, one's confidence dissipates. Less and less seems well established. Instead of crystallizing and becoming clearer, the shape of things in Kashmir becomes less definite, more jumbled, so that at a certain point one recognizes little more than terror and despair. Eventually a new, highly complex clarity begins to emerge, but one that is itself disheartening since it is so difficult to isolate anyone who is not part brutalizer and part victim, any option that provides hope for resolution.

Ideological bias involves a broad political orientation that guides one's selection, organization, and construal of data. For example, an Indian Congress Party member will portray events in a certain way, different from the way in which an Islamist might portray the same events. Rushdie undoubtedly has his own ideological orientations. But it is far from clear what those are in the course of *Shalimar the Clown*. Perhaps they are multiple and complex enough to balance one another. Thus, Rushdie's ideological (and emotional) opposition to religious fundamentalism led him to distrust the Islamists. At the same time, a suspicion of

nationalist sectarianism (which may have a tendency to create insular "homelands" in the old, apartheid, South African sense [see Rushdie, "Imaginary" 19]) promoted (more limited) skepticism regarding the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Finally, long-standing ideological worries over Hinduizing and centralizing tendencies of the Indian government encouraged a critical attitude toward the Indian position. In other words, Rushdie's various ideological orientations may have had the salutary effect of promoting systematic doubt with respect to all the dominant ideological positions on the conflict. Alternatively, his ideological commitments may have had only limited influence—direct or indirect—on his simulation of the events in the novel. Cognitive scientists distinguish between inference and simulation (see, for example, Doherty 48 on this difference in our understanding of other people's thoughts and emotions). Though separate operations, they usually interact such that our inferences qualify or extend our spontaneous simulations. This is relevant because our inferences are likely to be affected by ideological presuppositions. It is possible that Rushdie's simulative processes are simply more fully autonomous relative to at least the ideological processes of inference.

Rushdie seems relatively free from theoretical bias as well. Historians and political scientists writing on Kashmir tend to have a thesis as to what the central problem is—it is political mobilization without an outlet (Ganguly); it is a response to threatened *Kashmiriyat* (Das 30); it is a function of gendered militarization (Kazi). The authors then commonly select, organize, and construe the situation in Kashmir in such a way as to support their thesis. It is possible that Rushdie, being a novelist rather than a professional historian or political scientist, does not adhere to any particular thesis that he believes will explain the situation in Kashmir.

What I take to be Rushdie's relative lack of ideological or theoretical bias is connected with his broad human sympathy, and thus his relative lack of solidarity bias. Indeed, given the centrality of emotion to human cognition, it seems likely that solidarity bias underlies both ideological and theoretical bias in most cases. Solidarity bias is a particular emotional affiliation for one group in the conflict. As we will see, Ratnam has deep feelings of affection for India. In consequence, he has a strong solidarity bias for those affiliated with the Indian government. Waheed

arguably has particular attachment to Yasin Malik and the JKLF. Unsurprisingly, Muslims often have greater affiliation with Muslims than with Hindus, while Hindus tend to have greater affiliation with Hindus than with Muslims. In consequence, the writings of Kashmiri Hindus often emphasize the suffering of Hindus, with little attention to that of Kashmiri Muslims. Kashmiri Muslims, in turn, often downplay or sometimes entirely deny the plight of Kashmiri Hindus.[14] In contrast, Rushdie has wide-ranging sympathies—with ordinary Muslims and ordinary Hindus, with women and with men, with militants and those who oppose the militancy. This is not to say that his sympathies are indiscriminate or all of equal force. He clearly has greater sympathy for ordinary people than for people with power and authority, more for those who resist violence than for those who engage in it. But even among those with authority and those who engage in violence, he recognizes and develops their humanity in such a way as to foster the reader's empathy. The one exception to this is the Iron Mullah. Modeled on Ayatollah Khomeini, whose legal judgment condemned Rushdie to death, the Iron Mullah is fairly clearly inhuman. However, even here it is interesting that Rushdie does not rely primarily on provoking disgust. He makes the Iron Mullah mechanical, machine-like—a sinister version of the Tin Man from *The Wizard of Oz*—rather than decayed and infectious. Thus he tends to avoid the most deleterious forms of dehumanization even in this case.

In short, I take Rushdie to present the most broadly unbiased and illuminating account of the situation in Kashmir. For this reason, I begin with his novel, using it to present some background on the Kashmir crisis and to provide a general framework for understanding and responding to other works. This is not to say that Rushdie presents the final word on Kashmir. Of course, he does not. But he does provide something tragically rare—a lucid, knowledgeable, rational, and most of all humane point of departure for thinking about the issues involved. Since in my view Rushdie is largely on the right track, it might seem that his novel should be treated last. My reason for placing it first is that readers need to have a sense of the situation in Kashmir in order to evaluate what is going on in the more ideologically biased works. I am therefore in a sense giving part of the ending of the story at the beginning. I am doing that for the usual reasons. A comedy might begin with

the happy ending (e.g., a wedding) and tell the story as a flashback in order to enable the audience's laughter, since they know that potentially tragic events will ultimately work out well. A detective story might begin with the aftermath of the murder, then shift back in time; the details of the murder sensitize the reader to possible clues. The basic idea is the same with putting Rushdie first, in chapter 1: he provides a means of outlining the situation in Kashmir so that the reader can appreciate the propagandistic operation of the works treated in chapter 2.

As this suggests, chapter 2 turns to Indian propaganda works.[15] The organizational principle is roughly, "You just learned what is going on in Kashmir (in chapter 1); now, here is what mainstream outlets falsely claim is going on there." Specifically, chapter 2 considers the use of heroic and romantic emplotments to treat the Kashmir situation in such a way as to support the Indian government position. The first is J. P. Dutta's film *L.O.C.: Kargil*, a straightforward invasion narrative that dwells on the heroic feats of Indian soldiers against a dehumanized Pakistani enemy. In this emplotment, the Kashmir problem is simply an instance of the (heroic) conflict between India and Pakistan. In its unproblematized way, the film presents the killing of out-group members (Pakistanis) as something to celebrate, without any sense of empathic mirroring.[16] The second film, *Roja*, has a romantic plot and operates very differently. Like many other nationalist uses of the romantic plot, it frames this subnational conflict in terms of the separation and reunion of lovers. It also presents killing as wrong. In that respect, it is actually a highly progressive film, particularly in an Indian context in which violence in the service of the Indian state is widely celebrated. However, it presents such a grossly distorted version of the actual events in the valley that it verges on parody. For example, while killing is clearly wrong in the film, it is only the militants who engage in it. Indian soldiers kill no one in the course of the film—in gross contradiction with the actual situation in the valley.

These two films begin to mark out the "problematic" or limits of mainstream Indian imaginations of the Kashmir issue—the hawk and dove positions, the "hard-line" and liberal alternatives as these stood early in the conflict. Since one of the referees of the manuscript for the present volume found this point difficult to follow, it is worth dwelling on briefly. It is common for colonialist ideology to maintain partially

contradictory alternatives. One tends to be more punitive; the other is commonly more humanitarian. They are often elaborated by means of different forms of emplotment—such as the heroic and romantic genres. Those alternatives mark out the limits of mainstream debate and are crucially important for the cognitive and emotional organization of colonial ideology. These two films are influential representatives of the two main alternatives in mainstream Indian colonial ideology regarding Kashmir.

Again, they develop these alternatives through prototype-based emplotments. The same referee found it difficult to understand precisely what that means. To recapitulate (in slightly different terms from those presented above), we understand and respond to the world through our experience and imagination—or, more technically, simulation—of causal sequences bearing on goals and emotional responses to goal pursuit. These goal-related causal sequences are not imagined or simulated from scratch; they are guided in part by cognitive and emotional structures—crucially, narrative structures. The most consequential of these narrative structures are the prototypical genres (here, heroic and romantic) that imply and elaborate quite different social relations—in this case, bearing on colonialism and consistent with hawk and dove alternatives, respectively.

Chapter 2 concludes by briefly considering two other emplotments of the Kashmir situation in terms of the revenge and criminal investigation genres. These narratives reveal complications of the ideological alternatives, in part by treating individual people more fully, and thus to some extent avoiding the reduction of people to identity categories. Specifically, Samar Khan's *Shaurya* (Valor) is a criminal investigation film that presents an extended, later version of liberal state ideology. (The right-wing or hard-line position seems to have been more constant.) This version acknowledges some wrongdoing by the military (which at a certain point became impossible to deny); even so, it limits that acknowledgment and, crucially, indicates that the armed forces are successfully treating the problem themselves. Pooja Bhatt's *Dhokha* (Deceit) concerns the investigation of a terrorist bombing, which turns out to have been an act of revenge for atrocities committed in Kashmir. This film to some degree goes beyond even the extended problematic, particularly in its explicit analyses of and policy suggestions for Kashmir.

At the same time, however, the narrative shares crucial features with the standard liberal ideology on the crisis.

Chapter 3 considers works that may be more deeply inconsistent with dominant ideologies, and begins with a brief discussion of two further cinematic emplotments of the Kashmir situation. Sanjay Leela Bhansali's *Saawariya* allegorizes the situation in Kashmir, presenting us with a love triangle from the romantic narrative. The film is remarkable for its development of our sympathies with one lover (in effect, a representation of India), but with the resolution that the young woman (Kashmir) loves the rival (Kashmiri militant). The suggestion of the film is that Kashmir should want to be with India (the audience's preferred lover), but if it prefers the militancy, it has every right to choose it. Unlike the films considered in chapter 2, *Saawariya* is an *indirect* representation of the Kashmir conflict. Its overt story line has nothing to do with Kashmir, but it comments on Kashmir through allusion and structural parallelism. Another case of this sort is Tanveer Khan's *Madhoshi*. This film hints at the plight of Hindu refugees from Kashmir, suggesting a fantasy of revenge on their part—a fantasy that is, the film indicates, both illusory and self-destructive.

Films that rely on indirect representation of this sort appear more likely to fall outside the dominant Indian nationalist/colonialist framework, or at least to be more ideologically ambiguous. *Saawariya* and *Madhoshi* illustrate the point well, but a particularly striking case is Vidhu Vinod Chopra's *1942: A Love Story*, a work that combines a romantic narrative with a sacrificial narrative in the context of anticolonial nationalism. It may be seen as presenting the viewer with an emplotment of the Kashmir crisis that is very much in keeping with Kashmiri nationalist emplotments in Kashmir itself, and in that way directly opposed to the emplotments of *L.O.C.* and *Roja*. The contrast is enhanced by the fact that the overt historical subject of *1942* is the Indian struggle against British colonialism. Thus, the film may be understood as presenting the viewer with an implicit homology: colonial India is to the British Empire as Kashmir is to India. This suggests a harsh condemnation of Indian policies in Kashmir. On the other hand, there are ambiguities about the film's view of revolutionary violence, and ambiguities about its precise relation to the situation in Kashmir. As this suggests, the apparent ideological freedom found in works of

indirect political commentary is balanced by the ambiguity entailed in that indirectness. The ambiguity opens the films to "confirmation bias" in interpretation, roughly the tendency to accept data that conform to presuppositions, while rejecting data that do not (see Nisbett and Ross 238–42). In other words, the ambiguity makes it easier to interpret the films in terms of one's prior beliefs and expectations.

Chapters 2 and 3 focus on films primarily because the standard, Indian ideological positions on Kashmir have been demarcated most significantly and consequentially in mass entertainment media. At the same time, even with partially resistant works, this focus may overstate uniformity. Specifically, the complex production process of filmmaking makes it likely that the final work will be less individually particularized than a novel or a poem. That decreased particularity bears not only on personal foibles but on broader social patterns—including the potentially important factor of whether or not one is Kashmiri. Even when a great deal of creative control is in the hands of someone raised in Kashmir, as in the case of *1942*, that control is usually modified significantly by the extensive participation of non-Kashmiris. With non-Kashmiri writers, producers, actors, actresses, and crew members, there is a degree of what might be called "Indianization" of the resulting work. I do not say this as criticism. In itself, the point is neutral. Nonetheless, it does tend to muffle any Kashmiri voice in the film. This is also not to say that Kashmiri views are necessarily in contradiction with those of non-Kashmiri Indians or that they are more accurate or authentic. It is certainly not to say that the views of different Kashmiris are necessarily the same. However, there is likely to be some difference between the ideas and attitudes of people who grew up in a place and have relatives there, experiencing the trauma directly, and those of people more personally removed from the conflict. If nothing else, identity categorizations—with their emotional and cognitive sequelae—will almost certainly differ to some degree in some contexts.

At least in these respects, then, we may partially contrast Indian Kashmir films with the representation of Kashmir by Kashmiris in literary works. Beginning with chapter 4, we turn from Indian and partially Indianized representations of Kashmir to more individual Kashmiri voices. (Rushdie was in effect an intermediate case, born outside Kashmir, in India, but with Kashmiri ancestry.) Chapter 4 treats

three works written by Kashmiris but aimed at a relatively broad audience. In parallel with chapter 2, it begins with a work that at least partially takes up the heroic genre: *Kashmir Pending*, a graphic memoir by Naseer Ahmed, a former Kashmiri militant. It then turns to a novel by a Kashmiri Hindu, Bharat Wakhlu's *Close Call in Kashmir*. These works fall roughly within the ideological limits that we encountered in the preceding chapters. Yet there are complications. For example, like Ratnam's *Roja*, *Close Call in Kashmir* draws on the *Rāmāyaṇa* as a model for understanding the insurgency. However, Wakhlu's treatment of the groups involved—including Muslims—is more nuanced, and the overall development of the novel is not marked by the jingoistic nationalism of Ratnam's film.

The chapter concludes with Mirza Waheed's *The Collaborator*. Published by Penguin, this book undoubtedly aspires to a broad readership. But it is far more complex and literary than the other books under discussion and its audience is limited, if nothing else, by its untranslated Urdu. Despite this, the novel is in many ways a Kashmiri nationalist counterpart to Ratnam's Indian nationalist film. Specifically, its ideological orientation is almost the precise opposite of Ratnam's, manifesting in some ways parallel ideological problems. Still, its use of the heroic narrative structure is rather remarkable. Moreover, of all the works treated in the present volume, *The Collaborator* probably comes closest to communicating a sense of the experience of daily life in Kashmir in the early 1990s.

Chapter 5 turns from popular and semipopular fiction to academic poetry. Agha Shahid Ali was by far the most famous and influential Anglophone poet of Kashmir. His poetry presents us with the clear articulation of a view opposed to that of mainstream Indian nationalism. That position is usually seen as secularist. Yet careful attention to his Kashmir poems shows that Ali's position was moderately Islamist—in some ways even more Islamist than that of the JKLF. (On the degree to which the JKLF is not fully secular see, for example, Swami, who notes that "the JKLF's *practice* of politics . . . was far from secular" [166, italics in the original]; see also Behera on its imposition of "an Islamic code of conduct" [124; see also 150–51].) The analysis of Ali focuses on a single poem in which he movingly portrays the sufferings of Kashmiri Muslims, but seems to deny the sufferings of Kashmiri Hindus. The chapter

considers why and how this sort of scapegoating occurs in colonial conditions.

Chapter 6 continues with Kashmiri authors, but turns from Anglophone writers to Kashmiri-language authors,[17] who have a very different audience for their works. Unlike Hindi films, such works do not address a pan-Indian audience that might affect Indian policy in Kashmir, and unlike Anglophone works, they do not address an international readership that might influence American and European attitudes or United Nations policies toward Kashmir. Instead, they are addressing fellow Kashmiris, primarily men and women who live in the valley and experience the conflict in their daily lives. The argument of chapter 6 is that these works take up the usual narrative genres—particularly the sacrificial genre. But the result of their emplotments is often not support for any policy or even a caution about the possible consequences of the conflict. Rather, these stories repeatedly communicate a sense that there is no way to make narrative and emotional sense out of the crisis, that it defies organization in ordinary narrative structures. This is part of the experience of trauma, which is the way many—perhaps most—ordinary Kashmiris seem to experience life in the valley.

The various chapters of this book not only address specific literary works. They also take up different theoretical issues, extending the principles sketched in the preceding pages. Chapter 1 examines the nature of violence in relation to moral judgment, emotion, and complex social systems. Chapter 2 considers systems of ideological alternatives (or problematics) and the ideological operation of narrative paradigms—here, the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Chapter 3 addresses indirect representations of historical conditions and how such representations may be identified and understood. Chapter 4 extends the analysis of identity categorization to the use of modeling for out-groups, and particularly the use of a childhood model for colonized people; it also considers some issues of audience orientation and narrative discourse as well as some complications of individual adherence to dominant ideologies. Chapter 5 takes up the creation of "subcolonial" minorities within colonized groups, including colonized minorities, and the dynamics of scapegoating. Chapter 6 considers the nature of trauma and its relation to emplotment.

To recapitulate, the following chapters have three aims: first, to advance our theoretical knowledge about colonialism, anticolonial

nationalism, and their corresponding ideologies, including their relation to the cognitive and affective operations of identity definition and emplotment; second, to further our more socially and historically specific understanding of colonialism, nationalism, and their associated ideologies in Kashmir over the past quarter century or so; and third, to enhance our comprehension of the ideological force—and, in some cases, the theoretical and historical insights—of these particular works of literature and film.

Unfortunately, the analyses in the following chapters do not point to any straightforward way of resolving the Kashmir crisis—though their greatest value would of course come from their contribution to such a resolution. On the other hand, they do indicate some of the ways in which current policies and practices are not only morally wrong but practically self-defeating. Moreover, it seems to be part of the genre for books on Kashmir to end with recommendations. I have therefore concluded with some consideration of possible actions for the future. Specifically, the afterword presents a series of twenty-five recommendations that could potentially contribute in some measure to ameliorating conditions in the state—and perhaps, by extension, to other "intractable conflicts," of which Kashmir is one important case (see Bar-Tal and Halperin 923). In some ways, these recommendations are utopian. Even so, they may at least suggest that there are options other than the mutually provoking cycles of violence and violent retribution that have brutalized life in Kashmir for the past twenty-five years.

1 Understanding Kashmir

Salman Rushdie's Shalimar the Clown

Anticolonial nationalism is almost always bound up with a myth. In this myth, European powers are the colonizers and (largely) non-European countries are, simply, colonized. Thus, colonialism ends once the non-European countries throw off the political rule and escape the economic exploitation of the European countries. A successful break with European domination, then, successfully ends colonialism. This is the myth of *postcolonial emancipation*.[1] Of course, everyone acknowledges that European domination may continue after nominal independence of the colony. The point is not that anticolonial nationalists deny neocolonialism. The point is that there is often a tacit presumption that colonialism is confined to Europe and emancipation from Europe (and by extension, the United States) equals emancipation from colonialism. But, in fact, after successfully creating a new nation, a former colony is all too likely to establish its own colonies, its own forms of domination over regions or over minority populations. This *postcolonial colonialism* may be more local when compared with the global reach of the European powers. But it need not be any less brutal.

Salman Rushdie has been sensitive to this point for many years. In his 1980 novel *Midnight's Children* he depicted the horrors of West Pakistani colonialism in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In *Shalimar the Clown*, he takes up Indian control of Kashmir. But, in its depth of analysis, *Shalimar* goes well beyond that earlier treatment of postcolonial colonialism. *Shalimar* begins to suggest that colonialism is always complex, recurrent, multiple. It is found reiteratively, at level after level, like the old story from the American South of the slave owner who beat his wife; the wife in her turn abused the foreman; the foreman in his turn beat the slave; the slave in his turn flayed the horse.[2]

Mythic Kashmir: The Loss of Eden

Of course, *Shalimar* is not a treatise about colonialism generally. It is about Kashmir, which is, as we will see over the following chapters, a clear but highly complex and in some ways atypical colony. In keeping with this, the novel is pervaded by Kashmiri history. As briefly noted in the present volume's introduction, a central idea shared by writers on Kashmiri history is that Kashmiri culture was marked by an unusual degree of intercommunal harmony; Hindus and Muslims loved and respected one another and lived together without religious conflict. The idea is expressed in the poetry of medieval mystic poets who opposed the sectarianism of Hindu and Muslim, favoring instead the unity of all in devotion to God. In this account, the ethnocultural category of Kashmiriyat (Kashmiriness) superseded and rendered innocuous the categories of religion.

This standard idea is also a myth—a myth created around history. As used today, the idea of Kashmiriyat is the converse of emancipation; it is the myth of a lost paradise. The great historical hero of this story is the fourteenth-century ruler Zain-ul-abidin. Before his reign, "officials seized the wealth of Hindu temples, broke idols, imposed the hated *jiziya* tax [poll tax on non-Muslims]." At this time there was "a vicious anti-Hindu policy" including "forcible conversion" and a ban on the wearing of distinctive Hindu symbols (Akbar 53). Hindus fled (as they did again in the early years of the militancy, when threatened by Islamic militants). But Zain-ul-abidin brought the Hindus back, abolished the poll tax, and practiced reconversion (Akbar 27–28).

Rushdie, it seems, accepts the myth of Kashmiriyat. As he puts it, in the voice of Shalimar, "In the valley these words ['Hindu' and 'Muslim'] were merely descriptions, not divisions" (57). Moreover, he points toward Zain-ul-abidin as a model of Kashmiriyat. Indeed, in his novel, the anticommunal orientation of the indigenous Kashmiri theater group is manifest in part through their performance of the story of Zain-ul-abidin: "To be a Kashmiri, to have received so incomparable a divine gift, was to value what was shared far more highly than what divided. Of all this the story of [Zain-ul-abidin] was a symbol" (83). The version of this story in the novel shows Rushdie's human sensitivity. It would be easy for a Muslim to see Zain-ul-abidin's acts as a simple

manifestation of Islamic generosity. But Rushdie presents them as the ruler's gratitude to a Hindu physician (79–80). In this story, then, Hindus are not simply recipients of charity.

There is undoubtedly some historical support for this view of Kashmiriyat. Yet, even so, it remains a myth. Why would mystic poets have had to denounce sectarianism if it were simply absent? Why did Zain-ul-abidin have to call Hindus back and allow reconversion, except that they had been driven away or forced to convert initially? Moreover, conflict did not at all stop with Zain-ul-abidin.[3] Thus, Wajahat Habibullah points out that the term *Kashmiriyat* was "coined . . . to project a common cultural heritage among Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims," thereby "papering over their religious and social dissimilarities" (24–25).[4] Robert Huttenback observes that when political organizations arose in Kashmir they were not, initially, national but "were divided along strictly religious lines" (133). This suggests that perhaps Kashmiriyat was more of an ideological ideal than a practical, political reality. In keeping with this, Ghulam Khan points out, "Apparently the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims were very cordial and peaceful. But in fact there was a deep wave of suspicion, hostility and bitterness running at the bottom of their social relations" (31).

Rushdie, with his characteristic sensitivity to historical complexity, recognizes that the stories we tell about history involve selection and arrangement. We choose where to begin and where to end, what to see as characteristic and what to see as an exception. Thus, when communal violence spreads in the Kashmir Valley, the Hindus in *Shalimar* begin to question this myth of long-standing communal harmony (239). Nonetheless, Rushdie clearly wishes to maintain this myth of a lost Eden—an Eden that persisted even into the modern period.

Emplotting Modern Kashmiri History

This modern period is, of course, a period where the details of actual (rather than mythic) history matter as well, and it is important to overview a few of these before going on. For centuries, Kashmir was ruled, with greater or lesser incomprehension and exploitation, by non-Kashmiris. For purposes of the novel, the key transition point in this history came in 1846. The British took control of Kashmir, but did not desire to continue directly controlling the territory.[5] They therefore sold

it to a Hindu ruler, Gulab Singh, who had aided them at key points (see Akbar 57, 59). Despite this purchase, the maharajas were not entirely autonomous, particularly after 1889 (see Bamzai 626–31). Insofar as they were autonomous, Gulab Singh and his successors were not particularly enlightened rulers. This is evidenced by the fact that, in 1924, Muslims were agitating for, among other things, "abolition of forced labor and the restoration of all mosques seized by the state government" (Akbar 69).

Rushdie's story of the Noman and Kaul families begins during the reign of the Singhs. It is significant that this period is encompassed in Rushdie's romantic vision of the lost Eden. Part of that Eden is the *panchayat* system of local self-government in Indian villages, which was praised by writers such as Farooq Abdullah (son of the preeminent Kashmiri political leader, Sheikh Abdullah) as a way "to ensure the political participation of masses" (vii). Rushdie maintains this highly benevolent view through his representation of Pachigam's *panchayat*, with its multiethnic, multireligious membership (Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish [118]), its deep rationality and compassion (as shown by its decision regarding the interfaith marriage of the Hindu Boonyi and the Muslim Shalimar), and its healthy and productive relation to the society at large.

Here, too, Rushdie's account appears to have been overly positive. Riyaz Punjabi reports that *panchayats* were "comprised of the lower level functionaries of the Maharaja," which is to say, "village heads, landlords and other influential people" (37). Far from being autonomous, they "were manipulated by autocratic rulers" (38). Moreover, state manipulation of *panchayats* continued into the period of independence (42).

Why, then, is Rushdie adopting a romantic myth of a fall from paradise and why is he elevating the *panchayat* system? It seems unlikely that he is unaware of the complexities and contradictions in Hindu-Muslim relations in the past, since he explicitly notes that one might take communal conflict to be the norm and harmony to be the deviation (239). As to the governance system, it is possible that he simply thought too well of *panchayats*. But this, too, seems unlikely—if for no other reason than the deep naïveté of such a view. Rather, it seems that Rushdie is trying to create an effective story, and the story effect he wishes to produce is horror at the ongoing devastation of Kashmir. Virtually all

politically engaged writers try to do something along these lines. Most do so by increasing the evil of the enemy, making them into demonic hordes that perpetrate unspeakable evil. That option is not open to Rushdie, whose humane view of the Kashmir conflict recognizes the humanity of the Indian soldiers and the militants, as well as that of civilians, and of Hindus and Sikhs, as well as that of Muslims. In order to communicate the hell of Kashmir today, he does not populate it with demons. Rather, he contrasts it with heaven.

Again, this happy view of Kashmiriyat is not simply made up. But it is highly selective. This sort of selection is part of the "emplotment" of history, which is to say, the creation of a story out of historical events. In such emplotment, it is not uncommon for historians and novelists to shape conflicting social tendencies by reference to a few weighty characters—for example, political leaders whose personal confrontations come to stand in for (and perhaps partially explain) larger social oppositions. In the case of modern Kashmir, this emplotment commonly involves two figures—Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah.

Singh was the maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir when India and Pakistan became independent from England. At the time of independence, there were many semi-independent, "princely" states, such as Kashmir. They had a choice of joining Pakistan or India. One would expect that a Muslim ruler of a predominantly Muslim state would opt for Pakistan, while the Hindu ruler of a predominantly Hindu state would opt for India. The complication in the case of Jammu and Kashmir was that Singh was Hindu, while Jammu and Kashmir was primarily Muslim, though with a significant Hindu minority.

Roughly two months after the birth of India and Pakistan, Hari Singh had not signed the articles of accession to either nation. At this time, an uprising occurred in western Kashmir (see Whitehead 46), followed by an invasion that included Pathan tribals. There was also Pakistani involvement (see Whitehead 51). M. J. Akbar reports that the militants followed "a trail of horror, raping and abducting women, looting, and murdering civilians" (106). Opinions differ on the extent of the violence (see Whitehead for a judicious consideration of the evidence), but in any case the destruction was considerable.[6] For example, Andrew Whitehead refers to looting, rape, and abduction, as well as "Sikhs and Hindus . . . killed in large numbers" (61). This armed challenge led

Singh to accede to India, if with provisions for partial autonomy. Kashmiri nationalists have often remarked that the deal struck by Singh with the Indian government is not unrelated to the agreement struck by his ancestor with the British. In keeping with this, Whitehead observes that "at least in some parts of the Kashmir Valley, Indian troops were seen from the start as an occupying force" (184). (A striking literary expression of this view may be found in the poem "Our Heritage" by the Pakistani-Kashmiri writer Taos Banihali.)

These events are recalled in *Shalimar*. For dramatic effect, they are collapsed into a single night—the night Shalimar and Boonyi are born. This is, in effect, the moment when the new Kashmir is born, with the violence of the uprising, the accession to India, and the partition of Kashmir (since Pakistan retained control of part of western Kashmir). In other words, these events are what define the difference between the old Kashmir of (Shalimar's father) Abdullah and (Boonyi's father) Pyarelal, on the one hand, and the new Kashmir of their children on the other. Indeed, Boonyi's mother—the freest and most defiant spirit in the novel—cannot survive that night.[7]

The mention of Abdullah leads us to the other weighty character in this political drama—Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah was the most popular leader in the valley. He was known for his progressive politics (e.g., with respect to land reform and women's rights) and his opposition to Muslim-Hindu communalism. His prominent role in the history of the valley—and his close, semiallegorical relation to Rushdie's character, Abdullah Noman—are articulated directly by Rushdie: "there were two lions in Kashmir. One was Sheikh Abdullah, of course, Sher-e-Kashmir [Lion of Kashmir] himself, the unquestioned leader of his people. Everyone agreed that Sheikh Abdullah was the valley's real prince, not that Dogra maharaja" (59).

Rushdie's account may simplify the historical record. For example, Chitralekha Zutshi argues that popular views of Abdullah and, even more, his National Conference party were more complex. Quoting the Kashmiri political activist Prem Nath Bazaz, she indicates that the National Conference's progressive program, articulated in *Naya Kashmir* (New Kashmir), was opportunistic. She maintains that it was an "attempt . . . to boost [the party's] flagging popularity among Kashmiris" even at this early date (*Naya Kashmir* was set forth in 1944). She writes

that "the National Conference regime was . . . an installation of the Indian government." Indeed, "The National Conference regime systematically suppressed papers and periodicals that did not agree with Sheikh Abdullah," and even "promulgated an ordinance . . . allowing for the arrest and summary trials of those suspected of pro-Pakistan leanings" (313; Habibullah presents a similar portrait of Abdullah's rule).

On the other hand, to represent Abdullah as too narrowly aligned with the Indian government would be misleading. He vacillated significantly in his relations with India over the years (a point discussed by Swami, among others). As Rushdie summarizes, the Indian government "kept putting . . . Sheikh Abdullah . . . in jail, then doing secret deals with him, then reinstalling him in power on the condition that he supported the union with India, then getting irritated all over again when he started talking about autonomy in spite of everything" (247). He presents a similar, if more consistent change in the character Abdullah Noman and his wife Firdaus: "Up to now they had tried to believe that their beloved Kashmiriness was best served by some kind of association with India. . . . But now the mood had changed" (131).

The problem was that the initial accession had been premised on two conditions: first, the relative autonomy of Kashmir within India; second, the holding of a plebiscite to ascertain the people's will regarding the final disposition of the state (see Akbar 124; on the reiteration of the pledge guaranteeing a plebiscite, see Roy, "Seditious Nehru"). Over the years, autonomy was almost entirely eroded. (In *Article 370*, Noorani documents the process in detail; see also Bose, *Kashmir.*) Moreover, the possibility of a plebiscite became increasingly remote. Spontaneous popular discontent was almost inevitable, particularly in conditions where basic democracy was undermined (as happened repeatedly in Kashmir; see Bose, *Kashmir*). That discontent was exacerbated by the regional power rivalry of India and Pakistan, leading to Pakistani involvement in Kashmiri politics. Unsurprisingly, independence movements arose, some militant. Incidents such as the 1971 hijacking of an Indian airliner show the seriousness of these groups (see Malik 282).

Rushdie presents such separatist acts as part of a developing spiral of violence in which the presence of the military spurs greater resentment and resistance among Kashmiris, leading to greater suspicion among the military, thus motivating increased intrusion into Kashmiri lives,

giving rise to increased resistance, generating violent incidents from the military, driving Kashmiris themselves to violence, and so on. The idea of such a cycle may seem obvious. The general concept is certainly recognized and emphasized in political psychology (e.g., Fisher, Kelman, and Nan refer to the "interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic" found in certain conflicts [494]). But what is remarkable about Rushdie's account is that there is no single, definitive start to the cycle. It is, in fact, a wholly unnecessary spiral. In this way, it is not like classical colonialism. It is not as if the Indian government sent in troops to protect access to gold or oil. In other words, the colonial occupation of Kashmir by India did not begin with rational greed, which then necessarily led to militarism, which led to rebellion. Indian colonialism in Kashmir is, in that sense, an instance of "pure" colonial occupation—colonialism for the sake of colonialism. The occupation is justified simply by the fact that it is. Thus Rushdie's Colonel Kachhwaha rationalizes his crackdown on Kashmiris by reference to the territorial integrity of India (96). But that is circular. Kachhwaha claims that Kashmir is an integral part of India—thus repudiating claims for popular autonomy—simply because it has already been claimed to be an integral part of India. The utter irrationality of such an occupation is perhaps more shocking than the more standard forms of colonialism in which there is some straightforward motive.

In many ways, Rushdie depicts the situation in Kashmir as a highly intensified and fatal version of the famous Stanford Prison Experiment. In that study, psychologist Philip Zimbardo recruited a group of ordinary, college-age men to participate in a two-week simulation of prison conditions. The participants were randomly divided into two groups, "guards" and "prisoners." They were then put in makeshift prison situation in the basement of the psychology building at Stanford University. Very quickly, the relation between the guards and prisoners degenerated into authoritarian cruelty on the part of the guards and rebelliousness or humiliated submission on the part of the prisoners. The brutality of the guards and the suffering of the prisoners was so severe that the experiment had to be terminated prematurely. Even Zimbardo himself became caught up in process of control and in tacitly permitting the cruelty of the guards. It was simply the dynamics of the situation that produced the conflict and violence. Neither Zimbardo nor the guards

had anything to gain (e.g., they were not trying to take over the prisoners' land). In Rushdie's portrayal, the situation in Kashmir is in effect a far more extensive and lethal version of such a situation-generated escalatory process. It is a form of colonialism, but without the practical motivations of labor exploitation or resource appropriation—just as the Stanford Prison Experiment was a form of prison without the practical motivations of punishment or reform. Even if this is not the whole story of the Kashmir crisis (and there are clearly many factors contributing to this devastating situation), it is undoubtedly a very significant part of it—as Zimbardo's and related research would suggest.

Unsurprisingly, the growing discontent among the Kashmiri people and the increasing rigidity and harshness of the Indian political elite eventually reached a threshold. Due to numerous political frustrations over the preceding decades, and following the death of Sheikh Abdullah, a significant segment of the populace shifted their electoral support away from Abdullah's India-aligned National Conference party. The 1987 elections were virtually certain to give a substantial number of seats to National Conference's rival, the Muslim United Front. However, there was massive vote fraud (see Ganguly 98). Rather than punishing those who committed fraud, the government arrested and tortured Muslim United Front election workers (Habibullah 61–62). According to a number of writers, the resulting sense of complete disenfranchisement was crucial to the transformation of the insurgency (see, for example, Widmalm 77–83). What had formerly been a relatively small group of activists now swelled to a vast popular movement. This was far from the first case of vote-rigging; indeed, such rigging was the rule rather than the exception (see Habibullah 30–32 and Talbot and Singh 136; the discussion in Bose, *Kashmir*, is particularly compelling). But the scale and visibility of the corruption and the context in which it occurred made this a tipping point.

The 1987 elections appear in *Shalimar*. As Rushdie explains, "Unofficially, as the results came in, it became plain that the wrong man was winning. So the election was rigged." That is not all; "supporters" of the Muslim United Front "and electoral agents were seized and tortured." As a result, "Thousands of previously law-abiding young men took up arms and joined the militants, disillusioned by the electoral process." Of course, here as elsewhere, there was not only a single cause. "Pakistan

was generous," Rushdie continues, explaining, "There were AK-47s for everyone" (276).

The Descent into Hell

Before she dies, Rushdie's prophetess Nazarébaddoor explains that "The age of prophecy is at an end . . . because what's coming is so terrible that no prophet will have the words to foretell it" (68). Just as one would expect from Rushdie's analysis, the increased militancy of resistance to Indian colonialism inspired further brutality by the occupation forces. This, too, reached a threshold. A particularly brutal regime began in 1990. This included destructive house-to-house searches; the use of rape as a way of controlling and humiliating the population (see, for example, Malik 308–09); firing on crowds; arson (e.g., the 1993 burning of parts of the capital city, Srinagar, "during which [Indian military] set fire to buildings and shot civilians trying to flee the flames" [Gossman 8]); torture (according to a 1995 Amnesty International report, "The brutality of torture in Jammu and Kashmir defies belief" [2][8]); and other forms of state terror.

These practices were made possible by the Indian government's decision to take up laws left over "from the days of colonial rule" (Malik 306). Further legal provisions only enhanced state colonial power. These included the 1990 Disturbed Areas Act, which "forbade the assembly of more than five people; authorized relatively low-ranking personnel to shoot anyone they suspected of disturbing public order; and permitted the destruction of any building thought to be an arms dump or providing shelter to militants." Following the 1990 Special Powers Act, "Officers were entitled to fire upon anyone contravening any law or order in force, in the disturbed area . . . arrest people without warrant . . . enter and search any premises without warrant" (Malik 307). In keeping with this, "In 1991 Amnesty International estimated that 15,000 people were being detained in the state without trial" (Talbot and Singh 137). Rushdie makes reference to these acts, and explains, "The political echelon's decision to declare Kashmir a 'disturbed area' " meant that "search warrants were not required, arrest warrants ditto, and shoot-to-kill treatment of suspects was acceptable" (290).

In keeping with this, Rushdie makes repeated reference to the acts of terror committed by the Indian military. The most significant instances

of these acts concern the characters we know and care for. Among the many devastating passages in the book we find the description of the "retributive" murder of Abdullah Noman and his wife Firdaus. Because Anees Noman was a member of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the army murdered his father, after first breaking his hands (308)—the hands that metaphorically held together the village of Pachigam, protecting its peoples and traditions (see, for example, 231). Because Anees was a militant, they raped his mother before and after killing her—to humiliate, disgrace, and dishearten anyone who knew or cared for her or her husband (308).

Of course, the tens of thousands dead in the following decade (see Widmalm 131) were not all killed by the Indian armed forces. Kashmiri militants contributed as well—even if they seem to have killed at only about half the rate of the army (see Talbot and Singh 136–37).[9] These groups received a great increase in support due to brutality of the Indian armed forces and the involvement of Pakistan. Moreover, they underwent a change in these years. The early militants were for the most part semi-secular nationalists, associated with the JKLF. These are represented by Anees Noman in Rushdie's novel. In Rushdie's account, these were violent but principled revolutionaries; he contrasts them sharply with the other militant groups that began to become important at this time—the Islamists or jihādis.

The Islamists were driven by antagonism toward infidels and were often closely associated with Pakistan. As Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh explain, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Pakistan intelligence services were "able to . . . engage some of the *jihadis*" from Afghanistan "in the militancy that had broken out in Kashmir" (167; italics in the original). In *Shalimar*, the Islamist groups include the terror squad of the Gegroo brothers, who had raped Zoon Misri. They were part of "the most 'Afghan' " of the Islamist groups, "the Lahskar-e-Pak or Army of the Pure." This group ordered "all Muslim women to don the burqa and adhere to the dress and behavioral principles laid down by the Taliban in Afghanistan" (Rushdie 277). Here Rushdie is pointing toward several actual groups—especially Lashkar-e-Taiba, often translated as "Army of the Pure" (see Stern 107). Rushdie substitutes "Pak" (*pāk*, meaning "pure") for "Taiba" to stress the link with Pakistan.[10]

The relations among these semisecular and Islamist militant groups were generally poor, often hostile. Rushdie rightly sets them against one another, both in their general aims and strategies and in their interpersonal interactions. As he puts it, the "liberation-front-wallahs were nationalist subversives rather than religious fanatics and between them and the iron mullahs there was little love lost" (122). This split is encapsulated in the growing conflict between Anees and Shalimar. "*I quarreled with Anees again*," Shalimar explains. "*I spoke of our Pak allies and told him I would put my trust in them and in our common God and he called me a liar and a whore who wants to be fucked from both ends. . . . He is against Pakistan and doesn't want to talk about religion*" (259; italics in the original). (Rushdie overstates the secularism of the JKLF. As Navnita Chadha Behera explains, though "the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is generally credited with injecting Islamic formulations into the movement, the JKLF was already using such themes in its mobilization strategies and public discourse . . . seeking to establish a system of *Islamic democracy*"; moreover, "JKLF was the main force behind the expulsion of the minority Pandit [Hindu] community, with many of its cadre implicated in the brutal killings of Kashmiri Pandits" [150–51, italics in the original; see also 124–25].[11])

Rushdie also nicely represents another phenomenon that recurs in colonial and revolutionary or other militarized conflicts. When violence becomes legitimated—either by the state or by antistate agents, such as militants—it is very likely that these new, socially acceptable forms of violence will attract people who are already prone to violence or who have become habituated to it in other contexts. In other words, both the military and the revolutionary groups are likely to attract sociopathic and victim-seeking agents, as well as criminals.[12] For example, Stern cites work suggesting that some individuals are attracted to "violent acts, and the political objectives they espouse are only a rationalization"; she points in particular to the estimate that "2 percent of soldiers actually take pleasure from killing" (164). The case of rape is perhaps the most obvious instance of this. If rape is accepted as a tool of domination for a given organization, it seems likely that such a group will attract rapists. Thus, in connection with rape in Kashmir, Kazi cites one officer as asking, "Who do you think joins the security forces . . . ?" and answering, "We get the worst—the rogues, the thugs" (183n66). This

is just what we find with the Gegroo brothers, only in this case with the militants rather than the military. Trapped in a mosque after raping Zoon Misri, they reappear as jihādis. The suggestion is that they have not only literally taken refuge in a holy place, but metaphorically taken refuge in religion.

Why Violence?

This last point is worth dwelling on, for it is crucial to Rushdie's novel. How does it happen that a rapist can justify his act by appeal to religion—or nation, in the case of the Indian military? In part, of course, this is simple hypocrisy. That is the case with the Gegroo brothers. But the violence of Kachhwaha seems different. He seems to genuinely believe in the justice of his cause. More generally, each side claims it is responding to the cruelty of the other side. But some individuals appear to believe more fully in the rightness of their response, and in their own innocence. In addition to Kachhwaha, the other obvious case of this is the Iron Mullah. In short, the two characters who are most committed to ideals are not the characters who behave most humanely. Rather, they are the characters who most fully enable inhumanity. How can this be?

Rushdie hints at an explanation when he has Pyarelal Kaul claim, "Man is ruined by the misfortune of possessing a moral sense" (91). The problem is that, for characters such as Kachhwaha and the Iron Mullah there is something higher than the empirical truth and human feeling that themselves might have prevented violence. In the case of the Iron Mullah, it is God and his revelation, which belies apparent empirical truths. In the case of Kachhwaha, it is the nation. Thus, according to the former, the believers "know that the universe is an illusion and that truth lies beyond the illusion, where the infidel cannot see" (267). Similarly, Kachhwaha reflects, "When the truth and integrity [i.e., the national integrity of India] conflicted it was integrity that had to be given precedence. Not even the truth could be permitted to dishonor the nation" (97).

But the suppression of truth by doctrine—religious or national—is not the only source of violence. It is not even an adequate source. Even more important is the suppression of feeling. It is ordinary for us to recoil from the suffering of others—say, people consumed in flames (as

when Indian troops burned areas of Srinagar) or people driven from their homes into refugee camps (such as the Hindus who fled Kashmir). But we can engage in processes of thought that limit those feelings. Here, too, norms enter, for norms establish something higher than human feeling (as well as empirical truth). The Indian Army must not only suppress truth in the name of the nation, but empathy as well. The iron mullahs are even more extreme. They are so denatured by divine principle that they have only "machine parts" where they should have had a heart (316).

The suppression of truth and the suppression of feeling are closely related. It is, after all, our sense of what is true (e.g., that some suspect's mother has been raped by soldiers) that provokes our fellow feeling and, ideally, our beneficence. To suppress the truth of the "enemy's" suffering is to inhibit compassion. The addition of an appeal to principle only compounds the suffocation of our natural empathy.

But human beings are so robustly lethargic that even the suppression of truth and the moral rationalization of cruelty are not sufficient to produce violence. Two other conditions are necessary. First, the agents of violence must have some motivation to inflict pain. We do not do anything without motivation. Violence is no exception. One obvious possibility here is devotion to the nation (Kashmir or India), the religious community, or God. Interestingly, Rushdie has very few characters who are genuinely motivated by social or political aims.[13] Anees Noman may be one. Generally, in *Shalimar*, even the most vigorous nationalist or communalist actions are initiated and sustained by personal feeling. Personal relations are, to use Firdaus Noman's words, the "low-grade cause of all the discontent on earth" (113; Firdaus is speaking specifically of families). The case of Shalimar himself is obvious. His quest for revenge against U.S. ambassador Max Ophuls is not a political commitment but a personal vendetta against the man who kept Shalimar's wife as a mistress. Shalimar is not unique in this respect; the point extends to others as well—such as Kachhwaha. His entire military career is in effect a struggle against the demeaning attitude of his own father. Moreover, his particular animosity toward Kashmiris derives from Boonyi's rejection of him and her choice of Shalimar ("Pachigam would suffer for Boonyi Kaul's insulting behavior" [101]).

Of course, the problem here is not feeling per se. All actions, maleficent and beneficent, require motivation. In part, it is the type of feeling.

Generally, the humane social actions of the characters in the novel are based on attachment and trust. We see this in, for example, the *panchayat*'s affirmation of Kashmiriyat in the marriage of Boonyi and Shalimar. In contrast, violence is commonly based on betrayal and humiliation. (As I have already noted, the importance of humiliation is stressed in a number of treatments of the Kashmir crisis and similar conflicts; see, for example, Stern 235–36.) We see this in the cases just mentioned—Shalimar and Kachhwaha. Moreover, this personal motivation suggests why certain sorts of "principles" come to be invoked with such frequency and force—prominently, principles of group pride and honor (for Shalimar, "Honor ranked above everything else" [258]). The invocation of these principles is a way of rationalizing violent responses to shame.

But personal motivation, too, is not enough for the systematic cruelty we find in Kashmir. Even with motives and rationalizations, people cannot simply go out and fight wars. There must be some complex of social activities that are aligned with personal motivations. In other words, there must be some relevant institutions, some socially regularized sets of practices that are congruent with the actional outcomes of the relevant motives. If the actional outcome of a feeling of shame-provoked rage is murder, there must be agencies and social policies that allow individuals to engage in murder—if murder is going to become a social practice (e.g., a counterinsurgency war) and not an isolated criminal act. Similarly, if the actional outcome of a feeling of attachment-inspired goodwill is beneficence, there must be agencies and social policies that allow individuals to engage in beneficence. In both cases, the agencies and policies do not provoke the motivation initially. However, they orient and coordinate the individual motivations. Kachhwaha on his own would not have turned his shame before his father into the murder of Abdullah Noman. The Indian military along with Indian governmental policies—along with the diverse personal motivations of other individuals in the Indian army—channeled his motivations into that outcome.

It should be clear why this account of violence works particularly well with Rushdie's treatment of the Kashmir conflict developing through cycles of provocation and response, with intensifying harm and cruelty. In a sense, the initial hostilities are incidental—personal

experiences of shame and rage. These begin the cycle, which then serves to refocus and, often, enhance the prior feelings. For example, Kachhwaha's attempt to overcome his shame before his father leads him to the situation where he can be humiliated by Boonyi. The social context of India in conflict with Kashmir orients how Kachhwaha categorizes Boonyi (as a Kashmiri; there are, after all, many ways he might have categorized her); at the same time, it provides an outlet for his anger, which is now generalized to other members of her identity category.

Critical Anticolonialism

The relatively benevolent treatment that Rushdie gives to the JKLF—not to mention the searing condemnation of Indian military actions in Kashmir—indicates that *Shalimar* is an anticolonial novel.[14] The usual, teleological myth of emancipation is the standard result of such anticolonialism. Moreover, Rushdie's emplotment of the history of Kashmir—making it into a story of a tragic fall—lends itself readily to emancipatory mythologizing. Commonly, the lost Eden is precisely what the national anticolonial movement is seen as (potentially) reinstating. Indeed, part of the reason for appealing to a past national utopia is to claim that the future, independent nation will reestablish that utopia, having eliminated the demonic enemy. Rushdie presents an alternative, a romantic but *critical* anticolonialism heightened by the imagination of paradise lost,[15] but not rendered cruel and triumphalist by the imagination of paradise regained.

There are two crucial factors here. First, Rushdie himself recognizes that any claims of a utopian past are highly and consequentially selective.[16] From the same history, one can construct a story that is almost the precise opposite. Thus he plagues Pyarelal with the worry, "Maybe *Kashmiriyat* was an illusion. . . . Maybe the tolerant reign of good king Zain-ul-abidin should be seen . . . as an aberration, not a symbol of unity. Maybe tyranny, forced conversions, temple-smashing, iconoclasm, persecution and genocide were the norms and peaceful coexistence was an illusion" (239). The second factor is that, even if the crimes just enumerated were by Muslims, the key explanatory category for Rushdie is not Muslim or Hindu (or Kashmiri or Indian). It is, rather, human. Pyarelal's disillusion is not about Muslims, but about "the idea that human beings were essentially good" (238).

In keeping with this generalization of the problem, then—and contrary to the emancipatory myth—Rushdie makes clear that colonialism is a continually recurring problem, found at the heart of anticolonial movements, including that in Kashmir. Perhaps the best way to understand this is not in terms of large political programs but instead in terms of human feeling, particularly the development of empathy. One important case of this is the "[e]thnic cleansing" (295) of Kashmiri Hindus. Rushdie devotes a very affecting section of his novel to this issue. His portrayal involves, most significantly, the sort of effortful empathy that goes beyond spontaneous response and that is so important for humane attitudes, particularly to out-groups. Like Pyarelal, Rushdie himself has the task of imagining and memorializing this pain—"Forgetting would be a crime against those who suffered 'whole-hog' burning of their neighborhoods, or seizure of their property, or death, preceded by such violences as could not be imagined or described. *Kill one, scare ten*, the Muslim mobs chanted, and ten were, indeed, scared. More than ten" (296; italics in the original).

In addition, Rushdie engages in a nuanced analysis of the blame for this ethnic cleansing. In keeping with his profoundly noncommunalist way of thinking, he finds the treatment of Kashmiri Hindus to result from many complex and interrelated forms of colonialism on all sides of the conflict. There was religious fanaticism. There was the greed of those who "looted from temples and homes" (296). There was the incompetence of the Indian government, their political exploitation of the Hindus' conditions, and their simultaneous denial of the severe problems in the valley.

To get a sense of what Rushdie is doing here, it is perhaps valuable to contrast his work with that of another prominent postcolonial writer on Kashmir—Agha Shahid Ali. Ali was undoubtedly one of the finest poets in postcolonization Anglophone literature, and his writings on Kashmir are very effective in exposing the terror of the Indian Army and the brutality of Indian governmental policy. But his poetry evidences a staggering failure of empathic imagination when it comes to the exodus of Hindus from Kashmir. Consider, for example, "I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight." In this poem (which I will discuss more fully in chapter 5), he presents the Hindus of Kashmir as peacefully walking out of Kashmir, "clutching their gods." Seeing their

Hindu neighbors leave, the speaker asks, "Who will protect us if you leave?" (180). Human rights reports indicate that "militant groups threatened, assaulted and murdered Hindus residing in the Kashmir valley—driving more than 100,000 to flee to refugee camps . . . where most remain in increasingly desperate conditions" (Gossman 17). In Rushdie's words, "Three hundred and fifty thousand pandits [Hindus] . . . fled from their homes and headed south to the refugee camps where they would rot . . . like the unloved, undead dead they had become" (296). Rushdie details an intense campaign of terror against Kashmiri Hindus. In this, all that Ali manages to see is the absence of a Hindu human shield protecting Muslims from the military.

There is still more complexity to Rushdie's treatment of blame and his repudiation of the myth of the postcolonial than even this indicates. The tendency of emancipatory or teleological anticolonialism is to isolate a true and complete enemy. But for Rushdie there are no true and complete enemies. A true and complete enemy is inhuman, an object excluded from compassion. Rushdie works against this tendency first of all by exploring the personal experiences that underlie even terrible violence, developing for example the reader's sense of Colonel Kachhwaha's humanity even while exposing his crimes. In addition to developing positive empathic response through his portraits of particular characters, Rushdie does not foster the sorts of thought that inhibit compassion. We have already seen his opposition to moralistic rationalizations, which tend to displace our spontaneous aversion to other people's pain. Perhaps even more important, Rushdie opposes the insertion of "enemies" into dehumanized character types in standard narratives—most obviously, their characterization as demonic. This is particularly significant, as it is a special danger of the lost paradise story, where the enemy may take on the role of Satan.

In India this form of dehumanizing emplotment often draws particularly on the great Indian epic and sacred religious poem, the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The *Rāmāyaṇa* provides a paradigmatic narrative model that often has strongly nationalistic and xenophobic consequences, as in the case of the film *Roja*, to which we will turn in chapter 2. Indeed, it is commonly part of a demonization of the enemy and a divinization of the homeland. It certainly has this function with respect to Kashmir. We will consider the *Rāmāyaṇa* more fully in chapter 2. For now, it is

sufficient to note that it concerns the divine incarnation, Rāma, rescuing his beloved Sītā, who has been abducted by the demon, Rāvaṇa. In the standard, political use of the story, India is assimilated to the divine Rāma while the enemy (usually Pakistan) is linked with Rāvaṇa. More generally, the "good guys" are linked with Rāma and the "bad guys" with Rāvaṇa.

The use of the *Rāmāyaṇa* model for Kashmir occurs in *Shalimar* as well. But Rushdie brilliantly shows that the model does not simply and unequivocally map onto any one set of characters. When Boonyi first reflects on the *Rāmāyaṇa*, she wonders if Shalimar is her Rāma or her Rāvaṇa, "or both" (50). The ambiguity remains throughout the story. Later, she assimilates Max to Rāvaṇa—but Shalimar fails to be Rāma precisely insofar as he is nonviolent in the face of Boonyi's/Sītā's "abductor" (196). Needless to say, this hardly means that Shalimar is the image of divine goodness when he takes up the knife and slits Max's throat—or perhaps it does mean this, perhaps it means that the image of divine goodness is just what allows such acts of brutality. In any case, in real life, everyone is sometimes a Rāvaṇa, sometimes a Rāma, sometimes a Sītā. As Rushdie summarizes, "In the old story Sita the pure was kidnapped and Ram fought a war to win her back. In the modern world everything had been turned upside down and inside out" (263). Indeed, things are even more convoluted that this. It is not simply a matter of the modern world. Through Boonyi's meditations on the story, Rushdie makes clear that even the original epic is more equivocal on the status of these characters. For example, in Boonyi's reflections on Sītā's response to Rāvaṇa's "lecherous, flattering speech" (49), Rushdie points to aspects of Vālmīki's text that are often ignored in Hindu tradition (see canto 46 of the Āraṇya Kāṇḍa in Vālmīki). Even in the epic itself, all three characters exhibit morally relevant complexity.[17]

The point is not confined to the *Rāmāyaṇa*. It is generalizable. Referring to both history and myth, Rushdie tells us, "Everywhere was a mirror of everywhere else" (355). But the problem is ascertaining just what this mirror relation means. Much earlier in the novel, Rushdie has Max wonder, "Did the mind discover likeness in the unlike in order to clarify the world or to obscure the impossibility of such clarification?" (180). There are three problems with using one situation as a model for another, whether the first situation is historical or mythic. First, our

understanding of the model is often poor (as when we simplify the moral properties of the *Rāmāyaṇa*). Second, it is not always clear how the source maps onto the target (who is Rāma and who is Rāvaṇa in the story of Boonyi?). Third, there are always differences between the model and the target (even insofar as she is analogous to Sītā, Boonyi is necessarily different in many respects as well). Everywhere is a mirror of everywhere else. But it is a distorting mirror. The point is particularly crucial when it comes to establishing a putatively true and complete enemy.

The Future of the Nation: The Bhand Pather and Political Despair

There is one difficulty of having only a romantic myth, and no emancipatory fantasy: it can lead to a sort of political despair. *Roja* ends with the hero bravely defending the Indian flag while a chorus sings about the nation of India. Agha Shahid Ali's "Some Vision of the World Cashmere" (in *Veiled*, 188–89) may end with a sense of national resurrection, and even personal resurrection, where dead relatives seem joined together in a transformed (presumably free) Kashmir. But where does one go with a situation in which all the political sides and all political options appear to some degree cruel and wrong? Where does one go when the only apparently fair option, "Kashmir for the Kashmiris," is reduced to an "old fairy tale" (291), its mythic status made explicit? (And, even if it were not simply a fairy tale, Hindu Kashmiris would almost certainly be excluded anyway.) One might expect a novel about Kashmir to end with some suggestion about the author's solution to the crisis. But in *Shalimar* we are faced with two people—here, two semiallegorical figures—in a dark room poised to kill one another—Boonyi's daughter (named both "India" and "Kashmira") and Shalimar. The haunting final sentences—"There was no second chance. There was no India. There was only Kashmira, and Shalimar the clown" (398)—suggest not only a loss of hope for India, but a sort of global condition, a standoff between innocent victims and cruel victims. Kashmira is innocent. But Shalimar, though far from innocent, is himself the product of past suffering, both personal and political. I suspect that almost all readers are like I am in strongly wishing for the survival of Kashmira. But, if she kills this victimized victimizer with her bow, what system has been defended? What, exactly, has triumphed?

More broadly, what does Kashmira represent? Is she simply the individual victim of terror? But, if so, the training in archery that she has undertaken—or the use of other, more modern weapons—hardly appears to be a generalizable solution. More people with guns (or bows and arrows) seems an unlikely way of resolving the world's current crises. And what about Shalimar? Does he simply represent terrorists or militancy? If so, it seems clear that killing him will, at best, produce temporary security for one endangered target, not a general solution. Moreover, this killing will in no way address the political structures and military routines that created and sustain the nightmarish conditions in Kashmir.

The deeply tragic vision of the novel may be highlighted by contrasting it with the Bhand Pather, the traditional performing art of Kashmir. It features prominently in Rushdie's novel as the profession of the Nomans. M. K. Raina explains that the Bhands themselves have a "secular outlook" and are deeply anticommunalist—for example, Muslims perform "in honour of [the Hindu] goddess." Moreover, the purposes of their plays historically involved exposing "[t]he injustice that the people suffered" (Raina, "The *Bhand Pather*"), typically in a "satirical" manner (DuPont 13). More precisely, "There is often the figure of a ruler from outside who is exploiting the natives" (Raina, "Humour").[18] A key figure in overcoming this exploitation is "the jester or *maskhara*," a "rebel . . . who does not cow down to the oppressor" (Raina, "The *Bhand Pather*"). In addition, the overall situation "sometimes [involves] traces of the *Ramayana*" (Raina, "Humour").

The links between Rushdie's novel and the Bhand Pather should be obvious. They share the same political purposes, the same opposition to non-Kashmiri oppression of Kashmir, the same focus on the jester or "clown" (as Rushdie prefers), the same genuine anticommunalism—a real respect, even a sort of sharing across communities, not a mere tolerance—and a parallel use of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. But the differences are equally striking. In the Bhand Pather, "the local character is . . . victorious in the end" (Raina, "The *Bhand Pather*"). Moreover, that victory comes when the "the jesters fool" the "ruler from outside" and "bring him to some kind of an understanding" (Raina, "Humour"). This is precisely what is gone in *Shalimar*. The trickster is not victorious. Or, if he is, then his victory is as cruel as the oppression he is opposing. This

is because the extent of the brutality is so great that even the clown wields a sword; he can no longer trick the oppressor, but rather aspires to repeat the oppression. Moreover, even if the clown could maintain the role of ironic trickster, the oppressors are now too multiple and too filled with rage and righteousness to gain human understanding—either knowledge or sympathy—and end the violence.

Indeed, the tragedy of *Shalimar* goes even deeper. Rather than inspiring human understanding in the oppressor, the clown himself has lost that understanding. The political value of the Bhand Pather may be that it makes the enemy redeemable through human feeling and it makes the hero human—clever and ironic rather than transcendent. To advert to the *Rāmāyaṇa* parallel, it does not give us Rāvaṇa and Rāma. But conditions change people. In *Shalimar*, Sītās remain—possible or real victims of oppression, even if they have now taken up weapons themselves (as in the case of Kashmira). But the possibility of a bloodless victory for the Kashmiri *maskhara* seems lost. Even the clown himself can no longer be a clown, but must be a moralistic Rāma and a cruel Rāvaṇa all in one.

This loss of the *maskhara* is part of the loss of Eden, part of Rushdie's own myth—in this case, a myth that has all too great a similarity to the real world. It is part of what makes all the options for Kashmir so terrible and its future so disheartening. Indeed, one aspect of that future is the loss of the Bhand Pather itself. Raina quotes "a master" of the Bhand Pather, Ama Kak, as saying, "It will all soon die out and no one will ever know that we the *Bhands* had such a rich and developed . . . heritage" ("The *Bhand Pather*"). Here, too, Rushdie shows himself an anticolonial novelist. However despairing he may be about the future of Kashmir, he has set himself the task of trying to preserve the memory of a culture that may soon be destroyed forever.

2 Dominant Ideologies and Their Limits

Four Movies about Kashmir

Having gotten some idea of the situation in Kashmir and its sources, we may now turn to the ideologies that, in their distorted forms, guide much mainstream discussion of Kashmir. In order to do this, we will first consider some general principles about the relation between emplotment and ideology. We will attend especially to the ways in which emplotments may define not only specific ideological positions but the alternatives that are broadly considered reasonable. In connection with this, we will focus particularly on two influential films that in effect present the hard-line or "conservative" and "liberal" alternatives of mainstream Indian ideology on Kashmir. The chapter concludes with briefer treatments of two films that employ more unusual emplotments and begin to deviate, if only to a limited degree, from the ideological mainstream.

In any political conflict, we are accustomed to saying that there are two sides to the story. As usually intended, this is false, or at least misleading. To take the primary case of concern in these pages, there are many "sides" on the Kashmir issue, in the sense that there are many, often complex views of what grievances and what rights are at issue, how they arose, and how they might be resolved. The authors and filmmakers considered in the course of this book obviously share some ideas and diverge on others. But they do not separate into two alternatives, each homogeneous.

On the other hand, there does seem to be a sense in which one may reasonably speak of two sides, at least in some conflicts. The issue might be clarified by distinguishing two levels at which we may speak of conflict. At the level of particulars, we may say that there are specific motives of individuals and subgroups, various commonalities and

differences both within and across the parties in conflict. Thus there are various ideas and practices—both congruent and divergent, complementary and contradictory—among the Kashmiri militants, opposition politicians, ordinary Kashmiri people, the Indian government, and so on. At this level, it rarely makes sense to speak of two sides.[1]

But there is another level at which we might consider the ideologies of a conflict, the views about facts and about norms that guide the understanding of the conflict. Specifically, groups not only propagate particular accounts of specific conflicts. They also maintain broad principles that guide the formulation of such accounts. We may refer to these as *metaprinciples*. Metaprinciples shape which ideologies arise at a particular level. For example, in a wide range of nations today, there are only a few categories through which dissident groups may be understood. If the dissidents make any use of violent means, then they are almost certain to be classed as "terrorists," at least by the government to which they are opposed. This occurs even in cases where the state itself is making use of vastly more extensive and destructive violence and doing so precisely to terrorize the dissident population—as is usually the case (Stritzke and Lewandowsky point out that "in the twentieth century, for every civilian killed by non-state terrorism, 280 civilians were killed by state-sponsored terrorism" [3]).

Categories such as "terrorist" or "terrorist organization" are part of larger complexes of possible characterizations and explanations defined by metaprinciples. These possible characterizations and explanations form what are sometimes called *problematics*. Problematics are the sets of possible views that are acceptable within a given group, views that organize discussion of—or discourse on—a particular topic by setting out the main alternatives, such as *nonviolent dissident* versus *terrorist*. Of course, the problematic is not defined simply by labels. It includes possible ways of understanding the groups, actions or events, and conditions categorized by the metaprinciples. For example, in the case of "terrorists," this involves constraints on how terrorists are imagined, which is to say, how their thought processes and motives are conceived and whether or not we have any (parallel) empathic response to those thought processes and motives. In the standard view, the terrorist is not someone who has rational, positive goals and ordinary human feelings. Rather, he (or, more rarely, she) is someone who wishes simply to harm

some innocent people physically and disable other innocent people emotionally (through fear). When the account of terrorism goes beyond that, positing a guiding motivation, this is generally reduced to hate, as in President George W. Bush's question, "Why do they hate us?" (and his answer, "They hate our freedoms"; Bush, "Address").

At the particular level, then, we have multiplicity (a point nicely illustrated by Rushdie). On the issue of violent conflict, for example, we have a range of views—most obviously, those of the various militant groups, ordinary people in Kashmir (with all their diversity), different soldiers, and so on. In contrast, we have the relatively official discourse, the "dominant problematic." But here two questions arise. First, just what does it mean to say that a particular problematic is dominant if there are many different views among different people at any given time? Second, we have considered only a relatively univocal position—in this case, that terrorists are outside the realm of both rational and empathic consideration; where, then, does duality enter (i.e., where are the "two sides")?

The answer to the first question is straightforward. Problematics or discourses are relative to groups. Thus there are problematics governing the understanding of the Kashmir crisis not only in the Indian government but in the various militant groups and opposition parties. Indeed, we may distinguish different degrees of specificity at which problematics might be isolated. There is a broad problematic governing Indian governmental discourse on Kashmir, but more particular problematics governing Congress Party and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) discourses. At some level, however, one can usually isolate a problematic that governs what might be considered mainstream political and social discourse—government, media, and even ordinary political debate and discussion. The "dominant" problematic in this case may reflect deep-seated ways of thinking about the issues or more superficial ways of speaking only. The point is there is often a degree of conformity to standard ways of addressing a particular issue (e.g., violent political dissidence) in government and media, as well as so-called responsible scholarship, and other areas.

What about duality, then? This occurs within problematics. Ideological duality is not inevitable. Even so, there is a strong tendency for problematics to be organized by reference to two alternatives, often two

"extremes" that define putative limits. When there is strict uniformity in the views expressed by a group—in the case of dominant ideology, by the media, government, and so on—then we may speak of "unequivocal ideology." That certainly occurs. But issues on which there is unequivocal ideology are usually not subject to debate. Put differently, what is subject to official disagreement involves some ideological difference. No ideological system would survive—or even develop—if it required absolute uniformity of thought on all socially consequential issues down to details. Thus, virtually every topic must involve possibilities for divergence in views at some level. The function of problematics is twofold. First, they determine the level of specificity at which disagreement may occur. Second, they determine the range of such disagreement. That range often takes a dual form (e.g., liberal and conservative). For example, the supreme value of democracy is an unequivocal ideology in dominant Western discourse. However, there is room for disagreement at the level of the precise form of representative, electoral democracy. At this level, there are basically two alternatives, presidential or parliamentary. In this case, the alternatives are relatively discrete; they are subtypes of the general category. In other cases, the problematic establishes a less precisely defined limit to what may be considered reasonable dissent from a standard position. For example, in the case of "terrorism," the entirely dehumanizing view of "terrorists" may be understood as having a "liberal" alternative. This liberal view allows for a small number of dissidents who have comprehensible grievances and who have been deceived by their terrorist comrades into engaging in violence. A problematic that includes this liberal view serves to exclude recognition of more nuanced diversity among violent dissidents and acknowledgment of the—usually much greater—terrorism of the state's practices. Moreover, defining a partially rational group among dissidents provides a potential means of splitting the opposition and even recruiting collaborators. In any case, the key point here is that conditions do not define two sides to an issue or conflict. Ideological problematics commonly do.

Narrative and Nationalism

I have been speaking of problematics as if they are somewhat isolated, concept-like structures. However, they are complexes of interrelated ideas, commonly involving causal principles. As noted in the introduc-

tion, these causally structured complexes are most often developed in narrative sequences, typically following a few dominant genres. For example, in the case of the "War on Terror" in the United States, this emplotment takes up the heroic prototype. Thus it emplots the violence of September 11, 2001, on the model of an unprovoked foreign invasion.

More precisely, the fundamental components of any particular ideology are beliefs and feelings, a representation of just what the relevant, worldly situation is and a set of emotions that motivate action in relation to that situation. But, of course, these fundamental components do not operate in isolation. Scattered beliefs and diverse feelings do not give rise to concerted action—particularly not the coordinated action that is required across individuals in a group (whether state authorities or dissidents). Thus, the beliefs must be organized into structures. These structures include explanations of how the situation developed and projections of what future outcomes are likely or possible. The feelings too must be organized in relation to one another and in relation to the events, causes, and possible outcomes. Moreover, human motivational systems are complex. They involve fundamental emotional impulses, governed first of all by ancient subcortical structures (a point discussed extensively by Panksepp and Biven). But they also involve modulations of those impulses by more evolutionarily recent prefrontal structures. The prefrontal modulations are themselves complex because they must engage fundamental motivational systems in order to have behavioral effects. This point holds whether the modulation is prudential or ethical. In other words, in order to act against obvious self-interest for moral reasons, we need to have some sort of emotional engagement with the moral action (e.g., compassion with someone who would suffer from our self-interested behavior).

The standard human way of organizing situations, causes, consequences, actions, and emotions—including emotions bearing on ethical norms—is through narrative. Again, that narrative organization is not simply some minimal organization into sequences of agents pursuing goals, though it certainly includes that. Rather, it involves recurring structures. In other words, there are narrative forms that give a complex organization to our understanding of and response to political conditions and possibilities. These forms prominently include such cross-culturally recurring prototypes as the heroic and sacrificial plots.

As noted briefly in the introduction, the heroic plot has two story components. One is a usurpation sequence. In this part of the narrative, the legitimate authority structure of a society is disrupted and some illegitimate order is established. This commonly involves an initial betrayal, followed by the exile of the legitimate ruler. The other sequence involves an external rather than internal threat to the society, specifically the invasion by an enemy society. Typically, the invasion has initial success, threatening the home society, often until the legitimate leader returns and ends the foreign domination. The victory over invasion frequently involves a collaborator character, someone from the enemy camp who joins the home society. Both sequences in the heroic plot routinely involve divine election as well, which is to say, the preference of God for the home society over that of the enemy. In relation to this, the enemy is often identified as specifically irreligious and immoral or even demonic. (For cases of this genre, see Hogan, *Understanding Nationalism*, chapter 5, and on divine preference for the national in-group, 121–22.)

The heroic narrative is fundamental to all forms of nationalism (see Hogan, *Understanding Nationalism*, 16, 20, 216, 217, and 266). Other narrative prototypes play a role in nationalist thought and action. However, they come to prominence only in specific conditions. For example, the sacrificial plot is common in nationalist thought and action, but it tends to be most important in periods when the society is so devastated that it is impossible to imagine a heroic solution to the problem.

Again, heroic, sacrificial, romantic, and other nationalist emplotments recur cross-culturally and transhistorically, with the heroic structure as the default. But this is not to say that the emplotments are identical. There are four main reasons why precise narrative understanding varies despite the shared prototypes. First, the prototypes, even if unchanged, organize different particulars. In other words, emplotments are guided in part by the specific conditions they select and structure. No matter how much Saddam Hussein may be analogized to Adolf Hitler, the emplotment of World War II cannot be the same as the emplotment of the Iraq War, since what the heroic prototype shapes in the two cases is very different. On the other hand, such variable specification often seems to be fairly inconsequential for the ideological functions of the emplotment. In terms of what is commonly judged important—for example,

the assignment of culpability for violent conflict, the humanization or dehumanization of various participants, and other key factors—the heroic form often appears to overwhelm the specific historical conditions (as the recurring comparisons of Hitler and Hussein suggest). In this respect, the same ideas and attitudes do seem to recur with remarkable consistency over apparently diverse particulars.

We have already touched on the second reason that emplotments vary. Even for the same set of historical particulars, the mappings of structure to history may differ. We see a case of this sort when Indian and Pakistani government officials identify different usurpers and invaders in their heroic emplotments of Kashmiri history. Here, too, there is functional continuity, however. The ideological purposes of the emplotments are virtually identical on the Indian and Pakistani sides.

The third type of difference across emplotments results from the fact that, in some cases, the shaping narrative structure itself may be altered by the mapping process. In other words, the structure may require revision due to features of the target domain (i.e., the historical conditions that the structure is organizing). Consider the heroic plot and terrorism. The groups commonly labeled "terrorist" are most often not representative of an enemy nation. Nor do they necessarily take and hold territory in the nation that has been attacked—an apparently necessary condition for the invasion sequence of the heroic structure. In some cases (e.g., the September 11 attacks) their link with any sort of territorial possession even outside the attacked country is indirect and distant. In these and other ways, the default heroic emplotment of terrorism may need to be altered. Accommodating these differences is not simply a particularization of the structure in its application to the historical situation, since the mapping does not work at all points. Unsurprisingly, the revisions of the structure tend to preserve or extend the social function of the emplotment. Consider, again, the point that terrorism often does not bear on the acquisition of land or resources. One common version of the antiterrorist heroic plot deals with this by positing sheer irrational hatred as the motivation for the violence—hatred of our freedoms, for example (as in Bush's speech, as already noted). Terrorism, then, becomes a pure act of violence for the sake of violence—hence an act that is incomprehensible by reference to ordinary human motives.

On the other hand, here, too, the prototype seems to be much more robust than one would anticipate. For example, policy makers—and probably many ordinary people—are strongly committed to finding nations behind nonnational terrorist acts. After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government invaded Afghanistan, in effect treating Afghanistan as the nation responsible for the "invasion" of our soil. Similarly, the official Indian line on Kashmiri militancy has been that it is the result of infiltration from the national enemy, Pakistan. Of course, in the latter case, the standard heroic structure is reinforced by the fact that there is a dispute over land and one historical possibility is that Kashmir will join Pakistan.

The final way in which nationalist emplotments may differ is perhaps the most important. Narrative structures do not have their effects solely at the level of prototypes. They operate through specific stories or exempla—especially paradigmatic cases, high canonical works that are widely admired in a society. These specific cases clearly differ from society to society. In the Indian tradition, perhaps the prime case of this is the *Rāmāyaṇa*, not only in literature and film, but also in Indian politics. Before turning to particular emplotments of Kashmir, it is worth considering the *Rāmāyaṇa* in slightly more detail than that given in chapter 1.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* and the Nation

The *Rāmāyaṇa* is one of the two great Sanskrit epic poems. But, unlike epic poetry in the West, it is also considered a sacred text. It recounts the actions of Rāma, an incarnation of the god Viṣṇu. In the Hindu pantheon, Viṣṇu is widely considered to be the single supreme deity whose ultimate form encompasses all divinity. When the world is threatened by evil, he takes on incarnate form to save the world. As Rāma, he is widely revered as the perfect exemplar of dharma or ethical duty. In keeping with this, he protects the world against the evil *rākṣasa* or demon, Rāvaṇa. Rāma's wife, Sītā, is the incarnation of the goddess Lakṣmī, the consort of Viṣṇu. Just as Rāma is viewed as the exemplar of dharma generally, Sītā is revered as the exemplar of wifely dharma. A key event in the epic is Rāma's exile, a version of the usurpation plot in which Rāma's brother is awarded the throne. Sītā insists on sharing his suffering, rather than remaining at home in luxury.

As the reference to Sītā may already suggest, the *Rāmāyaṇa* combines a romantic narrative with the heroic narrative. This works out in the invasion sequence. Due to a request by Sītā, Rāma engages in an imprudent action, leaving her for a hunt. With Rāma out of the way, the *rākṣasa* king, Rāvaṇa, comes and abducts her. This abduction is a version of the action of the "rival" in the romantic plot, and here it substitutes for the conquest of land in the heroic plot. Thus, following the usurpation, we have a sort of invasion. However, the invasion does not involve conquering the land; it involves taking a person. After Sītā is abducted, Rāma spends some time bemoaning his state. Eventually he gathers allies to attack Rāvaṇa. In the course of this process, he is assisted by his selfless brother Lakṣmaṇa as well as a foreign ally, Hanumān. Crucially, his eventual defeat of Rāvaṇa is assisted by the defection of Vibhīṣaṇa, Rāvaṇa's brother. Vibhīṣaṇa is the "reasonable" and "moderate" *rākṣasa* who cannot side with the bad guys because he has a good heart and recognizes their evil ways. Needless to say, the defection has nothing to do with the fact that he is made ruler of Rāvaṇa's kingdom after Rāma's victory. Other characters who have a perhaps more disinterested commitment to justice would include the *rākṣasīs* (female *rākṣasas*) who befriend Sītā in captivity. Perhaps most important, at one point, Rāvaṇa tricks Sītā into believing that Rāma has been killed. The *rākṣasī* Śaramā reveals to Sītā that this is deception.

After Rāma wins the war, he and Sītā are united—though Sītā has to pass through an ordeal by fire to prove that she has not been unfaithful when in the custody of Rāvaṇa. The couple then returns to Rāma's kingdom, where he is installed as the legitimate ruler. Here again we see the development of the romantic-heroic combination. The reunion of Rāma and Sītā substitutes for the restoration of the conquered land. The test of Sītā to some degree recalls a determination of which officials had been loyal to the legitimate ruler and who had collaborated with the enemy. Finally, the coronation of Rāma is the usual restoration of the rightful leader.

The broad narrative of conflict between the dharmic Rāma and the adharmic (immoral) Rāvaṇa is commonplace in Indian treatments of national conflict, particularly conflict with the great national enemy, Pakistan. However, the details of the plot almost appear designed to treat terrorism. Among other things, the story avoids the issue of land.

In addition, it involves kidnapping, a crime commonly associated with terrorism. Moreover, *rākṣasas* are cannibals. Thus Rāvaṇa threatens to eat Sītā if she does not succumb to his desires. This serves as an apt parallel for the supposed barbarism of terrorists, sometimes associated with the mutilation of their victims. The only drawback of the story is that it does give the terrorist a sort of human motivation, since Rāvaṇa is driven not only by lust but also by family loyalty, since Rāma has mutilated his sister. This part of the story is usually not stressed in its nationalist uses.

The importance of the noble collaborationist, Vibhīṣaṇa, obviously fits with the liberal emplotment of terrorism. Perhaps more interesting is that a similar point holds for the more sincere *rākṣasī* companions of Sītā. It is common for the denigration of out-groups to distinguish, sometimes sharply, between the men and women of the out-group. For example, few white Americans would have the same reaction to seeing a black woman in a dark alley as they would to seeing a black man. There are often two aspects to this. First, women are viewed as more humane, thus more likely to recognize and feel compassion for our suffering. (In heroic narratives, the primary victims are in-group members—even if, in actual fact, the enemy has suffered far more.) Second, these women are themselves victims of the same irrationally hostile men as we are. Indeed, a commonplace of liberal propaganda involves justifying attacks on enemy men in defense of women from the enemy group. (One need only think of the putative benefits of the American-European invasion of Afghanistan.) This to some extent creates the image of "enemy" women as natural allies of the in-group.[2] (The relevance of these points will become clear when we turn to the film *Roja*.)

L.O.C.: Kargil and Heroic Tragicomedy

In the following chapters, we will be considering some of the individual diversity that characterizes views of Kashmir. However, this chapter focuses primarily on the ways in which the dominant problematic is both established by and manifest in popular narratives. To do this, we will begin with the "two sides" of the dominant problematic and its emplotments as represented by two popular films: J. P. Dutta's *L.O.C.: Kargil* and Mani Ratnam's *Roja*. As represented by these films, both sides of the dominant problematic are greatly simplified in comparison with

the nuanced complexity of Salman Rushdie's depiction in *Shalimar the Clown*.[3] This is not to say that they are equally simplified. Since it is a relatively more complex case, we will focus most of the following discussion on *Roja*. However, it is valuable to treat *L.O.C.* first precisely because of its relative simplicity, as well as its straightforward conformity to the main elements of the heroic threat/defense (or invasion) scenario. We might say that it is a relatively *untroubled* nationalist emplotment. For example, as we will discuss in the following section, *Roja* repudiates violence generally, whereas *L.O.C.* in effect celebrates violence committed by "our" side. One result of this is that *L.O.C.* can present in-group violence, whereas *Roja* must conceal or deny that violence. Factors such as this make the ideological thematics of *L.O.C.* relatively overt.

The film concerns the battle between India and Pakistan over the Line of Control (L.O.C.) dividing Kashmir between those nations. J. P. Dutta, the writer and director of the film, cannot be accused of greatly distorting the basic facts, since the war, considered narrowly, does fit the invasion/defense scenario. As Navnita Chadha Behera summarizes, "In the spring of 1999, the Pakistani army attempted to infiltrate regular troops . . . across a 150-kilometer stretch of the Line of Control," occupying territory on the Indian side (67). Pakistan shelled areas farther inside Indian territory (see Jamal 190). In contrast, "India decided not to cross the Line of Control or bomb the supply lines of intruders in the enemy's rear" (Behera 68).

These facts are important, and it is perfectly fair of Dutta to present them. This remains a nationalist and ideologically distorting emplotment, however, first of all because it reduces the history of the Kashmir dispute to this encapsulated event. Pakistan did, indeed, invade. Nonetheless, in the Pakistani view, India did not have a right to the territory that it was claiming and it was brutally denying Kashmiris the right to self-determination (not that Pakistan was doing any better in Pakistani Kashmir; see Behera 184–89 and Human Rights Watch, "With Friends"). Moreover, it seems clear that the Pakistani objectives were limited to—at most—"liberating" Kashmir. Pakistan never aimed at conquering India. The force of the invasion/defense emplotment comes from the threat to the entire nation posed by the enemy. This is brought out by a tagline of the film, "For Your Tomorrow They Gave Their Today." There is no clear way in which any possible addressee of the film was saved

from death (having a "tomorrow") by the deaths of the Indian soldiers. Given the violence of the Indian Army in Kashmir, it cannot be Kashmiris who were saved; given that the Pakistani objectives can hardly have stretched far into India itself, it cannot be Indians elsewhere. Note that the sense of threat is important for the consequences of the film's ideology. Empirical research indicates that a sense of threat promotes right-wing and "authoritarian" thinking even among liberals (Taber and Young 539). In addition, by leaving out earlier history, the film does what nationalist emplotments of war invariably do: they present the conflict as having an absolute and singular origin. Pakistan did invade. But there were multiple events stretching back over a half century that led to this invasion; none can be isolated as the true beginning, the ultimate explanation of the war.

Of course, even the putatively initiating event requires some sort of explanation. In the case of nationalist war writing, that explanation commonly lies in the perfidy of the out-group. Establishing this explanation may involve elaborating on the character of the out-group. One way of doing this is by drawing on models that make the invasion more apparently comprehensible. These models include wild animals, such as rodents or insects whose nature drives them to encroach on human (i.e., in-group) space. As we will see, Dutta engages in just this sort of modeling.

The film begins with shots of Indian corpses, clearly suggesting that they have been killed without warning by invading Pakistanis. Confining the events entirely to 1999 and the L.O.C., this may be fair. However, it is clearly not fair in presenting the Indian military as the primary victims of violence in the region. In subsequent scenes, we see wounded soldiers complaining of an ambush. The presentation is systematic—one has lost an arm; another, an eye; a third, his leg. The opening sequences clearly establish Pakistan as the aggressor and India as the victim in the standard heroic scenario.

To make clear the connection with the situation in Kashmir, an early scene presents two Muslim men attaching a bomb to a bridge. Their nefarious plot is stopped by the Indian military, who kill one of the terrorists. These soldiers are about to be sent to the L.O.C. The tacit implication is that they are fighting the same enemy in each case. Indeed, in a later scene, one of the soldiers wonders if these enemies are humans or

wild beasts. His officer says that they are humans, but crazed jihādis, like in the Kashmir Valley.

In keeping with the reference to beasts (*jānvar*), the first dialogue of the film reports that "some rats" have crossed the L.O.C. into India. This is the first suggestion that the film will employ a dehumanizing and disgust-provoking model for the Pakistanis, reducing their motives for the invasion to the usual invasive tendencies of vermin. The soldiers say that they will "crush the rats." In keeping with disgust-provoking models of out-groups generally, this model fosters the desire to exterminate the enemy and works to inhibit any tendencies we may have to experience empathy with the out-group and thus to oppose violence against them.[4] Even the most nonviolent among us is rarely opposed to killing rats, and this is particularly true when the rats are in one's house. A few scenes later, the film presents the Pakistani invasion of India as an entry into our house. Subsequent scenes develop these and related metaphors. When not objects of disgust, the models present objects of great fear. For example, in one speech to the troops, an officer explains that there are some wolves in their house. Asked what they should do, the troops shout, "Kill them!" Self-evidently, one does not, for example, negotiate with a wolf in one's house. This model thus precludes nonviolent solutions to the political situation it is being used to understand.

Clearly, modeling in these cases is related to the broader issue of humanization. The Indian soldiers are extensively humanized, prominently through the development of attachment relations (e.g., their memories of parting from family members). In contrast, we almost never see even the faces of the Pakistani soldiers. For example, when the Indians die, we view their anguished faces and are given their inner thoughts—usually, memories of their families. We are prepared for these dying recollections by the elaborate development of attachment relations through flashbacks to individual soldiers' prewar lives in the course of the film. The attachment development also serves the cause of army recruitment, appealing to the sexual fantasies of adolescent males, who see beautiful, glamorous actresses singing songs of profound longing for their *sipāhī* (soldier). (Like most Hindi films, *L.O.C.* is a musical—hence the singing.) In contrast, when Pakistani soldiers are killed, we typically see them only for a moment and only from behind.

There are a few points in the film where there is a slight deviation from this pattern. For example, we see one Pakistani soldier's face repeatedly. However, it is difficult to imagine that many viewers respond favorably to a visage so palpably communicating hatred. In addition, later in the film a soldier remarks that the Pakistanis fought bravely—thus at least crediting them with some military virtue. But we also see Pakistani soldiers running away in fear. The image is likely to have much more of an effect on viewers than the verbal assertion. Finally, at one point a soldier says that they should respect a dead Pakistani because he too was someone's son. But soon after that, another soldier insists that these Pakistani soldiers are not even human.

Unsurprisingly, the national identity categorizations are bound up with religious ones. The film makes some gestures toward religious inclusion on the Indian side. (In contrast, the Pakistani soldiers at one point explicitly denounce Indians as *kāfir* (infidels), thus directly indicating religious intolerance.) Nonetheless, the soldiers repeatedly invoke specifically Hindu slogans, which serve to stress the religious opposition with Pakistan. Thus, early in the film, the troops shout "Jaya Mā Kālī" (Victory to Mother Kālī), referring to the Hindu goddess of destructive time (see Daniélou 270–74). Later in the film, battalions repeatedly call out for the protection of Hindu deities or victory to those deities. Fundamentally, this is part of the cross-cultural pattern in which groups assume that God (or the greatest of the gods) favors the in-group in the conflict. As an officer puts it at one point in the film, "Bhagvān hamāre sāth haī" (God is with us). Again, this divine favor is in addition repeatedly identified as specifically Hindu. Once Indian soldiers do call out to Allāh. But it turns out that this is a deceit. A Muslim soldier has led his Hindu and Sikh comrades in deceiving the Pakistanis by crying out to Allāh, thereby suggesting that they too are Pakistani. This deceit allows the Indian soldiers to approach the enemy without danger. That approach is, of course, followed by killing the Pakistani soldiers. Though a Muslim soldier designs and leads this deceit, it is difficult not to see it as at least verging on blasphemy as it is a self-consciously deceitful use of God's name. In any case, the film fairly consistently identifies India with Hinduism and Pakistan with Islam, thus aligning the national and religious identity categories. The Muslim who initiates the deceit is in this way the "good collaborator" character from the

standard heroic plot. Though Indian, he operates as a member of the out-group who has joined the side of the in-group.

Needless to say, as a heroic narrative, *L.O.C.* has its share of heroism. Indeed, the soldiers are almost superhuman. Their chests filled with bullets, they still manage to keep running until they can kill the Pakistani soldiers and blow up their machine guns. In the end, they defeat the Pakistanis. Though there is sorrow, due to the loss of so many lives, the overall suggestion is that the soldiers gave their lives bravely for a noble cause. Thus it is incumbent upon those who are still alive to honor their memory by supporting the nation. That support centrally includes preserving the territorial integrity of India against invasion of the national home by rats and wolves. Moreover, that support may be guaranteed by proper devotion to Hindu deities. It is a very simple, military ideology, relying on a straightforward use of the heroic narrative prototype. As such, it basically defines the hard-line, right-wing ideological position on Kashmir in the dominant Indian problematic.

Propaganda and Individuality in *Roja*

Mani Ratnam's 1992 film *Roja*, "an enormous success all over India" (Thoraval 340), is both similar to and different from *L.O.C.*, for it is the "other side" of the dominant problematic. One obvious way of characterizing the ideological difference between the films is by saying that *Roja* manifests a liberal, humanist nationalism—that is to say, a nationalism that espouses broadly liberal attitudes on social issues and that rejects subnational identity categories, such as religion, while remaining firmly nationalist. Moreover, in keeping with his humanism, Ratnam clearly views killing as wrong. This poses a problem for a film that sets out to support the national military. Ratnam's solution to this is to portray the Indian military as killing no one and the Kashmiri militants as killing massively. In contrast, *L.O.C.* presents us with a more standard militaristic and, in one sense, conservative nationalism. It is not clear that the film actually takes any particular stand on social issues. However, it clearly does not view all killing as bad. Killing the enemy is, in *L.O.C.*, a good thing.

More exactly, the ideological position of *Roja* is first signaled by the fact that the opening credit of the film is devoted to thanking the Indian Ministry of Defence. This expression of gratitude clearly applies

to the making of the film itself, but its placement at the beginning of the film also suggests that Ratnam is more generally expressing his gratitude for the behavior of the Indian defense forces in Kashmir. As Yves Thoraval points out, the film received "logistic help from the Indian Armed Forces" and was "officially blessed by some governmental circles in New Delhi" (340). As Rustom Bharucha explains, "Not only has this unprecedented commercial blockbuster received the implicit blessings and very direct support of the ministry of defence, it has also been awarded a prize for national integration from the government of India." Moreover, "the votaries of the Hindu right in the Bharatiya Janata Party, notably its leader L. K. Advani, have also endorsed the message of the film."

Again, the one way in which Ratnam deviates from the default emplotment is that he rejects killing of any sort. One might admire the director for this consistent stance (as opposed to the militarist view, which says their killings are bad while ours are good), but the problem is that this leads to an almost pathological distortion of the facts. Numerous human rights and other reports have attested to the great brutality of the Indian Army in Kashmir, as we have already seen. Moreover, the policy result of Ratnam's presentation is, in a key respect, indistinguishable from the militarist nationalism of *L.O.C.*—unqualified support of the Indian military in Kashmir. Indeed, these two films present an almost ideal representation of a dominant problematic. One celebrates the superior violence of the national in-group; the other asserts the innocence of the national in-group. Though in one sense very different, both have the same implications regarding national militarism.

Other differences have the same consequence of serving to support the Indian government's main policies on Kashmir, again nicely illustrating the operation of dominant problematics. The most important instance of this concerns gender. *L.O.C.* does not treat "enemy" women; *Roja*'s representation of Kashmiri militancy strongly suggests a broad difference between men and women with regard to terrorism. Though there are a few young women involved in the insurgency, the film indicates that the militancy is almost entirely male and that women may feel empathy with Indian men and a sort of solidarity with Indian women. This would be unexceptionable if it were in accord with the facts. But, as Seema Kazi explains, "The movement for *azadi* [freedom]

had strong resonance amongst Kashmiri Muslim women and simultaneously afforded them an opportunity for political self-expression" (140). She goes on to document their extensive and active involvement in the independence movement. Similarly, Suranjan Das notes "the establishment of women's organizations . . . with the explicit purpose of defending male militants from aggressions of Indian security forces," one of which "was believed to have enrolled 70,000 volunteers" by May 1990 (52–53).

Ratnam also suggests that the social position of women (at least Hindu women) in South India is significantly superior to that of women (at least Muslim women) in Kashmir. In the years after the film, many women did become alienated from the insurgency due to its increasingly religious and patriarchal character (see Kazi 172). What is most important here, however, is that this suggestion of possible liberation for women is part of one standard liberal justification of war against specifically Islamic militants.

Here we begin to see the more individually distinctive elements in Ratnam's treatment of Kashmir. Specifically, he appears to have three broad thematic purposes in the film. The most important is to support the "national integrity" of India. This has both overt and covert components. The overt component, on which we will be concentrating, concerns the rejection of Kashmiri separatism and the vehement condemnation of Kashmiri terrorism. The covert component involves a parallel rejection of Tamil nationalism. As to the latter, Ratnam produced his film through the Tamil film industry. For decades, this industry had, in part, generated propaganda for Tamil nationalism (see Thoraval 318–19). In this context, Ratnam is in some ways taking a boldly resistant stance, strongly affirming the unity of India and thereby repudiating Tamil nationalism along with Kashmiri nationalism. This aspect seems to have gone largely unnoticed in reception of the film, though there has been some suggestion of it in Tamil Nadu; as Tejaswini Niranjana reports, "When the film was released in 1992 in Tamil Nadu, many people are supposed to have seen it as an exorcism of the collective guilt felt by Tamilians over Rajiv Gandhi's assassination" by a Tamil militant (82n10).

We may distinguish between primary and subsidiary themes in a film. A primary theme is not only prominent but may subsume other themes. The affirmation of India's national integrity and the associated

condemnation of terrorism constitute the primary thematic concern of *Roja*. The other two themes mentioned above are subsidiary. They concern gender and tradition. With respect to the former, Ratnam clearly wishes to reject at least some aspects of patriarchal gender relations. First, he wishes to celebrate the power and authority of women in South Indian society, and depicts them as strong, competent, and far from submissive. In contrast, he clearly condemns the Kashmiri Muslim subordination of women. This is represented particularly in the relation between Liaqat, who is the central militant in the story, and his sister. Liaqat beats her more than once in the film, even drawing blood. More generally, she is terrified of him. As these points suggest, the gender concerns of the film are important on their own, but they also contribute to the condemnation of the Kashmiri militancy; hence their status as a subsidiary theme.

On the other hand, Ratnam does have other, more autonomous gender concerns, particularly surrounding sexual double standards. First of all, Ratnam does not fetishize female chastity. He hints that Roja's sister has had premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend. More significantly, he also stresses the sexual union of Roja and Rishi, including Roja's sexual enjoyment. As we will see, Roja takes up the role of Sītā in Ratnam's use of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. This sexualization of Roja may be viewed as rejecting the apparent frigidity of Sītā, as she is widely understood. Alternatively, Ratnam might be seen as restoring the sexuality suggested in Vālmīki's original. For example, in canto 30 of the Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa, when pleading with Rāma to bring her with him in exile, Sītā explains, "With infinite delight, O you of the lovely eyes, I shall sport with you" (Ragunathan) and, "As I follow behind you I shall no more tire on the path than on our pleasure beds" (Pollock). In addition, Ratnam rejects the usual confinement of female sexuality to the young. In film, it is not unusual to have a middle-aged or older man who is still sexually active (often with a very young woman), but Ratnam repeatedly represents older women as sexual beings. This is, in fact, probably the most radical aspect of *Roja*. Though not directly relevant to our present discussion, it is important to recognize the political range and complexity of Ratnam's film.

The final set of thematic concerns in *Roja* is that of tradition. Ratnam presents many aspects of tradition as valuable. Indeed, in many

ways, the film expresses a sort of romantic antimodernism. The good and happy people of the film ride in bullock carts or pass down the streams in small, traditionally built boats. One of the main concerns of the film is the *chhoṭī sī āśā*, or "smallish hope," that makes life meaningful and such hope seems to be intertwined with traditional practices. It contrasts sharply with the large aspiration of militant groups, just as the traditional practices contrast with the weapons of the militants (and even those of the army). As this point indicates, the advocacy of traditional simplicity contributes to the primary theme of opposing the separatist terrorism in Kashmir. On the other hand, here, too, Ratnam is not merely taking a standard position but modifying it through reference to his liberal humanism. Specifically, he supports tradition only to the extent that it does not harm women. Thus, he shows that traditional arranged marriage may turn out very well (as in the case of Rishi and Roja). But, at the same time, the early sequence with Roja's sister supports a woman's free choice in marriage.

We will, of course, be concerned with the primary theme of the film and the way it is developed through the emplotment of the situation in Kashmir. Before beginning to treat individual scenes in the work, however, it is worth briefly outlining the plot and its relation to the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

Wasim Khan is a terrorist who has killed fifty people. The Indian military capture him. Meanwhile, in the south, Rishi Kumar marries Roja. During this sequence of scenes, one of the women explicitly refers to the *Rāmāyaṇa*, thereby calling it to the viewer's mind (though given its ubiquity as a model in Indian film and politics, that was probably unnecessary[5]). Rishi is sent to Kashmir to work for military intelligence. Like Sītā with Rāma, Roja insists that she will go too and, after a brief struggle, succeeds in persuading Rishi. Shortly after their arrival, Roja's whim leads Rishi to behave somewhat imprudently. In consequence, Rishi is kidnapped by Kashmiri militants, whom Roja explicitly refers to as *rākṣasas* (demons, such as Sītā's kidnapper, Rāvaṇa). (Perhaps the most narratively interesting aspect of Ratnam's use of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is this reversal of the abduction—changing it, in effect, from Sītā to Rāma—which is consistent with the film's more progressive gender politics.) The militants are led by Liaqat, played by Pankaj Kapoor, who is supplied with a sizable, witchlike nasal wart for this role. They

demand the release of Wasim Khan in exchange for Rishi. They explain that if Khan is not released, they will dismember Rishi—probably as close as one can get to the behavior of *rākṣasa* cannibals in this context.

Ultimately, Rishi's exchange for Khan is arranged. At this point, though, the militants inexplicably claim to have killed Rishi. This recalls Rāvaṇa's deception of Sītā regarding the death of Rāma, though that makes much more sense as a plot development in the *Rāmāyaṇa* than it does here. In any case, Roja does not believe that Rishi is dead. She says that she will be able to discover the truth through the women of Kashmir. Though the film is inexplicit, it seems to be hinted that she does just that. In the next scene, Liaqat is striking his sister and looking at her with what is evidently dismay; Rishi has escaped. The implication is that Liaqat's sister is the one responsible for Rishi's freedom, perhaps following some sort of women's solidarity work on the part of Roja and, in any case, indicating a similarity of attitude in the women. In real life, the army would have reason to approach this woman, since it was known that Rishi had been held in her home. However, rather than a sympathetic connection between two women, a far more likely scenario would have been the arrest and torture of the entire family, perhaps accompanied by the burning of the house. In any case, the Śaramā-like role of this sister seems evident. (As has been noted above, Śaramā is the *rākṣasī* or demoness who reveals to Sītā that Rāma has not died.)

In the end, Liaqat finds himself betrayed by Pakistan. He encounters the escaped Rishi and, rather than recapturing him, helps him to return to the Indian military. Rishi asserts that Liaqat is good at heart and urges him to reject terrorism. The film ends with the possibility that the good-hearted Liaqat—who earlier boasted of having killed more than twenty-five people—may repudiate violence and come to the negotiating table. His benevolent look at the end of the film contrasts starkly with the rabid expression ("demented," as Bharucha puts it) that is characteristic of Wasim Khan. Evidently Liaqat plays Vibhīṣaṇa to Wasim Khan's Rāvaṇa.

Perhaps the most surprising and interesting parallel concerns Sītā's fire ordeal. Again, Sītā has to pass through fire unharmed to prove that her loyalty to Rāma has never wavered. Similarly, during captivity, Rishi rescues the Indian flag from the militants. Though he is set on fire in the course of the fight, he, like Sītā, emerges unharmed. He thereby

proves his unwavering loyalty to India. The sequence is repeated in a sort of epilogue to the main story of the film.

This outline should already suggest the ways in which Ratnam uses the *Rāmāyaṇa* to organize the viewer's cognitive understanding of the Kashmir insurgency in line with the dominant problematic.[6] It is important to stress that this modeling has not only cognitive but motivational consequences in an Indian context. Niranjana reports that the film provoked "displays of 'nationalistic' fervour" from audience members, including shouts from the audience: "Victory to Mother India" and "Death to Pakistan." For our purposes, perhaps the most interesting slogan is "Victory to Śrī Rāma" (79; "Śrī" is an honorific). However, to gain a fuller sense of both the cognitive and emotional operations of the film, we need to go through it in greater detail.

The narrative begins just before dawn. Though the place is identified as Srinagar, the capital city of Kashmir, the events occur outside any city. A military convoy enters, and soldiers and dogs leave the vehicles. It is a morning raid on a militant enclave. Unlike many real army actions, this one is safely removed from civilians, who are therefore clearly not endangered by the Indian Army. The militants begin firing on the army soldiers; they also use grenades. The army only returns fire; it does not initiate fire, and does not use more indiscriminately destructive explosives. In keeping with this, but not with real military operations, the army does not kill a single rebel. In contrast, we see the militants kill four soldiers. We are later told that the number slain was actually fifteen. In the course of the raid, the army uncovers a huge arms cache and they arrest Wasim Khan. In short, the militants murder while the army only detains murderers and captures weapons—which is to say, the army prevents murder. Even if viewers are not self-consciously aware of this discrepancy, it is very likely to mark their emotional attitudes toward the two sides. In addition, Khan has the look of a maniac or a caged animal when he is caught, potentially provoking fright in viewers—in a caption, he is identified as "ātaṃkvādi": a terrorist, or one who supports or advocates (causing) fear. Liaqat, his second in command, has his prominent wart, which may provoke disgust.

The second scene takes us to the opposite end of the nation. There, too, the sun is rising. However, while Kashmir is grim and violent, Sunderbhanpur is bright and cheerful (a point made by Niranjana

[82n5]). The heroine, Roja, is singing a song about how the little heart is filled with smallish hope, *chhoṭī sī āśā*. This delightful little hope is illustrated by Roja's joy in bathing, dancing, playing with family members, and other ordinary daily activities. In addition to the degrees of light, there are two striking contrasts between these opening scenes. The first is that the pictures of ordinary daily life and the joys of fulfilled smallish hope focus almost entirely on women and girls, while the Kashmir scene focused entirely on men. Second, the ordinary people of Roja's village are Hindu. This becomes clear when we find Roja worshipping at a shrine of the Hindu god Gaṇeśa. Of course, in itself, this is perfectly fine. But it suggests an opposition to the Muslims of the opening scene. Moreover, the song hints at a more specific contrast in the status of women when Roja sings that the clouds are her *cunnī*, or veil—presumably as opposed to the rather more proximate and concealing veil of Muslim tradition. Indeed, one of her little joys is taking a degree, as we see her in a cap and gown, not in a veil. At the same time, Ratnam connects the small hope with tradition—the very unmodern vehicles (such as the bullock cart) already noted, an individual fisher casting his net, women engaging in traditional dance. Finally, all this may point to a broader opposition in which the small hope that brings joy in daily life is contrasted with the big hope of, for example, national independence—the abstract hope of *āzādī*, or freedom, violently proclaimed by Liaqat later in the film. Even for partisans of smallish hopes, however, there is a problem here. In conditions of colonial domination, the joys of daily life may be rendered impossible. In other words, they require some sort of freedom as their condition, a point the film fails to recognize.

The subsequent scenes follow Rishi's visit to the village to marry Lakshmi, Roja's sister. Lakshmi considers another man her husband, but her father has refused to allow this marriage due to a grudge between the two families. Lakshmi recruits Rishi to help her. He therefore refuses the marriage, precipitating a small crisis. Lakshmi's and Roja's grandmother appeals to her son (the girls' father) to allow Lakshmi to marry her beloved. The argument is simple and reasonable. The feud was begun in a previous generation. There is no reason to carry it over to the present. The fairly clear suggestion of the scene is that there is a parallel situation in Kashmir and perhaps in Hindu-Muslim relations more generally. An earlier generation made an error, but we should not

allow that error to poison our relations in the present. The point is actually a reasonable one in relation to Hindu-Muslim conflict. Generational antagonism continues to plague India, as both Hindus and Muslims recall the communal violence perpetrated against their parents or grandparents during partition. It simply does not make sense to blame some Hindus or Muslims today for what other Hindus or Muslims did decades earlier. On the other hand, the argument does not apply well to Kashmir, where the violence is ongoing and not primarily that of a past generation.

Lakshmi, her beloved, Rishi, and Roja are now married in a double wedding. Ratnam develops the tradition of women singing at the marriage ceremony in a quite admirable way. He does not gather up a set of Hollywood beauties and he does not purify the songs into some sort of rarified spirituality. He uses ordinary middle-aged and older women, and the songs are clearly and joyously sexual. Moreover, the songs call to mind Kṛṣṇa—another incarnation of Viṣṇu—and his wife, Rukminī, an incarnation of the goddess Lakṣmī (see Daniélou 262), thus suggesting the consistency of robust female sexuality with Hindu tradition.

Ratnam makes a similarly positive use of Hindu tradition in Roja's relation to Gaṇeśa. The intimacy and affection she has with the deity are very sweet. It is unfortunate that the film seems to use this to suggest problems with the abstract devotion to Allāh. But in itself Ratnam has picked up a valuable and tender aspect of Hinduism that, in my view, merits celebration. Moreover, the relation of this intimacy and affection to the smallish hopes of Roja's life is important. Indeed, Ratnam is not wrong that there is something problematic about grand goals and fierce allegiances. James Joyce's Stephen Dedalus expresses a similar sentiment when he remarks, "I fear those big words . . . which make us so unhappy." The smallish hope and personified, relatable deities of Roja's world have real social value and that should not be forgotten or demeaned.

Of course, at the same time, Roja's small hopes and tender devotions are not disturbed by an occupying army. Moreover, despite all the talk of smallish hope and its little joys, Rishi is working toward a rather big hope. Specifically, after the marriage, he is sent to Kashmir to decrypt messages being sent into Kashmir, presumably from Pakistan. In short, he is part of a great project of maintaining the territorial integrity of

India—surely a project no less abstract than that of the militants, and one without any obvious justification. For example, there is clearly no democratic rationale for this, with polls consistently showing that Kashmiris overwhelmingly favor independence from India (see Bradnock 15 for relatively recent figures; see Kazi 103 for an earlier poll).

With respect to the ideological operation of the film, it is important that Rishi's assignment concerns Baramulla (though there seems to be some geographical unclarity in the film). This was presumably chosen at least in part to recall what is perhaps the most famous site of atrocities in the 1947 uprising and invasion. As Andrew Whitehead explains, "From the moment of the Indian army's entry into Baramulla, the violence the town had witnessed at the hands of the invading forces [i.e., those that had previously come from Pakistan] was publicised and recited as evidence of their—and their instigators' [i.e., Pakistan's]—cruelty and callousness towards Kashmir and its people" (231). In short, Baramulla serves as a symbol of the Indian Army "saving" Kashmir from Pakistan-supported insurgents. It implicitly frames the current conflict in terms of the 1947 conflict.

After Rishi's mission is announced, we cut to Kashmir. In a brief montage sequence, Ratnam presumably aims to give us a sense of the real conditions in Kashmir. He begins with soldiers marching in place. Suddenly there is a great explosion behind them. This clearly indicates that the militants are yet again initiating the violence. The reasons that they are initiating violence are indicated in the following shot: the militants are doing *namaaz*—that is, engaging in Muslim prayer, facing Mecca. The conjunction of the violence and the *namaaz* suggests that they are engaging in violence because of Islam. Moreover, it hints that they have an almost worshipful attitude toward the violence itself. In keeping with this, each militant prostrates himself beside his weapon, as if the guns were part of the prayer itself. This leads to a shot of a military convoy driving along a road, which explodes with mines.

When Rishi arrives, he is observed and photographed by the militants. They not only photograph him from outside, but even from inside a government building, suggesting that they have spies in the army or police. This is undoubtedly the case. However, that fact does not so much indicate the perfidy of the militants (the apparent suggestion of the film) as the broad appeal of their cause.

While being driven to their lodging, Rishi remarks casually on the curfew and its necessity for security reasons. This makes a curfew appear perfectly normal and obscures the great hardships experienced by people living under it. For example, Patricia Gossman explains that strict curfew "seriously impaired health services" (15).

Rishi and Roja subsequently frolic in Kashmiri nature, occasionally in the vicinity of some rather sedately dancing Kashmiri women. There are several purposes to this scene. First, it suggests the continuity between South India and North India. The Kashmiri Muslim women are hardly as exuberant as their South Indian, Hindu counterparts. Nonetheless, they have the same sort of hope and joys. Moreover, they share the delight in nature. The second purpose is to develop our sense of the attachment bonds between the couple. This will serve to make their separation more affecting.

Rishi's kidnapping occurs soon after this scene. Roja rushes to the authorities where she (a Tamil speaker) finds herself unable to communicate the problem. This would strike Kashmiri viewers as highly ironic. The typical situation in Kashmir is a mirror image of this. A woman rushes to the military authorities to plead that her husband or son has disappeared, probably at the hands of the military, but as a Kashmiri speaker she cannot communicate with the soldiers. In good ideological fashion, the film takes a situation of oppression of the dominated group (here, Kashmiri Muslims) and presents it as imposed on the dominant group (here, non-Kashmiri, Indian Hindus).

The first scene of Rishi's captivity begins with an extended point-of-view shot. We pass through the winding paths of the village with no sense of whose point of view we are adopting. Repeatedly, militant guards pop out onto the path, weapons ready, only to recognize "us" and retreat. Finally, we learn that "we" are Liaqat's sister, who is bringing food to Rishi. There are other point-of-view shots in the film (e.g., there is one very similar shot from Rishi's point of view). But this one is perhaps the most striking. It seeks to directly identify us with this Kashmiri woman. We cannot know at this point, but the shot is part of the liberal colonialism and nationalism of the film. It helps to suggest that we should adopt the point of view of the oppressed, Kashmiri Muslim women, presumably to recognize them as potential allies. The intercommunal sympathy of this young woman is evidenced by the very fact that

she is alone and bringing the prisoner food. Indeed, on entering Rishi's attic prison, she unties him. Liaqat enters, discovers what she has done, and promptly shows the patriarchal perfidy of his society by striking her.

In the ensuing conversation, Rishi asks what their demands are. Liaqat barks at him that they demand "āzādī," freedom. This is a "big word" of the sort feared by Stephen Dedalus, an abstraction that has little content as far as this film is concerned. Of course, in reality, it does mean something—for instance, the right to fair elections and to actual security rather than the terror of occupying security forces. Nonetheless, this is a prime example of the "big hope" that contrasts with the *chhoṭī sī āśā* celebrated by the filmmaker. There is a further problem with the idea of *āzādī* here. Liaqat insists that he wants freedom for every Kashmiri. However, viewers familiar with the situation in Kashmir know well that many militants do not want freedom for the Kashmiri Hindu minority (a preference shown sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds). Later in the film, Rishi makes this explicit, pointing out to Liaqat that the Hindu community has been driven from their homes by the insurgency.

In subsequent scenes, Roja identifies the insurgents with *rākṣasas* and searches for Rishi like Rāma searches for Sītā after her abduction; the insurgents present their threat of dismembering Rishi; and Rishi expresses his brave defiance of his captors. In one important scene, an army officer tells Roja that the country will disintegrate if everyone is selfish. Rather, we all need to put the nation first. Both the officer and the filmmaker seem to be oblivious to the fact that this is precisely the sort of big, empty hope that drives Kashmiri nationalists as well. Of course, here Ratnam's point is supported by the fact that, in the fantastical Kashmir of *Roja*, the Indian Army kills no one, while "innocent soldiers" (as he puts it) are killed by militants.

Before the plot advances, Ratnam presents us with two song interludes, one from Roja's point of view, the other from Rishi's. In each case, the interlude presents their small, happy memories of romantic attachment, memories now rendered painful by the couple's separation and the threat of death that hangs over Rishi. It is relatively easy to cultivate pathos by creating situations in which viewers will empathize with the loss of attachment figures (spouses, children, parents). Moreover, Ratnam is entirely right to stress that killing and other forms of

violence and terror have consequences that range far beyond the individuals targeted, that they spread pain across all their attachment relations. In the case of Rishi, they spread not only to Roja but to his mother, to Roja's sister, and to other members of her family. But, of course, in reality this goes both ways. It bears on those killed by the military as much as those killed by the militants. The problem is the usual one that comes with empathy. It is much easier to cultivate empathy with "our" side than with "their" side. We are much more likely to experience and share the suffering of "our" soldiers' families than "their" soldiers' families. Ratnam's song interludes rely on and intensify this ordinary tendency.

Between the two interludes, we witness Rishi's bravery in the face of the militants' brute force. Specifically, they ask that he speak into a tape recorder to show that he is still alive. (It is not clear how this will show that he is alive, since the recording could have been made earlier, but then again we cannot expect rationality from terrorists.) Rishi simply says "Jai Hind" (Victory to India). As the militants beat him mercilessly, he continues to repeat this slogan. There are three points worth remarking on in this sequence. One is that the militants beat two people in the course of the film—Rishi and Liaqat's sister. This furthers the link between them. In keeping with this, the beating of Rishi is intercut with shots of the sister's face, showing her clear disapproval of the beating.

The second point is that Rishi defies his captors on purely symbolic issues. Later, as already noted, he nearly sacrifices his life to prevent them from burning the Indian flag. In other words, he does not show great bravery in preventing harm to people but instead in supporting or opposing abstractions. In a place where thousands of people are being killed, this initially seems so ludicrous that one might be inclined to take it ironically. But it appears to have been intended quite seriously by Ratnam, and it seems to be widely received in that way as well. For example, according to Bharucha, "almost every single reviewer has relished . . . this sequence" as a "great act of patriotism."

Finally, the specific sort of symbolism here is highly resonant. Militants and innocents in military custody are subjected to severe physical and psychological torture. Basharat Peer reports that part of the torture involves forcing them to say "Jai Hind" (138; this was in 1992 [135], the

same year as *Roja*). Thus, Ratnam again reverses the actual situation. In the real world, often entirely innocent Kashmiri Muslims are beaten to force them to affirm loyalty to India. In the upside-down world of *Roja*, however, an Indian intelligence operative is tortured because he does affirm loyalty to India. (Note that Rishi is repeatedly and unproblematically referred to as "innocent" even though he is working for the intelligence wing of the Indian military. A Kashmiri who performed similar functions for a militant organization would certainly not be considered innocent by the Indian government, even if he did not carry a gun. Indeed, one could argue that Rishi is guilty of conspiracy with [state] terrorists, thus aiding and abetting the commission of war crimes. In that sense, his actions are not entirely different from those for which Afzal Guru was convicted and executed; see Roy, "And His Life.")

After this scene and the song interludes, Roja determines that she will appeal to Wasim Khan. This scene in effect allegorizes the possibility of negotiations with the main leaders of the militancy. Roja goes to the prison and faces the rabid Khan who can only shout at her that he is fighting a jihād. The idea of a jihād is almost entirely vacuous in the context of the film. As I have already noted, jihād is a struggle to witness on behalf of God in contexts where such witnessing is inhibited. It need not be military, but it may be—specifically, in cases where there is a military threat to or persecution of Muslims. As Maulana Muhammad Ali puts it, "*Fighting in defense of religion*" counts as jihād when "under the circumstances" it is "necessary for the Truth [of Islam] to live and prosper; if fighting had not been permitted, Truth would surely have been uprooted" (705n705; italics in the original). In the words of the Qur'ān, as translated by Ali, "fight in the way of Allāh against those who fight against you," for "persecution is worse than slaughter" (2: 190–91). Of course, many militants—perhaps the great majority—invoke jihād hypocritically or vacuously. But, insofar as some of them sincerely and thoughtfully characterize their struggle as jihād, it may be understood in this sense. The community is, in this view, threatened by the Indian government's denial of self-determination and, even more, by its military occupation of the valley. But, in the film, jihād is merely a slogan.

The point is made still clearer in a subsequent scene where Liaqat boasts that he has killed more than twenty-five people on the instructions of his "leaders" because this is a "jihād." There are several points

to make about this scene. First, Liaqat's affirmation of jihād is as abstract as Wasim Khan's. Second, Liaqat bizarrely explains the concept of jihād by translating it into English as "holy war." The phrase "holy war" seems designed to occlude the meaning of the term "jihād," replacing it with a stereotype about Islamic militarism. In addition, it may suggest a link between the militants and the English-speaking world—particularly the United States. Indian policy in Kashmir has historically included a suspicion about U.S. interference. For example, in 1953, the Indian government arrested Sheikh Abdullah, claiming that he was "collaborating with the United States and planning independence" (Habibullah 177). The role of the United States is often seen as mediated by Pakistan. In keeping with this, the rest of the dialogue makes clear that the Kashmiri militants are taking their orders from Pakistan. There is undoubtedly Pakistani involvement in Kashmir (see, for example, Kazi 93–96). Moreover, Rishi later offers a perfectly reasonable argument that taking orders from Pakistan involves enslaving oneself, not *āzādī*. (We saw a similar view expressed by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front [JKLF] militant Anees Noman in *Shalimar the Clown*.) However, there are indigenous roots to the Kashmir crisis and there are militant groups that are not simply servants of Pakistan. It is, rather, part of the film's propaganda function to blame the entire situation on a foreign power—the invading out-group from the heroic prototype.

Between these two scenes treating the Kashmiri jihād there is an army raid. Army raids in Kashmir are notoriously brutal and inaccurate. They lead to the deaths of civilians as well as rape and arson (on rape see, for example, Kazi 153–62). Needless to say, things are quite different in the imaginary Kashmir of *Roja*. First, the raid is accurate. The soldiers isolate the house where Rishi was actually being held, though the militants have managed to escape. Second, the soldiers do not rape the sister; nor do they even arrest anyone, not to mention torturing them. Instead, they evidently just leave when they do not find the militants and Rishi. Third, the raid is so peaceful that Roja, a civilian, can accompany the troops. Finally, during the raid, Roja and Liaqat's sister exchange meaningful glances, evidently establishing a sort of solidarity that will bear fruit later in the film.

Scenes follow that serve to intensify the emotional response of the audience. In one, Roja is awakened from sleep to identify a corpse,

possibly Rishi's. The most striking scene is Rishi's escape from his captors to defend the Indian flag, outlined briefly above.

One of the most astonishing sequences in the film involves a cohort of young militants who are traveling to Pakistan for training. This group includes Liaqat's young brother. On the televised news, we then learn that the militants have been killed—by Pakistan. The result is demonstrations—against Pakistan. Moreover, this is not simply government propaganda. The betrayal of the militants by Pakistan is made clear in subsequent discussions between Rishi and Liaqat. In the fantasy world of *Roja*, then, the Indian Army does not kill or harm anyone, and even the militants who end up dead have actually been killed by Pakistan. Moreover, popular sentiment in Kashmir is not opposed to the Indian occupation but to Pakistan. The sequence is almost delusional. Admittedly, in early 1992, the JKLF organized a march in Pakistani Kashmir "to stress the unity in struggle of the two Kashmirs" (Bose, *Kashmir*; see also Kadian 141). Pakistani troops fired on the marchers, killing twenty-one. This gave rise to extensive protests in Indian Kashmir. This is probably what inspired the scene in *Roja*. But *Roja*'s representation of the deaths of insurgents and popular attitudes in Kashmir remains wildly distorted even with this small link to reality.

After this, Rishi consoles Liaqat on his brother's death. Liaqat laments that the militants created "disturbances and riots" on the instructions from Pakistan. In other words, Liaqat's loss of his brother provokes a sort of confession that the independence movement is in effect a fabrication by the national enemy. Rishi (a Hindu) then goes on to give Liaqat a brief lecture on Islam, explaining that Allāh does not condone killing. It is striking that propaganda on Islam tends to take two forms. First, it suggests that Islam is violent and war-mongering. We have seen this throughout the film. Second, it states that "true" Islam rejects violence. "Islam is peace," as President George W. Bush famously put it ("Islam"; I should note that Bush made this comment in the course of a speech that did have the very admirable intent of opposing harassment of Muslims after September 11). As already noted, orthodox Islam advocates standing up against cruelty and using violence in self-defense and defense of the community. In short, it is not intrinsically war-mongering (though obviously any group of Muslims—or Christians or Hindus—can be war-mongering); nor does it simply advocate peace.[7]

Rather, it affirms the standards affirmed by most modern nations—not initiating violence, but also not turning the other cheek. Of course, this option cannot be admitted, since that would involve acknowledging that the militants at least believe that they are engaging in self-defense.

Eventually, the government agrees to the exchange of Wasim Khan for Rishi. As already noted, the militants incomprehensibly claim that Rishi has been killed. Roja vows that she will find out the truth by appealing to Kashmiri women. This is followed by Rishi's escape, evidently engineered by Liaqat's sister. Several points are important about this escape. First, Rishi manages to get hold of a rifle, but he uses it only as a club—not to kill his captors, but only to render them unconscious. Second, when Rishi encounters Liaqat, soldiers from the Indian Army are lined up facing the two at some distance. Though he eventually allows Rishi to go free, Liaqat initially fires in his direction to prevent him from going farther. Even with this provocation, the Indian soldiers do not kill Liaqat. They hold their fire, allowing Liaqat to decide what to do. Moreover, once Rishi escapes, they do not shoot Liaqat. In *Roja*, the commitment of the Indian Army to nonviolence is truly Gandhian. Again, the final dialogue of Rishi and Liaqat brings the hope that the "moderates" among the rebels, recognizing the perfidy of Pakistan, will take up the role of Rāvaṇa's brother Vibhīṣaṇa and collaborate with the Indian Army to preserve the territorial integrity of India. Indeed, earlier in the film, Rishi explains to Liaqat that the rebels should present their grievances to the government and negotiate over them. At that point, Liaqat insists that the only demand they have is a partition from India. Rishi then makes clear that such an option is impossible. Negotiations, he explains, would take place with the presumption that India would never again be partitioned. Perhaps Liaqat's release of Rishi is a step in that direction.

Now, of course, the lovers are reunited, and cuts to various other characters show their joy and relief.[8] But the reunion is not the end of the movie. There is a musical epilogue that serves to stress the main thematic point. A rather touchingly patriotic song, repeated from earlier in the film, plays on the soundtrack as we see images repeated from different parts of the film. The epilogue begins with the sexual relations of Rishi and Roja. This once again suggests the acceptance of sexuality that is an important, if subsidiary, theme in the film. Despite the

culmination of the film in the lovers' reunion, however, the song makes clear that such personal happiness is secondary to the integrity of the nation. In other words, at least one big hope is more important than smallish hopes and joys—specifically, the big hope of the Indian nation. As we see the lovers in their sexual embraces, we hear, "Bhārat hamko jān se pyārā hai," which means that India is dearer to us than *jān* (life). But *jān* can also mean one's beloved. Thus the line can mean that India is dearer than one's beloved.

The song goes on to characterize India as the rarest rose garden and the pride of the world. These lines recall the natural beauty of both South and North India that was stressed earlier in the film. From there it identifies the nation as "Bhārat Māṁ" (Mother India). In a standard nationalist manner, it thereby suggests the substitution of an attachment bond to the nation for attachment bonds to one's beloved (or *jān*) and even one's biological mother.[9] The song goes on to assert the national integrity of India "from Kashmir to Madras." In connection with this assertion of national integrity, it replays the scene of Rishi throwing his body on the burning Indian flag, recalling the *Rāmāyaṇa* and Sītā's fire ordeal. The film ends with a call to the viewer to raise his or her voice: all Indians are one, despite differences in caste, religion, and language. But this sits oddly with the final image—Liaqat completing his prayers as Rishi is beaten up for preventing the flag burning. It is difficult to say just what the film's attitude is toward Liaqat's prayer or the possibility of integrating Liaqat and other Muslims into an India that is like a rose garden. The point is in keeping with the unusual use of the romantic plot in the film. Typically, a civil conflict separates lovers representing the two groups or regions at war. The culminating romantic union suggests the union of those warring groups. But, in *Roja*, the civil conflict separates two Indian Hindus, not an Indian and a Kashmiri or a Hindu and a Muslim. It is therefore difficult to see what consequences the union has for the nation.

Nonetheless, Ratnam clearly does wish to suggest some sort of national reconciliation. An earlier line in the song recalls the old slogan of Hindu-Muslim unity against British imperialism—"Hindu Muslim bhāī bhāī" (Hindu Muslim brother brother). Specifically, the line is "Sabhī to bhāī bhāī pyār se rahēge ham" (We will *all* remain brothers from love). The song's liberal optimism is possible only because the film

so thoroughly conceals the real condition in Kashmir. It is hard to imagine *pyār* (love) or Hindu-Muslim brotherhood (or sisterhood) arising in the devastation wrought by the Indian Army and the militants. Indeed, it is hard to imagine *pyār* or Hindu-Muslim bonding, given the representation of Islam in the film.

Again, the simple ideology of *L.O.C.* is "untroubled" because it suppresses ambivalence, dehumanizing the enemy and celebrating in-group violence. The liberal "other side," represented by *Roja*, also suppresses some ambivalence by occluding Indian violence. But, at the same time, it represents militant, putatively Islamic violence. The result is a troubled ideology, one that is not entirely at ease with its own principles and claims. This troubled character perhaps makes the ideology of *Roja* difficult to sustain. Some acknowledgment of in-group wrongs seems necessary. First, in the case of Kashmir, the extent of these wrongs is so great as to make denial implausible. Second, if all the blame is placed on the enemy, it is difficult to maintain any sort of liberal, conciliatory "alternative." These may be among the reasons why some subsequent works present a revised, liberal view of Kashmir.

Complicating Propaganda:
Extending the Dominant Problematic

To some extent, Ratnam was able to present such a benevolent portrait of the Indian military because it was still relatively early in the Kashmir conflict. As the years passed and information about military atrocities became more widely disseminated, it became more difficult to maintain this idealized portrait in an even remotely plausible way. (Clearly, this problem does not arise for *L.O.C.*, which treats a particular war rather than an ongoing condition, and which in any case celebrates killing.) The usual ideological response to revelations of colonial atrocities is threefold: (1) acknowledge that a few, regrettable incidents have occurred; (2) attribute these incidents to deviant individuals ("a few bad apples"), not to systemic policies and procedures; and (3) maintain that the government has investigated and dealt with these incidents, thus assuring that they will not occur in the future. These strategies also render the opponents ("us" and "them") more parallel in a way conducive to a liberal alternative. Specifically, in allowing that "our" side is not all good, it makes sense of the possibility that "their" side is not all bad,

but may include some misguided but redeemable individuals—genuine Vibhīṣaṇas, so to speak.

In terms of narrative, this scenario is clearly connected with the criminal investigation genre. Specifically, this genre is likely to enter into colonialist emplotments of colonial atrocities insofar as such atrocities are understood to have been isolated incidents, initiated individually (not as a matter of policy), and subjected to judicial evaluation and punishment. At least in the case of Kashmir, this form of emplotment is often combined with an embedded revenge narrative. Specifically, there are often two criminal acts, one by the in-group, one by the out-group, with one serving as revenge for the other. The films *Shaurya* (Valor) and *Dhokha* (Deceit) present clear and neatly complementary examples.

Samar Khan's *Shaurya* (2008) is based on the American film *A Few Good Men*. It concerns a Muslim soldier who kills his commanding officer. In the course of the trial, it is revealed that the officer was about to shoot a young girl for no apparent reason, except that her sobs of fear annoyed him. The officer is clearly a psychopath and can hardly be considered representative of the army generally. In a slight complication of the usual scenario we learn, however, that he was not the only bad apple. Rather, there was a still higher officer who protected him and, indeed, ensured that he would be able to pursue his cruel designs. This is the no less pathological Brigadier Singh, who engages in various activities that show his psychological disturbance in the course of the film. Thus we are prepared to learn at the end that he has a virulent hatred of Muslims, even expressing the fascist wish to exterminate them.

By placing the pathology in a high-ranking officer, the director and writers do suggest that brutal practices in Kashmir have not been limited to isolated acts of individual foot soldiers. But they also suggest that these practices have been localized. They are still the result of a few deviants, not of institutional policies and practices, even if those deviants have in some cases managed to reach positions of authority. For example, the commander's decision to murder the girl is presented as a more or less arbitrary whim. In fact, even a slight suspicion of militancy frees soldiers to shoot and kill Kashmiris with no retribution—and it frees them legally, by the Disturbed Areas Act and the Special Powers Act (see Malik 307). Moreover, the case itself is not prototypical. It is un-

likely that the Kashmiri military will take a sobbing preadolescent girl and shoot her. It is, however, tragically common for them to target an adolescent boy, shooting him on the street due to some suspicious activity or killing him in custody after torture.

This quarantining of the atrocities is connected with the criminal investigation emplotment. The point is stressed and generalized by the closing titles of the film. After the final scene, the filmmakers make clear the thematic point of the criminal investigation narrative. First, they implicitly embed it in the standard, Indian colonialist heroic narrative. Specifically, the initial title of this closing sequence announces that the film is "Dedicated to the men who protect not only our borders . . . but also our freedom" (ellipsis in the original). This is, in a way, brilliantly phrased. Freedom is protected by protecting borders because the way to lose freedom is through an invasion by the enemy—an invasion implicit in the infiltration of militants across the Line of Control, precisely where the soldiers in the film are located. Thus the film indicates that the criminal investigation narrative does not undermine, but rather reinforces the heroic emplotment of the Kashmir crisis. This is followed by a dramatic listing of the actions taken by the army in response to bad apples. Almost all these actions suggest criminal investigations. The first title of this sequence is "Army has fired 89, including 34 officers for Human Rights Violation in J&K [Jammu and Kashmir state] since 1990." The filmmakers admit a problem, and that is good. But at the same time, they suggest that the problem is being adequately treated by the military themselves—despite the rather feeble statistics (perhaps 70,000 people had been killed, with the punishment that eighty-nine soldiers had been discharged in almost twenty years, a miniscule fraction of the troops that have been stationed in Kashmir, presumably far less than 0.01 percent[10]). More direct evidence for severe problems comes from human rights organizations. In 2013 Amnesty International reported, "Widespread impunity prevailed for violations of international law in Kashmir, including unlawful killings, extrajudicial executions, torture and the enforced disappearance of thousands of people since 1989" (*Amnesty International Report 2013*, 121). The report lists a series of specific cases clearly indicating that the Indian armed forces and police are very far from taking care of the problem of their own human rights violations.

The problems are only enhanced by the revenge narrative. In the embedded revenge plot, Brigadier Singh had taken an orphaned Muslim into his home. The boy raped Singh's daughter and wife, then killed them and burned Singh's mother to death. So Singh has come to hate Muslims due to an even worse crime than what the deceased commander would have committed. The commander was about to kill a young girl; Singh's daughter of about the same age was not only killed, but raped—then killed along with her mother (also raped) and grandmother. Moreover, it is difficult not to see the story as an allegory for India's relation to Kashmir—welcoming Kashmir into India in the face of the 1947 tribal invasion, but then being rewarded with terrorism. At the very least, this terrible trauma makes Singh's pathology more comprehensible. Most important, it places the ultimate blame for the series of atrocities on an (ungrateful and disloyal) Muslim, whose pathological violence is not explained, but remains inscrutable.

Pooja Bhatt's *Dhokha* (2007) is complementary to *Shaurya*. Both concern a criminal investigation of killing by a Kashmiri Muslim, and both embed a revenge narrative in the criminal investigation narrative. However, in the case of *Dhokha*, the revenge is undertaken by a Kashmiri Muslim rather than an Indian Sikh or Hindu. This small change is consequential for the film's ideology. As a result of explaining the source of the Muslim Kashmiri's terrorist attack, *Dhokha* is able to reveal at least some aspects of the situation in Kashmir that are largely concealed even in *Shaurya*.

Specifically, toward the beginning of *Dhokha*, a terrible terrorist attack kills many innocent people. The hero, Zaid (a Muslim police officer), learns of the bombing and rushes to the scene to help. As audience members, we are in the same position as we are when such events occur in actuality: We know about the violence, but we have little understanding of anything else. Most important, we do not know the precise motivations of the perpetrators. Initially, we do not even know their identities. Zaid is in this position as well. He eventually learns who the suicide bomber was—his young wife, Sarah. This is a shock to him and to the audience as well. It is important to the politics of the film that the terrorist was a beautiful, young woman. First of all, it is important for the simple reason that it contradicts the ideological view, familiar from *Roja*, that Kashmiri women must be on "our" (i.e., India's) side. Second,

this characterization is likely to reduce or eliminate viewers' disgust and fear responses. This is due to the widespread sense that women are more vulnerable and less threatening than men and that beautiful women are not nearly so disgusting as men with prominent facial warts. This reduction in fear and disgust is, in turn, likely to open viewers to the possibility of experiencing at least some sympathy with the terrorist. This tendency is enhanced by focusing the narrative on Zaid, making the viewer continuously aware of and sympathetic with his interests and emotional responses. Zaid's attachment bond with his wife seems likely to make viewers less inclined to cut her off from all possible empathy.

Not long after learning the identity of the suicide bomber from the government forensic experts, and thus from a public source, Zaid receives the video recording made by his wife before she undertook the bombing. This, too, is a public source. Thus, in this case, too, Zaid's knowledge in the film mirrors our own knowledge in life. After a suicide bombing, a recording surfaces in which the terrorist (or "martyr") explains that he or she is doing the will of Allāh (or whatever). Thus we learn the "official" reason for the bombing. This is all the information we usually have. A record of innocent deaths and a tape filled with slogans. It is difficult to have any sympathy with someone spouting slogans as a justification for killing innocent people.

But the criminal investigation prototype leads Zaid further as he seeks to understand both his wife's death and her crime. He eventually discovers the real motivation for her act. Sarah's father had been tortured and killed by the police in Kashmir. The family had sought justice, and it appeared their complaint would provoke relevant legal action. However, the same police then threatened her brother's life, forced her grandfather to sign a document exonerating them, and raped Sarah herself. (The scenario is very similar to that reported by an anonymous "commander" of a "jihādi group" interviewed by Stern [209].) This leads both Sarah and her brother, Danish, to become terrorists. Indeed, it turns out that the brother is himself going to undertake a suicide bombing in a crowded train station. At the climax of the film, Zaid convinces Danish not to detonate the bomb. The police then go on to arrest the murderers/rapists in Kashmir.

As this suggests, the film points to some of the brutal practices of the Indian occupation of Kashmir—torture, extrajudicial killing, and rape.

It also suggests that the legal system is not terribly effective in Kashmir itself, since Sarah's family is unable to pursue justice within that system. On the other hand, the full trajectory of the story has some of the same problems as *Shaurya*, problems that make the film in many ways compatible with dominant ideological views. The brutal treatment of Sarah and her family is still the result of a few criminals. Moreover, the criminal investigation system may not work the first time. But it does work the second time. Finally, the Kashmir security forces are presented as killing one person and raping one person. The revenge, however, involved twenty deaths in the first bombing and would have involved many more in the second. In this way, the violence of the terrorists is vastly greater than that of the army.

If *Dhokha* is both more accurate and more progressive than *Shaurya*—and it is—this is in part the result of the way the genre is mapped onto the events. In other words, it is in part because the revenge is taken by the Kashmiri Muslim. Thus the initiating crime is by Indian forces. Even so, the political value of Bhatt's film derives to an even greater extent from the nonnarrative, argumentative sections of the film. Specifically, Bhatt has the terrorist leader, Maulana Umar Farhidi, deliver a brief lecture toward the end of the film. Alluding not only to India but to the United States and other nations, he begins by pointing out that countries claim they are combating terrorism but they rain bombs down on innocent people. When they kill, he says, it is called "defense." But when Islamic militants kill, it is called "terrorism." He goes on to enumerate the crimes committed against Muslims in India, including all the recurring crimes of the government, military, and police (e.g., killing detainees in custody) that we have noted in Kashmir. He draws the quite reasonable conclusion that, if his followers are terrorists, so are the Indian government and police; if the former have blood on their hands, so do the latter. He ends by saying that if Muslims were safe, then the nation would be safe.

Farhidi's personal credibility is not very great given his own intentional killing of innocent people. In connection with this, few viewers are likely to accept the "two wrongs make a right" view implicit in Farhidi's lecture. However, it is clear that there have been two wrongs. It is, in other words, clear that this is not the world of *Roja* where only the militants commit crimes.

This point is not only acknowledged but emphasized in Zaid's final speech. There he unequivocally asserts that the police and Indian military are guilty also. He quotes Faridhi, saying that both sides have blood on their hands. He goes on to make the startling admission, "First we create terrorists and then we kill them." Moreover, he outlines appropriate responses to extrajudicial killings, suggesting that the death of Sarah's father was not an isolated case. Of course, the earlier problems still remain. But these speeches show that the film does not simply conform to the standard, Indian nationalist problematic regarding Kashmir.

In the decade and a half between Ratnam's film and *Dhokha*, the liberal boundary of the dominant problematic had slightly shifted, in part as Indian atrocities became increasingly difficult to deny. (Moreover, as already noted, it is difficult to maintain a liberal view if all the fault is on one side, as suggested by *Roja*.) In that respect, *Dhokha*'s acknowledgment of Indian killings, and its acknowledgment of at least partial governmental responsibility for creating terrorists, are in part a matter of time period. Again, the *Roja* position (that government forces had no blood on their hands) could not be sustained. The problematic had to acknowledge government violence. It incorporated this acknowledgment by suggesting that such violence is occasional (not pervasive), that it is not a matter of policy, that it occurs through the acts of deviant (e.g., corrupt or mentally disturbed) individuals, and that it is being investigated and punished. Nonetheless, *Dhokha* does go beyond the standard alternatives to indicate that the investigation and punishment are often inadequate and that preventive measures have proven ineffective. Moreover, it directly challenges the double standard which allows one group's atrocities to be excused as "defense," while another group's atrocities are condemned as "terrorism." In these ways, *Dhokha* provides a sort of transition to indirect treatments of Kashmir, which may more readily depart from the standard ideological alternatives.

3 Breaching the Ideological Boundaries

Three Films Not (Apparently) about Kashmir

Direct and Indirect Reference

Up to this point, we have been considering direct representations of Kashmir—or, more precisely, fictions that explicitly identify their fictional locale with the real place, Kashmir. In such cases, readers or viewers tend to assume a high level of continuity between the fictional world and the real world. Indeed, they tend to assume that virtually all general conditions are continuous—the same laws, political relations, social conditions, and so on. Moreover, they tend to assume a "type identity" even for fictional particulars. Thus readers and viewers are likely to assume that the same sorts of things occur in Kashmir as occur in the story, even if the particular story events did not occur. In other words, readers or viewers tend to assume fairly extensive identity except in cases where they are given some clear signal to the contrary. (In keeping with this, Prentice and Gerrig point out that reading fiction can have significant effects on our beliefs about and attitudes toward the real world [530–31].)

Direct and explicit reference is, of course, the most obvious way for a fictional work to treat Kashmir. But it is no less possible for a work to address conditions in Kashmir indirectly and inexplicitly. In these cases, our assumptions are very different. Suppose a work presents itself as addressing Gulistan. However, we infer that it is, in some way, at some level, dealing with Kashmir. We do not, in that case, necessarily assume that conditions in the fictional Gulistan are continuous with those in Kashmir; nor do we necessarily assume that events in Gulistan are type identical with events in Kashmir. Put differently, the default is not continuity, with discontinuity necessarily signaled.

The situation here is parallel to that between literal and metaphorical uses of language. When a predicate is applied literally to a target, we assume that all components of the predicate apply, unless we have reason to believe otherwise. For example, we assume that something called a "lion" has four legs, unless we are told that it is, say, "a three-legged lion." In contrast, if a predicate is applied metaphorically, we need to determine just what components apply to the target. If we are told, "Smith is a polar bear," we do not assume that all components of "polar bear" apply to Smith. Rather, we assume that one or several components apply and it is our task to isolate them. This is what occurs with indirect and implicit fictional references to political conditions. In the case of Gulistan and Kashmir, we need to ascertain just what components of the "source" (the fictional Gulistan) apply to the target (Kashmir). In such cases, our search and decision are likely to be guided by thematic considerations, which is to say by the real-world purposes of the discourse, the purposes that carry over from the discourse itself into the lives of real people. For example, in the case of Gulistan, we may be interested in implications regarding policy alternatives for the Indian government or popular sentiment about Kashmiri independence.

Note that direct and explicit reference does not in itself make a work more accurate or complete in its depiction of a target, such as Kashmir. A direct, explicit work may be highly misleading on thematically crucial issues, while an indirectly referential work may be spoken of as entirely "true" despite the fact that it is making no direct statements about the target. Here, too, we see parallels with literal and metaphorical predication. "Jones is a weak swimmer" may be false and "Jones is a real fish" true on thematically relevant issues (e.g., whether Jones should be allowed into the deep end of the pool), even though the latter, construed literally, clearly involves many features that would be false of Jones (e.g., that he has gills).

In this chapter, I turn from direct representations of Kashmir to what are arguably indirect representations. One difficulty with indirect reference, and one difference from most uses of metaphor, is that the target is implicit. For this reason, it is often difficult to tell if there is a reference or not. Indeed, this is where *nonthematic* continuities become important. In order to clarify this point, we may distinguish between

distinctive and nondistinctive continuities, as well as informative and uninformative continuities. Distinctive continuities are continuities that particularly isolate the target. Suppose a fictional country has a president, a senate, and a house of representatives. This is clearly the same as the United States, and is partially distinctive of the United States. In contrast, a fictional country with people is continuous with the United States in having people, but that is nondistinctive. We therefore have at least some reason to see the former fictional country as indirectly referencing the United States, but no reason to see the latter as doing so.

Informative continuities are continuities that tell us something new about the target. Uninformative continuities merely bring up information that we already had. Having people is not only a nondistinctive continuity; it is also uninformative. In contrast, suppose a narrative indicates that the condition of Kashmiri militants is directly parallel with that of Indian militants in the last years of the British raj. At least for those who saw the Kashmiri militants as simply criminals, this would be an informative continuity between the fictional and real worlds. (As I am using "informative," the information need not be true. "Information" here refers to what the fictional world is communicating, not its validity with respect to the target.)

Thematic continuities are, generally, informative. However, they are often not clearly distinctive. Or, rather, if they are distinctive, it is difficult to tell. The very fact of informativeness tends to make thematic continuities difficult to recognize initially. Suppose I think of the Kashmiri militancy as solely a matter of criminality. Suppose also that a film presents the militancy as driven by precisely the same sorts of national feelings that spurred Indian patriots in the 1940s—but it does so indirectly, thus without explicitly signaling the target. Given my prior view of Kashmir, I have no reason to connect the film with Kashmir. Moreover, even if I thought that Kashmiri militants might be patriots, that would hardly be distinctive. I would have as much reason to link the film with, say, Irish or Namibian nationalists. In contrast, noticeably nonthematic and uninformative continuities are often distinctive. Suppose we notice that the people in the fictional country are, say, eating lotus root and drinking salty, pink tea. These are both (partially) distinctive of and uninformative about Kashmir. As such, they point toward Kashmir as the implicit target country. Thus distinctive but uninforma-

tive, nonthematic continuities often help to link the fictional world with a target. In consequence, they may foster the reader's or viewer's interpretative isolation of informative, thematic continuities between that source and target. Once we connect the story with Kashmir through pink tea and lotus root, we may come to understand the film's thematic claim that, say, the militants are patriots.

Indirectness is a consequential feature of political discourse primarily because it allows an author or filmmaker greater freedom in expressing dissident views. In contexts where there is considerable pressure to conform to a dominant problematic, it is often easier for a director or screenwriter to deviate from standard ideologies when the deviation is not overt. This is what we at least seem to see in Indian works that treat Kashmir indirectly. On the other hand, this relative loosening of ideological constraints does not imply their complete overthrow. Moreover, there is the problem that the implicitness of the link often makes the thematic continuities more ambiguous. Specifically, it is not always entirely clear how the film maps onto the target—or even that it does genuinely map on at all.

Saawariya and *Madhoshi*

Sanjay Leela Bhansali's *Saawariya* (Beloved) is a film adaptation of Fyodor Dostoyevsky's "White Nights," with some influence of Luchino Visconti's earlier adaptation of the same work. The basic story of the film is as follows. A young musician, Raj, comes to town and meets a beautiful young woman named Sakina. Sakina lives with her very strict grandmother, but still manages to sneak out at night. A year earlier, Sakina's grandmother had rented a room to a young man named Īmān. Sakina fell in love with this man and was heartbroken when he left. He promised her that he would return on ʿĪd, an important Islamic festival, the day when Muslims break their Ramaḍān fast and celebrate. When Raj meets Sakina, it is only a few nights before ʿĪd. Raj pursues Sakina despite her story about Īmān, telling his landlady, Lillian, about his feelings for Sakina. On the appointed night, it appears that Īmān is not going to show up, and Raj rejoices that he will be united with Sakina. But at the last moment, Sakina spies Īmān waiting for her on the bridge and runs to join him. The film seems fairly clearly designed to give audience members sympathy with Raj and to encourage them to hope

that he is united with Sakina. Moreover, Īmān is so undeveloped a character that it is difficult to have much interest in him, or even to tell if he genuinely cares for Sakina. Nonetheless, Sakina's joy is so intense and infectious when she is united with Īmān that it is likely most viewers will recognize this as the inevitable conclusion, seeing that it would not be right for Sakina to accept Raj simply because we prefer him.

The film includes a number of relatively distinctive and uninformative continuities of the sort mentioned in the preceding discussion. Most obviously, the action takes place in a city where much of the transportation is by water. In part, Bhansali simply took this over from Visconti, who locates Dostoyevsky's story in a part of Livorno that is similar to Venice, with its canals and boats.[1] However, saying that Bhansali found this element in Visconti does not explain its presence here. Bhansali has freely changed many aspects of the story, characters, and scene. There is no reason why he would retain this simply because it was in an earlier film. One possibility is that he wishes to recall Srinagar, a city on a lake, with a great deal of commerce and exchange taking place through boats. Of course, in itself, this would be a very weak connection. It is given some strength by the fact that Sakina's profession is that of a carpet weaver—a traditional profession in Kashmir; indeed, Kashmiri carpets are renowned.[2] The city seems to have a Muslim majority, which is at least consistent with Srinagar. The film also includes a brief trip to a "Momin Lodge," which could perhaps allude to Gund-i-Momin in Kashmir. (If not, it at least emphasizes that this is a Muslim society, as a *momin* is a Muslim believer [see McGregor 836].)

There are more ominous possible links as well. Sakina's father disappeared. Īmān has to go off for secretive work. He explains, "We [*Ham*] do work for the nation [*mulk*]" and that work is "dangerous." The viewer has no reason to distrust Īmān. Given what he says, there are two possibilities. Perhaps he is working for the national government in secretive activity. It seems more likely, however, that he is working for an antigovernment organization that sees itself as representing another *mulk*. In an Indian context, the most likely reference is to Kashmir. This hints that Īmān is engaged in militant activity for Kashmir as a nation. Indeed, we can infer that he is not part of the secular nationalists, but specifically a religious nationalist—his name means "faith" and he is introduced when praying. It is also significant that his union with Sakina or *sakīnah*

(tranquility; see Maulana Muhammad Ali 107n328 on its usage in the Qur'ān), occurs on a Muslim religious festival. In connection with this, we can see that Raj's name is suggestive also. "Raj" means "rule" and, among other things, it is used to refer to periods of a certain type of governance. There is at least some hint that we might understand "Raj" as *Bhārat rāj*, the period of Indian rule in Kashmir.

In addition to these particular, partially distinctive connections, there are genre-related reasons that support interpreting the film in relation to India and Kashmir. Specifically, this is a love triangle film. Perhaps the most common allegorical structure for treating national allegory is precisely the love triangle plot. (For a number of cases, see Hogan, *Understanding Nationalism* 135–36 and 307–8n3.) In the love triangle structure, the nation is represented by one person, and that person has two possible spouses. The two possible spouses represent two possible future directions for the nation. For example, in Rabindranath Tagore's *The Home and the World*, Bimala represents either Bengal or India (or both), while her husband and her possible lover represent two alternatives for Bengal's political activism—among other things, the alternatives of nonviolence and violence.

Following this general pattern, in *Saawariya* the character of Sakina would suggest Kashmir; Raj would point to Indian *rāj* (rule or government); and Īmān (faith) would hint at an Islamic alternative to Indian rule. In this case, the suggestion of the film would seem to be India has a deep attachment to the famously beautiful Kashmir, such that it would make the "most beautiful bride for my Raj," as Raj himself puts it at one point (referring of course to Sakina and speaking in the voice of his landlady and mother substitute, Lillian). The filmmaker wishes that Kashmir reciprocated these feelings. But—and this is the central thematic and informative continuity—Kashmir does not; Kashmiris (generally) do not. (Only a small percentage wish for union with India—between 2 and 22 percent, depending on district [Bradnock 15].) Rather, Kashmir loves India's rival, the very militants who are working against the Indian Raj. Kashmir chooses union with faith, or Īmān. Moreover, we in the audience may wish she felt differently, but, given her feelings, union with Raj would not be right.

It is difficult to say how extensive the indirect representation of India and Kashmir is meant to be here. There are some small mistreatments

of Sakina by Raj, but they can hardly stand in for what the Indian military has actually done. On the other hand, Bhansali does not attribute any mistreatment to Īmān. In this respect, the film very much cleans up the human rights records of both sides, if it can be seen as treating them at all.

In any case, the key issue addressed by the film is self-determination, not violence by the state or the militants. Most important, the film suggests that Kashmir has the right to choose Īmān—clearly a political alternative connected with faith, perhaps an Islamic state. Just as Raj's marriage to Sakina would not work if she was longing forever for Īmān, so too would the union of Kashmir with India not work so long as Kashmiris were longing for independence connected with faith. In this respect, Bhansali's film steps outside the problematic defined by mainstream Indian debates on Kashmir and the films we considered in chapter 2. Indeed, in apparently fully supporting the Kashmiris' right to choose their own government, Bhansali presents what is, in the Indian context, a fairly radical perspective.

Or, *maybe* he presents such a perspective. The film connects with Kashmir only through hints and suggestions. Nothing is overt or clear. The links seem significant enough that many Indian viewers should be reminded of Kashmir. However, the links are equivocal enough that the filmmakers can always plausibly deny that they are there. Moreover, the links are indirect enough that even viewers who see them may not be inspired to reflect on the issue, thinking further about Kashmir. In that respect, it seems unlikely that the film's hints about Kashmir will have much of an impact on viewers. In short, the film violates the standard problematic, but not in a way that is likely to have any consequences for discourse surrounding Kashmir or people's behavior and attitudes toward the situation there.

Unlike *Saawariya*, Tanveer Khan's *Madhoshi* directly addresses terrorism and counterterrorism. In this respect, it clearly deals with relevant social and political topics. On the other hand, its links with Kashmir are somewhat more attenuated. Fundamentally, there is only one distinctive continuity—the fact that the main character is from a Kashmiri Hindu family, the Kauls. The Kauls are living outside Kashmir, and there is no reason to believe that they are refugees or even have any current familial connection with Kashmir. On the other hand, the

events of the film present a striking structural parallel with the condition of exiled Kashmiri Hindus.

Though not a terribly successful film overall, *Madhoshi* does make interesting and novel use of the revenge scenario. The film begins with Anupama speaking with her sister, who is telephoning from her office in the World Trade Center in New York City. It is September 11, 2001 and, shortly after the sister announces that she is pregnant, the first airplane crashes into the tower, killing the sister while Anupama is speaking with her. This is the murder of a loved one that commonly initiates the revenge plot. Two years pass, and Anupama is evidently leading a normal life. Alone one evening while exiting a train, she apparently witnesses an explosion and a subsequent gun battle. One rugged-looking man—later identified as "Aman"—runs from several more official looking men, whom he eventually kills. It is important that Aman initially appears to be a terrorist escaping from some plain-clothes investigators. In the confusion of the gunfight, Aman bumps into Anupama and drops his gun, which Anupama takes home. Seeking his gun, Aman finds Anupama. He explains to her that the men he killed were Pakistani secret service agents (from ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence). Going to his apartment, Anupama discovers that Aman is part of a secret organization dedicated to ending terrorism.

We eventually learn that Anupama is schizophrenic and that she has hallucinated the entire story of Aman. Much of the second half of the film involves treating this schizophrenia, and many of the problems with the film come from its strange portrayal of schizophrenia. For our purposes, however, it is important to consider the content of the hallucinations. Most fundamentally, at the level of the story, the violence Aman engages in is, in effect, a form of revenge for the killing of Anupama's sister. Of course, this revenge is Anupama's, even though—through her hallucinations—Anupama has Aman enact it. Indeed, Anupama is not even aware that she is seeking revenge. It is, rather, an unconscious motive. At the same time, this is not simply a matter of revenge. It is clear that, by imagining the multiskilled Aman as the instrument of her revenge, Anupama is simultaneously imagining a protector who will render future revenge unnecessary.

The question, then, is how are these events connected with Kashmir? The film suggests a general point about the victims of terrorism or other

violence. It also suggests a particular point about Kashmiris—first of all, Kashmiri Hindus. The general point about victims of trauma is that, even when their lives seem normal, they are likely to be haunted by severe anxieties and to nurture fantasies about revenge and protection. (We will return to the issue of trauma in chapter 6.) Kashmiri Hindus experienced just such a trauma during the anti-Hindu violence that drove them from Kashmir in the early years of the insurgency. The violence, the related threats, and the exile itself gave rise to a sense of helpless impotence in the refugees. It seems clear that many imagined a savior, a "messiah," as Anupama calls Aman—some person or group that would be comparable to the terrorists, but even stronger, more dangerous, and more efficient. Some imagined this role being taken by the Indian government, perhaps particularly if led by the Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party. Here, the character's name is important. Those who feel impotent imagine "a man" who can stand up and fight—a man whose manliness is well represented by the actor, the bulky-muscled John Abraham. At the same time, the name Aman means "peace" (see McGregor 51). Thus, this is a man whose iron toughness will bring peace—perhaps allowing return to Kashmir, in the case of Kashmiri Hindus. But this imagination is, the film indicates, a delusion, an impossibility, a mere fantasy of revenge and security. In short, the film suggests that political trauma of the sort experienced by Kashmiri Hindus will give rise to a delusory desire for manly violence.

There is a further complication here. As already noted, it seems at first that Aman is a terrorist. Moreover, his name is Arabic. Giving him an Arabic name, and showing him escaping from a bomb blast, seem to associate him more with Kashmiri militants than with a Hindu fundamentalist government. This suggests that the trauma victim's delusion of a messiah is a mirror image of the "enemy." Aman looks like a terrorist—indeed, he is almost a parody of a militant—precisely because he is modeled on terrorists, or on the victim's imagination of terrorists. It is, in fact, quite plausible that a dreaded enemy would furnish the most salient and emotionally powerful model for envisioning one's savior from that enemy.

Like *Saawariya*, *Madhoshi* gives us no sense of the terror perpetrated by the Indian military in Kashmir. However, it does tacitly criticize a highly militarized response to terrorism. In this respect it, too, chal-

lenges aspects of standard ideology regarding Kashmir—a challenge enabled in part by the film's indirectness. Of course, here the same indirectness that enables this challenge also makes it more likely to bypass viewers, producing no political effect.

The Ambiguities of *1942: A Love Story*

Again, indirect representations are both uncertain and often more ambiguous than direct representations. Ambiguity was not a significant issue in the two films we have just considered. If *Saawariya* is about Kashmir, then it does seem to suggest that Kashmir has the right to choose faith rather than (Indian) rule/*rāj*. If *Madhoshi* is about Kashmir, then it does seem to suggest that the idea of a supermilitant revenge against terrorists is delusional. In other cases, however, the thematic points made by indirect representations are more equivocal, more obviously open to multiple, even contradictory construals. Vidhu Vinod Chopra's *1942: A Love Story* is a case of this sort. As with the other films, it is not entirely clear that the film does set out to comment on Kashmir, though this does seem very likely.[3] More important, it is far from clear just what the film's attitude toward Kashmir may be. There are different thematic axes along which it might be interpreted. These axes have different possible values, which may be combined in different ways to produce divergent interpretations. Two axes are crucial here. The first concerns violence generally; the second concerns the relation of India and Kashmir.

As to the first axis, the film may be interpreted as expressing very different attitudes toward violence. Superficially, the conclusion of the film appears to be a simple celebration of the revolutionary activities of Indian nationalists in 1942, an uncomplicated affirmation of their violence, which involves killing British governmental officials and their Indian collaborators, including the hero's father. But the violence is extreme and, to me, horrifying. Moreover, it is difficult to see the death of the hero's father as unqualifiedly positive, however dislikable he may be. Of course, the hero is united with his beloved, a common signal that everything has turned out for the best. Thus, the film does not appear to be a Gandhian condemnation of violence. Even so, it is unclear to what extent it affirms revolutionary violence—whether it is almost entirely positive or more ambivalent.

As to India and Kashmir, the film could be seen as suggesting that the Kashmiri militants are betraying the unified cause of the Indian revolution. Alternatively, the Kashmiri militants could be viewed as having the same degree and kind of justification as the Indian revolutionaries. In the latter view, it is India that is betraying the revolutionary commitment to self-determination, thus serving as the contemporary counterpart of England in 1942. In short, it is difficult to tell just how to map 1942 onto 1994 (the year the film was released).

When combined, these axes yield three different interpretations: (1) the Kashmiri militants have betrayed the intercommunal commitments of the Indian revolutionaries (this takes up the positive view of revolutionary violence, but confines it to the Indian revolutionaries); (2) the Kashmiri militants manifest the praiseworthy revolutionary ideals formerly manifest in the pre-1947 Indian revolutionaries (this takes up the positive view of revolutionary violence, extending it to Kashmir); and (3) like the Indian revolutionary movement, the Kashmiri militancy is understandable, given the brutality of the government against which it is fighting, but that does not make its own violence inconsequential (this takes up the mixed view of revolutionary violence, extending it to Kashmir).[4]

My contention will be that the third possibility is the most likely. Even so, the fact that there are multiple interpretations is already significant. Most viewers of the film probably will not connect it with Kashmir at all. Those who do will probably vary in their understanding of the film's thematic point. I suspect that, unfortunately, the majority of responses will fall into categories 1 or 2, depending on whether the viewer is initially sympathetic to the Kashmiri militants (2) or not (1). In other words, I suspect that the "profile of ambiguity" of the film will accommodate the prior prejudices of viewers and that the most complex and most plausible interpretation of the film is likely to have relatively little impact.[5] Put differently, the following analysis will suggest that the film rather radically departs from the dominant problematic on Kashmir. However, its ambiguity allows viewers to fit its thematic points within that problematic or an alternative, Kashmiri nationalist problematic, depending on the presuppositions with which they begin.

The film begins toward the end of the story. A young man, Naren Singh, is about to be executed for nationalist activity. There is a pathetic

interaction with his mother that is simultaneously touching and, in my view, not entirely plausible. Naren apologizes to his mother, but she replies that, in giving his life for "Mother India," he is doing the greatest thing he could for his own mother. They part with the slogan, "Victory to India!" He subsequently meets his father and labels him a traitor.

From here the film cuts to the main title with a voice-over discussing the atrocities of the British and the man responsible for them, General Douglas. It recounts his brutality in killing thousands of unarmed men and freedom fighters. We witness one of these executions. We later discover that the young man executed was the son of Raghuvir and the brother of Rajeshwari, two central characters in the main story lines. In his physical appearance, General Douglas is likely to remind at least some viewers of Benito Mussolini; the hint of a connection serves to link British rule in India with fascism. In the course of the film, Douglas and those under his command shoot people who are unarmed and clearly harmless. This further indicates the fascist nature of the regime.

However, there are difficulties here. Though very far from benevolent, British government in India was hardly comparable to fascism. Thus Bertrand Russell contended that Gandhian tactics of nonviolence worked against the British colonial government precisely because there were some bounds on British atrocities. The same tactics, he remarked, would not have succeeded against the Nazis. One question this portrayal raises is to what extent the viewer is to see the film's representation of British government and the history of British rule as exaggerated. In part, the filmmakers seem to have generalized the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. They in effect take Brigadier General Reginald Dyer—the commanding officer directly responsible for the four hundred dead and twelve hundred wounded (Wolpert 299)—and place him in the position of a sort of military dictator. Unfortunately, this does not clarify the interpretive issues. The film may rely on viewers' recollection of Jallianwala Bagh. That recollection could suggest that the massacre was representative of British policies. Alternatively, if one begins with the view that Dyer's actions were exceptional, it could be taken to suggest that the film is not really representing British India accurately.

I suspect that most audience members will assume continuity between the story world and the real world. In other words, they will take the film to be portraying a fairly general British policy in India. Despite

this, I am inclined to take the film as suggesting that its representation of British brutality is exaggerated. I say this not because British counterinsurgency was humane—quite the contrary. I say it simply because some of the representations are excessive to the point of parody. For example, the Indian commanding officer shoots his good friend, an old man who is clearly harmless, and Douglas shoots people without trial in a manner that recalls—again—fascist practices. But why would a film directly reference an historical situation, then suggest its own inaccuracy regarding that situation? The answer is actually quite simple—and, once more, it is parallel to metaphor. In metaphor, we often take up a source that is clearly false at a literal level. Suppose I am asked, "Can Timmy be allowed in the pool?" If I answer, "Timmy is a fish," I am applying a predicate that is clearly false in its literal application. Timmy, standing right there, clearly does not have gills, scales, a tail, and so on. In cases of this sort, metaphor is signaled by the noninformative falsity of the statement. The function of false continuities in direct references is parallel to that of literally false predication in metaphor. The falsity of the representation of British India could suggest that the film is not so much about British India as about something else. Of course, the problem here is that, unlike the case with Timmy, the falsity in not self-evident (i.e., viewers can take it to be true that the British in India were fascists).

The issue of governmental violence is clearly important for our overall interpretation of the film. Most obviously, the film may be related to a broadly anti-Gandhian strain in popular Indian cinema that came to prominence in such 1970s products as the blockbuster *Sholay*. As I have argued elsewhere (Hogan, *Understanding Indian Movies* 86–99), one recurring function of some Hindi films is to establish the necessity of violence, sometimes in explicit contrast with Gandhian nonviolence. The film *1942* could be seen as fitting in with this trend. By representing British rule as fascistic, it could suggest that the violent revolutionaries of the time were both necessary and right. In other words, it could be seen as revising our sense of Indian history to reduce the value of Gandhism and to rehabilitate militancy—in part by contradicting the view of Russell and others that British rule was not fascistic.

Alternatively, one might argue that the representation of state violence in the film is more in keeping with India in Kashmir than with

the British in India. In the case of Kashmir, it is arguable that such individuals as Governor Jagmohan had unusual responsibility for atrocities and, indeed, that the atrocities perpetrated by the army were widespread and included the murder of unarmed innocents. Shoot-to-kill policies and military immunity from prosecution are broadly compatible with the representation of state violence in the film. In terms of Russell's division, then, the film could be seen as legitimating the Kashmiri militancy precisely because the Indian occupation of Kashmir has fascistic elements that British rule did not have. On the other hand, here, too, the representation would be exaggerated in certain respects—for instance, in terms of personality traits. I have no reason to believe that Jagmohan is a sociopath (like the film's Douglas), and it is important that the brutal policies of the Indian government in Kashmir do not require that the men be supernaturally evil. Thus, once again, the precise referent of the film's historical commentary is difficult to determine.

The story continues with the development of a plot to kill Douglas. Douglas is set to visit Kasauni. Kasauni appears to be located in a princely state, but it is evident that the state's independence is at best highly circumscribed. On the one hand, there is a Kasauni Palace, and Haripratap Singh lives in that palace, along with his wife and his son, Naren. Even so, the scope of Singh's administrative authority is not entirely clear. He is obviously collaborating with the British. But he seems to have little independent power.

Though Kasauni is located in what is now Uttarakhand, we have here some initial hints that the film may be indirectly addressing Kashmir. First, there is the simple association of a revolutionary movement taking place in the Himalayas. The most obvious case of this is Kashmir. Then there is the royal house. Of course, there were other princely states in the region, including princely states in contemporary Uttarakhand, such as the Garhwal Kingdom, whose royal house might be taken to have some connection with that of Kasauni in *1942*. However, the lineage in the film seems to suggest Kashmir. The last two rulers of Kashmir before the end of British rule were Pratap Singh and Hari Singh, the latter being the ruler who signed the accession of Kashmir to India. Hari Singh's son is Karan, who did not become a maharaja. It is difficult not to hear an echo of Hari and Pratap Singh in the film's royal

collaborationist Haripratap Singh, and an echo of the son Karan Singh in the revolutionary Naren Singh. This is one of those small, relatively distinctive and noninformative continuities that suggest the presence of an indirect reference with thematic consequences. Of course, this is not unequivocal. Karan Singh is hardly a revolutionary, so the parallel with Naren Singh does not extend to narrative details. It is, however, enough to encourage the viewer to connect the situation in the film broadly with that in Kashmir.

The plot to assassinate Douglas involves Raghuvir and Abidali. Raghuvir's daughter Rajjo (Rajeshwari) does not know anything about the plot, but accompanies her beloved father to Kasauni. There she falls in love with Naren. Though largely apolitical, Naren has shown that he has the right feelings by intervening to prevent the violence of soldiers against ordinary Indians. This undoubtedly contributes to Rajjo's feelings for him, since Rajjo has lost her brother to Douglas's brutality. Eventually, Haripratap learns of Raghuvir's involvement in a plot and reports him to the army. Raghuvir responds by in effect becoming a suicide bomber. After sending his daughter away, he blows himself up along with some soldiers. This act may be seen as linking the events with modern Islamic militancy. On the other hand, the film was made in 1993, when that association was far less strong, particularly in India.

Of course, Raghuvir's death is not a prototypical case of suicide bombing. It is unplanned and results when the soldiers come upon him and the dynamite. On the other hand, Raghuvir's decision to kill himself and the soldiers does raise the same issues about violence. Even from a nationalist and ethnocentric perspective, the killing of the (Indian) soldiers is at least questionable. Indeed, the film stresses that soldiers are largely following orders and doing what they think of as their duty. More significantly, Raghuvir's detonation of the dynamite destroys a sizable home, thereby suggesting the destructiveness of the bomb. The original plan was to use the dynamite to kill Douglas in the theater. Clearly that plan would have led to the deaths of many ordinary people attending the performance. When considered, it is difficult to see how such a bombing could be justified. Of course, this detailed imagination of the planned event is not really provoked by the film. It is, rather, something that the viewer has to undertake on his or her own. It seems unlikely that many viewers will consider the implications

of such a large blast occurring in a theater. Here we begin to see the ambiguity of the film's treatment of violence.

As to Kashmir, it is suggestive that the militants in the film repeatedly refer to Raghuvir's son, then Raghuvir himself as a *śahīd*, an (Islamic) martyr. This is a term that one might expect more from Muslim than from Hindu characters, and in this sense it might recall the situation in Kashmir more than that in (largely Hindu) Kasauni. But, here too, there are ambiguities. The term *śahīd* was used by revolutionaries of different religions for comrades killed in the struggle—for example, the famous Sikh militant Bhagat Singh (topic of the film titled *Śahīd*). Similarly, the militants in the movie do not refer to their struggle as one for *svarājya* (self-rule), but as aiming toward *āzādī* (freedom). The former is clearly associated with the Indian independence movement, while the latter is also linked with the Muslim independence movement in Kashmir. Of course, anyone is free to use either the Sanskrit-origin word *svarājya* or the Persian-origin word *āzādī*. Moreover, even if the filmmakers have self-consciously chosen *āzādī* over *svarājya*, that is consistent with a straightforward anti-Gandhian interpretation. In that case, the point might be simply to reject the Gandhian associations of the term *svarājya*.[6] Nonetheless, the term fits with the complex of other possible suggestions of Kashmir.

As noted above, the initial assassination plan involves a theater. While the bombing is being planned, Abidali is directing a theater troupe, and the rehearsal involves both Naren and Rajjo. They are performing a Hindi adaptation of *Romeo and Juliet*, a work that is easily recognizable as a version of William Shakespeare's play, but also easily recognizable as different. The point is significant. The very people who are so vehemently involved in the rejection of British government are simultaneously celebrating—if also changing—British culture. This almost necessarily qualifies the apparent anti-British quality of the film. In the extension to Kashmir, it could be taken as qualifying any criticism of India. In effect, the film establishes a sort of cultural continuity between the colonizer and the colonized. Indeed, the continuity is not simply a matter of performing an adaptation of a play by Shakespeare. The continuity extends to the story of the film itself. The love story mentioned in the title refers to the relation between Naren and Rajjo, who love one another but are separated due to the civil conflict that pits

their parents against one another. This allusion to *Romeo and Juliet* in effect universalizes the relation of the lovers, suggesting larger human patterns. Unfortunately this, too, does not clarify the interpretation of the film. On the one hand, the shared humanity could suggest that the two culturally continuous groups (Indian and English or Kashmiri and Indian) should remain united. But it could equally suggest that the both groups need their autonomy, just as both sets of lovers require autonomy.

One difference between Shakespeare's play and *1942* is that Naren strives to win Rajjo's hand by taking the side of his father's enemies. Again, in this case, the shift is made possible by the fact that Naren already had patriotic sympathy for ordinary Indian people against the brutal government. Despite Raghuvir's death, the plan to assassinate Douglas continues. This plan is also discovered—in this case, through the use of torture.

The torture is presented as brutal. It seems clear that the film is not endorsing such a cruel practice, yet here, once more, we have an equivocal connection. In 1994, when the film appeared, the use of torture for counterinsurgency in Kashmir was, or at least should have been, an obvious parallel. But the consequences of this are not entirely clear. The film presents torture as inhumane. This would seem to condemn torture by the Indian military in Kashmir. Even so, the film also presents torture as producing valuable intelligence that prevents a terrorist attack. (On problems with the idea that torture is a useful means of acquiring actionable intelligence see, for example, Bellamy 26–27.) Viewers might very well find this sympathetic especially insofar as they see the victims of an insurgent attack (e.g., an assassination) as part of "our side"—as most Indian viewers are likely to do in the case of Kashmiri militant violence.

My view is that the film is more in keeping with a denunciation of Indian government-sanctioned torture in Kashmir. Specifically, the film seems to be aimed at cultivating empathy with the oppressed based on their situation and suffering rather than empathy with Indians based on an identity category. In the former case, the viewer's empathy regarding Kashmir would be aimed at the victims of torture, and thus Kashmiris; in the latter case, it would be aimed at the identity category of Indians, and thus the army. This is in part a matter of the degree to

which one focuses on the torture victim versus the degree to which one focuses on the victims of the terrorist attack, given the film's representation of torture as valuable for preventing such attacks. In keeping with the antitorture interpretation, however, it is worth noting that Chopra's later film, *Mission Kashmir*, though generally far more supportive of Indian policies in Kashmir, does not support torture. Indeed, the film uses a version of the "ticking bomb" scenario to show that, had the police used torture, they would almost certainly have wasted valuable time, with the result that hundreds of people would have died. Specifically, in *Mission Kashmir*, the militant captured by the police is highly resistant to torture; they manage to trick him into leading them to the missiles that are set up for a terrorist attack. They barely arrive in time and clearly would have failed had they relied on torture.

Eventually Naren becomes part of a final attempt to assassinate Douglas. He steals a gun from his father and goes to a public event featuring Douglas. Betrayed by his own father, he is discovered, and he shoots at least two soldiers while trying to escape. This leads us to the opening events of the film, when Naren is to be executed. While Naren is waiting on the scaffold, however, other revolutionaries devise a plan to free him. This plan involves dousing a number of soldiers with kerosene and burning them alive. The graphic presentation of the flaming bodies is, to my mind, horrifying. The soldiers also fire on the crowd, killing many, including the sympathetic young woman who was scheduled to play Juliet. Eventually Naren is freed; his father is impaled on the flag, and Douglas is hung. Moreover, the government building is blown up, presumably killing whatever people were inside. Here, too, the graphic portrayal of the deaths is, for me, terrible. The crowd of people cheering these brutal acts is shocking as well. I cannot see anything positive in the outcome of the film. It seems to be a representation of the government and the people reducing themselves to a state of barbarism with devastating results for all involved.

The film ends with the masses singing Muhammad Iqbal's song about "our India." It is difficult not to take this as ironic. The people are celebrating the unique qualities of India amid the blood and corpses, and most of those present have lost loved ones in the immediately preceding violence. It is also likely that the army will soon march in and punish the town for killing Douglas and many soldiers.

The entire sequence makes it difficult for me to see the film as celebrating violence—or, for that matter, India. It certainly and unequivocally condemns the governmental violence of the British. Moreover, it clearly has sympathy with the anger of the revolutionaries. But it also seems to present their violence as terrible. The use of Iqbal at the end appears to be doubly ironic. First, it is ironic due to what has just been done in the name of "our India." Second, it is ironic due to Iqbal's position as "the national poet of Pakistan" (Aberbach 231). This is all the more significant as Iqbal was himself ethnically Kashmiri (Sharif). Here, too, the point seems to be that Kashmir is parallel to the revolutionary movement in British India. As such, we should be sympathetic with the suffering of the Kashmiri people at the hands of the government, and we should no more condemn the Kashmiri militants than we condemn the Indian revolutionaries. But at the same time, we (and they) should recognize the terrible nature of violence—the way that "an eye for an eye" makes "the whole world blind," as it is commonly put (in a phrase attributed to Mahatma Gandhi[7]). On the other hand, here, too, I suspect that most viewers of the film will never consider these issues.

In sum, *1942: A Love Story* is a film that probably *should* create a sort of critical sympathy for Kashmiri militants (not entirely unlike that of Rushdie's novel). It should suggest that the militants, at least many of them, are motivated by anger against Indian government oppression, much as many Indian revolutionaries were motivated by anger against British government oppression. That sympathy should be critical in that the film should create in viewers a sense that any sort of violence is ultimately harmful and self-defeating. In this respect, it should present a perspective on Kashmir in which the first and primary blame is placed on the Indian government, but in which the nature of violence itself is, in a sense, more to blame than any person or institution. However, it is far from clear that this is a point that viewers will take from the film. Indeed, in many ways, it seems likely that most Indian viewers will take precisely the opposite point. It seems likely that they will implicitly interpret the film as justifying any sort of violence on the part of India against its enemies. At the same time, a minority of viewers who begin with promilitant sympathies may take the film as unequivocally supporting Kashmiri revolutionary violence. Thus, the filmmaker may have

partially escaped the constraints of dominant ideology through indirect reference. But those constraints may simply reassert themselves in audience response, reaffirming dominant Indian (or, for some cases, militant) ideology in viewers' interpretations.

Why Indirection?

The preceding analyses have several consequences for our understanding of the discourse surrounding Kashmir and similar situations. The first bears on indirect reference in fiction. As emphasized above, indirect reference is difficult to ascertain with certainty. Moreover, even when clear, it requires a degree of interpretive effort that is probably not the norm in audience reception of popular films. This may simply seem to suggest that filmmakers should avoid indirect treatments and confine themselves to direct representations. Nonetheless, there are two reasons why filmmakers might turn to indirect representations. The first, already noted, is that political conditions sometimes limit the degree to which films can explicitly comment on political situations. Even when there is no danger of governmental censorship or legal prosecution, taking an unpopular political stance may make a film unpopular. Indeed, it may be difficult to get such a film produced to begin with. Even if produced, an unpopular political orientation will probably limit the extent to which a film will be seen and have an impact.

Conversely, direct reference may, for this reason, lead a filmmaker to misrepresent his or her own view in an ideologically conformist direction. This is suggested by the difference between *1942: A Love Story* and Chopra's later film, *Mission Kashmir*. The former suggests a view of the Kashmir situation that is far more critical of Indian policy and far more sympathetic to the revolutionaries than the latter. It is, of course, possible that Chopra changed his mind in the intervening years, or that the differences are the result of his coauthors on the screenplays. (Here it is worth noting that Sanjay Leela Bhansali, the director of *Saawariya*, was one of the coauthors of *1942*; it is presumably not a coincidence that these two indirect representations of Kashmir share this screenwriter-director.) However, it seems at least as likely that many of the political differences are due to the difference in type of representation, with the indirect representation enabling greater deviation from the constraints of standard ideology.

The second reason for indirect representation is that, when successful, it is often more effective than direct representation. Suppose *1942* leads a viewer to connect Kashmiri militants with Indian revolutionaries in the sympathetic but critical way outlined above. That connection, drawn by the viewer himself or herself, may significantly influence his or her attitudes toward the militants. Indeed, it is possible that, in many cases, a personal reunderstanding of this sort would influence a viewer's attitudes more strongly than a direct representation of Indian government policies in Kashmir. This is connected with the viewer's prior commitment to dominant ideology. A direct representation of Kashmiri militants may provoke a mainstream viewer's self-conscious criticism from the start—for instance, skepticism about the work's putative liberal or promilitant bias. In contrast, an initial acceptance of revolutionary struggle, due to its association with Indian independence, may forestall such skepticism and leave the viewer more open to considering the Kashmiri militants as revolutionaries rather than mere terrorists.

Thus indirect reference may be a potentially effective response to dominant ideologies. But unfortunately, it seems that such potential is rarely fulfilled. This leads us to a further consequence of the preceding analysis. We tend to interpret just about everything—from people and objects to films and novels—in a default mode. If it looks like a dog, we assume it is a dog unless given reason to think otherwise. The point of an indirect reference may be to criticize dominant ideology on a particular topic. However, in order to understand and respond to indirect references, we need to move away from habitual modes of thought initially. Those habitual modes of thought include dominant ideologies, constrained by the dominant problematic on such political topics as Kashmir. Our bias toward default modes of thought means that it takes a great deal of salient evidence to force us out of the default. A simple preponderance of evidence is usually not sufficient. Thus, works with any significant degree of ambiguity are likely to allow viewers to interpret them in standard, ideological terms. In the case of *1942* this means that the most likely response to the film would involve no reference to Kashmir at all. If, however, a viewer did link the film with Kashmir, he or she would be likely to interpret that link in keeping with the standard cognitive mechanism of "confirmation bias." (Confirmation bias is a widespread cognitive tendency to accept and stress evidence sup-

porting previously held views while discounting disconfirmatory cases as invalid or as exceptions; see Nisbett and Ross 238–42].) Thus, those beginning from mainstream Indian ideology would be likely to interpret the film as affirming an Indian identity categorization and accepting—even celebrating—Indian nationalist violence, whether against British colonialists or Kashmiri revolutionaries.

In short, there are not only cognitive and affective, but also practical (e.g., financial) constraints on the production of counterdiscourses, presentations of views that violate the constraints of the dominant problematic. These constraints are more serious to the extent that the work in question relies on extensive initial investment and subsequent popular success. Particularly in the context of such practical constraints, indirect reference may facilitate deviation from dominant ideologies in the works themselves and, in some cases, may foster ideological criticism in the responses of viewers. However, even when such a counterdiscourse is produced, viewers' interpretive biases may reduce it to an apparently confirmatory instance of standard ideology anyway.

4 Kashmiri Alternatives

Rival Ideologies in Three Anglophone Novels

Up to this point, we have largely set aside the observations and attitudes of Kashmiris themselves, except insofar as these figure in polling data and the like. We began our examination of Kashmir with Salman Rushdie's novel *Shalimar the Clown*. Though of Kashmiri ancestry, Rushdie was born and raised outside Kashmir. After that, we have focused on film. Again, it is valuable to consider film since dominant political ideology is formed and disseminated to a great extent through mass media. In keeping with this, the collaborative nature of film production makes it likely that individual idiosyncrasy of expression and representation will be lessened. The possibility of individual dissent from dominant views may be particularly significant when it comes to the representation of Kashmir by Kashmiris. The point is perhaps most obvious with respect to Muslim and separatist views. But even Kashmiri Hindus who largely share the dominant anti-Pakistan ideology are likely to present Kashmiri life and Kashmiri people differently from non-Kashmiris, if for no other reason than the fact that "Kashmiri" is a possible identity category for them. On the other hand, it is important not to romanticize the "subaltern voice," as it is sometimes called, assuming that Kashmiris will necessarily be, so to speak, ideology free. In fact, Kashmiris, too, are affected by distortive ideologies, whether the politically dominant (colonial) ideology of the Indian government or the parallel (anticolonial) ideologies of the Kashmiri nationalists—or Pakistani (colonial) ideology, or some combination of these.

This chapter turns from largely non-Kashmiri films to Kashmiri novels. It begins with a transitional case, much as chapter 3 ended with a transitional case (a film written, directed, and produced by someone raised in Kashmir): a graphic novel, which is partially written by a

Kashmiri, but with significant (collaborative) contributions from non-Kashmiris. The other two works are traditional novels, the first by a Kashmiri Hindu, the second by a Kashmiri Muslim.

Kashmir Pending

Naseer Ahmed's *Kashmir Pending* is an unusual work—a readable and engaging graphic novel in English that purports to represent an authentic testimony regarding the Kashmir insurgency. As such, it is a potentially valuable resource in understanding the conditions in Kashmir and conveying that understanding to a large audience.[1] But there are problems. First, the degree to which the novel represents a militant's experiences is questionable. Second, the way in which the novel emplots events seems to rely on standard models of liberal ideology that conceal and distort as much as they reveal. Specifically, *Kashmir Pending* includes elements of a familial separation and reunion narrative. This emplotment is rather loose and will not be a central focus of the following discussion. However, the use of this narrative prototype does point us to a key ideological element in the narrative—the modeling of militants as adolescents and the modeling of their leaders in Pakistan as bad parents. Another important, ideological feature of the work is also related to emplotment (though it is only partially consistent with the generational modeling of the separation/reunion plot). The novel tends to highlight the agency of the militants while treating the violence of the Indian armed forces as an aspect of the "scene" or the condition in which the militants act. Finally, there are ideological issues bearing on the narrational structure of the work—specifically its suggestions about the implied readership. On the other hand, the novel is not without insights into Kashmir as well as larger issues of colonialism and anticolonial militancy. In short, it is ideologically complex—in part conforming to the dominant problematic, but in part deviating from its constraints as well.

The Implied Reader and the True Story

One of the first topics to consider in examining a political work is its target audience. There are some indications in the story that the primary target audience of *Kashmir Pending* is young, Muslim, Kashmiri males. Specifically, the novel functions most obviously as a cautionary tale for potential militants, serving to dissuade them from taking part

in the insurgency. Here one might ask, is it in fact the case that potential militants are reading English-language comics, even if they are about Kashmir? Perhaps. But the fact that the publication is a graphic novel in English may also suggest that it is appealing to the growing body of Anglophone humanists—often with liberal political views—who have recently taken to reading and interpreting graphic fiction. In this respect, the real target audience may be readers who are interested in such works as Art Spiegelman's *Maus* or Marjane Satrapi's *Persepolis*.[2] There is, however, the complication that such readers are probably supposed to *imagine* themselves as a secondary readership for the work rather than as the primary readership. In other words, it is important for liberal humanists reading the work to think of its primary audience not as liberal humanists, but as "at-risk" Kashmiri youths. Put differently, we may say that there is what might be called a *rhetorical audience* for the work; the rhetorical audience is a group assumed to be the main implied audience by the *actual implied audience*.[3]

This rhetorical audience orientation, with its suggestion of an adolescent Kashmiri reader, is bound up with an important aspect of the narrative representation—cognitive modeling. Cognitive modeling commonly involves the use of simplified and familiar structures to organize, understand, and predict information about complex and unfamiliar structures. We find models of this sort in social and political ideology, which is not simply a matter of emotion and literal attributions. Such ideology also involves the use of certain recurring, nonliteral comparisons—for example, models for out-groups, often elaborated into narratives. Models treating out-groups tend to establish some hierarchy with a norm and deviations from the norm, or an ideal or a best case and poorer cases. The norm or ideal is mapped onto the in-group, and the deviations or poorer cases are mapped onto the out-groups. One common model for group relations involves age, with the in-group mapped onto the "adult" or those in "the prime of life" and out-groups mapped onto "children" or, less often, "the aged."[4]

Kashmir Pending draws on a cognitive model that tacitly understands militants as adolescents. In this respect, it takes up one standard, liberal emplotment of the Kashmir insurgency (cf., for example, Piyush Jha's 2009 film *Sikandar*). In each case, the militants (whatever their age) are understood as youths, misled by corrupt and seductive adults,

particularly from Pakistan. Of course, many revolutionaries are young, and that is important.[5] The point, however, is that adolescence operates as a common liberal colonialist model for characterizing and evaluating rebellion independent of the rights or grievances of the rebels. This model is liberal in contrast with a model that assimilates militants to, for example, animals (as in the use of vermin models for Pakistanis in J. P. Dutta's film *L.O.C.*). In keeping with this difference, liberal colonialism as a political orientation supports colonial domination for putatively humanitarian reasons, while also supporting a constrained democratic framework. The constraint is crucial for the colonialism. For example, the democratic framework does not extend to popular self-determination regarding the presence of colonial armed forces. The constraint in self-determination is readily rationalized and in part extended through the adolescent model of anticolonial rebellion and an associated parental model for the colonizers, adolescents having only limited self-determination relative to parents.[6]

The creation of a rhetorical audience might be relatively insignificant if the work's representation of the situation in Kashmir is trustworthy. The trustworthiness of this story is in principle founded on its authenticity.[7] Thus, just after the title page, we read, "This story is based on a true account" (3). The fact that the story is largely a first person narration suggests that it is actual testimony by its author, Ahmed. This is impossible to check, since "Names of characters and organizations have been changed" (3). Nonetheless, the latter statement itself reinforces the reader's sense of testimony, since *changing* the names indicates that there are real, historical/biographical counterparts for the characters. Indeed, there is even a hint that, if their true names were revealed, these real people would be endangered by the militants (not the Indian military, given the relation of the main character to the military at the end of the novel).

Even so, there is reason to doubt that this is strictly historical and biographical. It presumably is "based on" actual events. But the question is to what extent the details of the story correspond to particular occurrences. First, the story fits somewhat too neatly into a prototypical emplotment of Kashmiri militants as adolescents misled by sinister Pakistani adults, as just noted. No less significantly, the events of the narrative have rather greater narrative structure than we would expect from events in real life. We have a virtually Aristotelian plot here. The

main character, Mushtaq, commits the tragic error of turning to violence. It is not the result of a bad character, but he is also not entirely without blame. His tragic error leads to death. Death, in turn, precipitates recognition and reversal, leading Mushtaq from militancy to a peaceful and nonpolitical private existence as a small businessman. He has been "relocated" (82), presumably by the government, and has somehow ended up owning a restaurant. His postincarceration success—and even his relocation—sit rather uneasily with his insistence that he did not give any information to the authorities while in prison. The point is important because the reader's sense of the hero's ultimate nobility would seem to rely on his not being a self-serving collaborationist who trades his principles (however misguided) for business success. The events of the novel predate recent rehabilitation and amnesty programs (on which, see Rashid, and Namboodiri). Still, there were earlier amnesty offers. Thus the story is questionable in this respect, but not impossible.

It is true that there is a sense of irresolution at the end of the novel, which in this respect is not artificially structured. However, that irresolution concerns the political situation in Kashmir, not the life of the protagonist. The life of the protagonist is, rather, quite settled—a satisfying resolution based on his own choices and efforts.

Indeed, one of the most interesting and problematic aspects of the narrative, briefly noted above, is the way it treats the free choices of Kashmiri militants, the way it presents militants as making their own lives rather than being made by circumstances. One effect of focusing on the choices of Kashmiri Muslim youths is that the story ends up treating Indian government policies and Indian military actions—as well as Pakistani government policies and secret service actions—as mere background, as conditions for action rather than as actions per se. Put differently, the novel does something that is supposed to be virtually always good, in standard left-liberal views of literature. It "gives agency" to "the subaltern." But the effect of this is that the choice for ending the conflict is put entirely into the hands of the militants. Their options are, roughly, to give up militancy—to give up politics altogether, if Mushtaq is the appropriate model—or to struggle pointlessly against the policies and practices of India and Pakistan, which in effect constitute an unalterable state of nature. In short, this liberal granting of "agency" is fully in keeping with the dominant problematic. Indeed, one might go so far

as to say that *focusing* on or *foregrounding* the agency of the militants and *backgrounding* government agency is itself a key feature of standard colonial ideology.[8]

Returning to the veracity of this "true account," we find not only a broadly Aristotelian trajectory but more specific narrative structures as well. There are suggestions of a conversion narrative in which the hero wanders down a false life path until a crisis precipitates a realization and a resulting transformation. This is integrated with standard motifs, such as exile and return, and—most important—a familial separation and reunion prototype. Of course, a structure may be common and still true. The recurrence of a pattern in different stories does not indicate that it did not happen. However, the structure still selects particular events and leads to certain causal inferences; it partially shapes the final narrative. Even if all the events in the life of Mushtaq happened to someone, it is clear that many other things happened also, that there were complex causal interrelations among these things, and that the construction of a coherent, simple story will tend to make one causal sequence prominent at the expense of that complexity. Here, the point is particularly consequential since the familial separation prototype stresses that the main character is a child—a point consistent with liberal colonialist ideology.

Narrative shaping enters most obviously in the composition process, about which the reader knows very little. The title page explains that, though the story is "written by" Naseer Ahmed, the "visualization" is by Saurabh Singh, Anindya Roy, and Sarnath Banerjee. This already makes a difference, since the "visualization" involves particularizing events and conditions in ways not defined in the written text. Indeed, the possible conflict between visualization and text is widely stressed in theoretical discussions of graphic fiction (see, for example, Aldama 100).[9] What is important for our purposes is that a division of labor between the writer and the visual artist may result in misleading visual representations when the writer is claiming a sort of testamentary authority not shared by the visual artist. The problem is only furthered by the fact that the "narrative structure" is also contributed by Singh, Roy, and Banerjee.

Of course, testimony can be mistaken, and "outsiders" can make true observations. But it is difficult to get accurate information about conditions in Kashmir. As a result, testimony is particularly valuable. Moreover, the rhetorical effect of the work almost certainly depends to

some extent on the putative "insider" perspective. Thus, in one of the few critical treatments of the novel to date, Suhaan Mehta writes that it "privileg[es] the perspective of the Kashmiri people" (179). Of course, even if the work were entirely a product of a genuine former Kashmiri militant, it would hardly represent "the perspective of the Kashmiri people." At best, it would only represent one such perspective, if perhaps one that has many important similarities with those of numerous other Kashmiris. However, the contributions of Singh, Roy, and Banerjee would seem to limit even this.

Detailing the Crisis: A Liberal Problematic

But these are relatively general points. The heart of fiction is in the details—the verbal and visual particulars. For example, the deaths reported in a novel are frequently personalized. In other words, the people killed are often individuals about whom we know something as individuals. This is important, in *Kashmir Pending* and in other works treating Kashmir. For example, Kashmiri political discourse rarely gives us an image as emotionally powerful as the death of Boonyi in Rushdie's *Shalimar the Clown*. This particularity is where literature produces its distinctive political effects.

It would be unfair to compare *Kashmir Pending* to *Shalimar the Clown*, which is arguably the single great work of the Kashmir conflict. But the killings in *Kashmir Pending* are, individually, rather pallid and, collectively, relatively limited. There is an early statement, "Many lives were lost" (15), illustrated with a single corpse (see fig. 1). Yet in the years covered by the novel, there are few deaths. Moreover, those are somewhat equivocal in terms of blame. For instance, the text reports, "A stray bullet hit a protester" (24), but there is no indication of whether it was a mortal wound, a serious injury, or a light wound. (Of course, any possibility is bad.) Subsequently, there is a pictorial representation of a man being shot, evidently deliberately (27). The problem here is twofold. First, the text—but not necessarily the visual representation—is supposed to be testimony, so we do not know whether to trust this depiction. Second, we learn nothing about the man or what happened prior to the shooting—though it is important that, in the visual representation, he is not holding a weapon. Subsequently, Mushtaq's fellow militant Aziz is deliberately killed by the Indian Army. However, Mushtaq explains



Fig. 1. One of the few deaths represented in *Kashmir Pending*.

that he was betrayed by a rival militant group (68). In addition, a vegetable seller is killed in the "crossfire" between soldiers and militants (36), as are "a couple of civilian bystanders" (66). Finally, the militant Ali kills himself and two soldiers (91).

Clearly the treatment of killing in *Kashmir Pending* is more in line with actual events than that in, say, Mani Ratnam's film *Roja*. Indeed, the comparison is unfair to *Kashmir Pending*. Moreover, it is undoubtedly the case that the great majority of the killing in the Kashmir Valley is more to be blamed on the militarized situation than on the side that happened to fire a particular bullet—a point brought out well by the novel. Nonetheless, it is worth considering the treatment of the deaths in the novel. There are nine clear deaths (listed above, not counting the "stray bullet" case). Of these, one is a deliberate killing by the army. Again, this is represented visually, but not stated in the (putatively testimonial) text; on the other hand, the actual effect of the visual representation on readers may be strong enough that the absence in the verbal testimony does not matter. We might add the visual representation accompanying the "Many lives were lost" statement (15). Though this does not strictly assign blame to the army, I imagine it is taken to do so by most readers. Thus we have two people killed by the army.

Neither is killed in the testimony. There is, in addition, Aziz. Since Aziz is indeed a militant, at least some readers may count this case as somewhat different. More significantly, Mushtaq himself blames the infighting of militants equally with the army, thus dividing the responsibility.[10] The vegetable seller and the two bystanders are killed in crossfire, and thus we cannot assign blame for these deaths. On the other hand, the full sentence reporting the civilian deaths is as follows: "We tried to shoot our way out, but a couple of civilian bystanders died in the crossfire" (66), which could be taken as blaming the militants. Finally, Ali and two soldiers are killed by Ali, thus by a militant.

There are different ways of interpreting these numbers. If we simply count up the killings, then we might say that there appear to be two killings of civilians by the army (though the precise status of the victims is not explicit); there is one militant and there are three civilians for whom the army and the militants share responsibility; the militants are also responsible for the deaths of one militant and two soldiers. This puts government responsibility at, let us say, four (two whole killings plus half responsibility for four other killings). The militants, in contrast, are responsible for five killings (three whole killings plus half responsibility for four others). The numbers change to three and six, respectively, if we take the bystanders to have been killed by the militants when they "tried to shoot [their] way out" (66). In the second case, the militants are killing at twice the rate of the army. This is not in keeping with the numbers presented by Talbot and Singh, which indicate the reverse—that the militants have killed at about half the rate of government forces (136–37). On the other hand, it is important that the army killings come first and are much more likely to involve (apparent) civilians. This partially balances the distorted representation of the numbers killed.

But there is another, perhaps more important, bias here. The killings by the militants seem much more chosen, much more deliberate. Again, one of the killings by the army has no event surrounding it. It is merely an image of a dead young man (15; see fig. 1). Another is actually instigated by the militants (68). Again, like so much else in the novel, the deaths perpetrated by the army are almost like forces of nature. It is as if they are not the result of policy and decision. In contrast, the killings by the militants are more likely to be willed or at least a predictable result of choice (as in the case, "We tried to shoot our way out"). Indeed, Mushtaq's

final decision to leave the militancy involves a decision that he can even prevent deaths in "cross fires" (95). Thus the ideological orientation of the novel is not so much a matter of who kills more people. Rather, it is a matter of who has the capacity to stop the killing. This clear political/ideological orientation suggests again that this is not simply "a true account" (3), but a highly shaped and purposeful story. In itself, that is not a problem. But the shape is to a great extent provided by the two ideological tendencies already indicated: first, modeling the militancy on adolescent rebelliousness and, second, placing the entire responsibility for ending the conflict—including the avoidance of even accidental deaths—in the hands of the militants.

Tracing the Emplotment

As the story begins, an adult man is kneeling in Muslim prayer. In first-person narration, he explains that prison is the ideal place "to get closer to God" (5). Getting closer to God means, as we learn, leaving the militancy. The point is uncontroversial for liberal colonialist readers of the novel, but not for militant Islamists. The ease with which this connection is assumed further suggests that the work is not aimed at Islamist youths who would presumably need some reason to see abandoning jihād as "getting closer to God." It is also important that it is an adult figure who becomes closer to God and leaves the militancy.

After some background on Mushtaq and the introduction of twenty-two-year-old Ali, the scene then shifts to a young boy sitting presumably on the shore of Dal Lake in Srinagar. Soldiers are seated in traditional Kashmiri boats. Unprovoked, the boy hurls a stone in the direction of the heavily armed soldiers (see fig. 2), who do not respond. The scene is clearly important in closely linking rebellion with children. It also to some extent suggests that the initiators of the violence are not the soldiers, but the rebellious youths—particularly as the soldiers do not respond.

After this interruption, the scene returns to the prison. The focus of the prisoners' concern is food. The point may seem merely incidental until Mushtaq contrasts his current situation with his boyhood, when his mother would chase him to feed him (10). Mushtaq goes on to recall his father's hope that he would be a doctor. On the one hand, these reflections are quite normal; one imagines that prisoners often think about their families. Moreover, this introduces the rather minimal



Fig. 2. Hurling a stone at soldiers on patrol.

family separation structure. On the other hand, there is also a clear way in which we are being prepared to take Mushtaq's wrong turn toward militancy as adolescent behavior. More simply, we are being led to think of him as a child.

Mushtaq then turns to something more along the lines of historical background. He explains that he lived near the mosque, which was "a symbol of Kashmiri nationalist sentiment" where "Friday prayer" was "followed by fiery speeches against the government" (12). This is important in integrating Kashmiri nationalism with Islam, thus separating it from the history of at least partially secular nationalism. As Bose (*Transforming*) notes, the rise of the National Conference was in part due to "the control" it "managed to acquire over most of the Valley's mosques." In this way, Kashmiri nationalism has been connected with religion from the start (see also Swami 12–14, 45, 69–71, and elsewhere, on Islamist elements in the history of Kashmiri nationalism). Nonetheless, the National Conference program, and subsequently that of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), were not Islamist in the manner of some later movements, such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Undoubtedly, for

many young Kashmiris, nationalism is in fact Islamic nationalism, with nothing secular about it. For many, it is inseparable from mosques and hardly if at all linked with a movement for progressive social reform.[11] On the other hand, this is also the standard view in much of the rest of the world, and it ignores other strands in Kashmiri nationalism. The point becomes clear in the following frame. Referring to the speeches at the mosque, Mushtaq reports, "The consequence of such instigations was often felt on the street" (12). The frame depicts a soldier encountering protestors. The suggestion is that this conflict originated in the propaganda of the mosques. This is no doubt partially true, but far from the whole story.

The following pages are more revealing in that they go beyond standard ideology on Kashmir. Mushtaq discusses the astonishingly naive view of Pakistan held by some Kashmiri Muslims at the time. This, too, speaks against the validity of the insurgency, but it does so in a way that does not fit with Indian or Western propaganda. It indicates that people denied self-determination are likely to idealize options that are forbidden to them.[12] Mushtaq also sensitively portrays the out-grouping of Kashmiri Hindus. He even represents his own childhood attitudes and actions harshly, explaining that they literally saw Kashmiri Hindus as people to spit on. Of course, here again the representation makes the rebels into adolescents. But the recognition of the sectarian quality of Islamic-Kashmiri nationalism is important.

Following these criticisms of the militancy, Mushtaq turns to the Indian Army. This is one of the most powerful sections of the work. The account of the law is important and accurate—"Troops could arrest, kill or rough up any person on mere suspicion" (15; see also Malik 307). Moreover, the visual presentation is perhaps the most effective in the book. The bright, shadow-casting silhouettes of soldiers marching through the city in the first panel are chilling (see fig. 3). The whiteness gives them a nearly ethereal quality. Indeed, the soldier in the foreground might almost seem to be floating above his own shadow. The ghostlike representation makes the army all the more ominous, particularly against the red of the city, as if it had literally been washed in blood. On the other hand, in context, the representation may contribute to the sense that the army is simply a brute fact or force that cannot be changed.

The following pages do convey a sense of the broad range of Kashmiri men and women involved in protests. This is where we are told,



Fig. 3. India's ghostlike army on a blood-red street in Kashmir.

"Many lives were lost" (15). On the other hand, before we actually witness police firing, we are told that protestors used "Stones and petrol bombs" (17). Moreover, in contrast with reports of the army engaging in arson (Gossman 8), here the militants are responsible for "act[s] of arson" (19). The representation is not wrong—my own family had their ancestral home burned down, evidently by militants. Even after the Hindus left the valley, Sanjay Kak's documentary *Jashn-e-Azadi: How We Celebrate Freedom* records a large crowd at a militant leader's funeral repeatedly chanting, "The house of the infidel—uproot it! Set its roof on fire—strike or die!" Moreover, militants have set fire to government structures (see Swami 64–65 for examples). Nonetheless, the representation is misleading in potentially leaving the reader with the sense that arson in Kashmir is generally the responsibility of the militants. The police respond, we are told, with "teargas," but we are shown the police more benignly dousing a fire with a water hose (19).

The next chapter begins with Mushtaq's schooling, referring to mathematics, physics, and biology. The graphics add to the text an apparent representation of an Islamic school (20; see fig. 4). This seems once again to suggest the responsibility of teachers of Islam for the



Fig. 4. Mushtaq's school.

violence. Specifically, one imagines that many readers—particularly liberal colonialist readers—will link Mushtaq's eventual violence with the early Islamic education suggested by the visuals. Here, as elsewhere, it is true that Muslim leaders are in part responsible for the violence, but only in part.

In any case, Mushtaq is a mediocre student. When he turns sixteen, he determines that it is time to become more involved in the exciting political events that he largely does not understand. He makes it clear that the protestors had guns at this point (21), that "processions" were regularly "turning into riots," and "Aggression had reached a high level, the police was having a tough time controlling the mob" (22). This is when the "stray bullet hit a protester" (24) and, subsequently, the unarmed man is shot. Here again the violence seems to be initiated by militants—undoubtedly true in many specific cases, but misleading as to the situation as a whole.

Mushtaq is arrested. The visuals present him as being tortured, fully in keeping with actual practices in Kashmir. We of course know that Mushtaq has nothing to tell the army, since he is just an adolescent naïf at this point. When he leaves prison, however, he is received as a hero. The development is important and revealing. Many people in a society suffering military occupation are likely to identify and sympathize with a young boy arrested and brutalized by the occupying army. Indeed, incidents of this sort foster the sense—unfortunately accurate—that the military presence is a matter of occupation (rather than, say, protection). Moreover, the following chapter goes on to show how the experience in prison served to recruit Mushtaq to further anti-Indian nationalism. This, too, is a predictable result, if one that is often ignored by the military occupiers.

Given these experiences, it would be quite possible to represent Mushtaq's decisions as autonomous and adult.[13] Nonetheless, the novel stresses that he is an "impressionable youth" (as Mehta put it [177]). In his late teens, he treats leaders "with awe" (33). One of the leaders urges him to join the armed struggle. After the vegetable seller is killed, he agrees.

The account of this death is important, and probably reflects a common type of event in colonized countries. The vendor is "shot in the skirmish" of a "crossfire" (36). Thus his death may have been caused by

either the militants or the army. However, he is mourned as if killed by the army. One could argue that, if the army were not there, the death would not have occurred. That is, after all, one of the problems with colonial occupation: it creates a situation in which violence is likely to occur. (Of course, the same point applies to the militancy.) But the mourning suggests more than this sort of qualified blame. Moreover, in technical terms, there is no reason to believe that the dead man had been engaged in jihād (e.g., his identification as a "vegetable vendor," not as a militant, suggests that he was not at all involved in the movement). Nonetheless, he is labeled a "martyr."

In the context of an active nationalist movement, this sort of development is not unexpected. Given the nature of political organizations, one would expect them to recruit any events to support their own analyses and policies. This is predictable not only due to the bad faith of political leaders generally but also as a result of (sincere) confirmation bias, the general human tendency to construe data as fitting a prior theory (see Nisbett and Ross 238–42)—in this case, the tendency to view equivocal events as fitting rather than violating anticipation. Indeed, the propensity does not seem to be confined to leaders. Politicized crowds might act on confirmation bias without any direct guidance from leaders and often with only minimal communication among themselves. As a result, in the Kashmiri context, the death of any innocent person is likely to be blamed on the government by the opposition (and vice versa), since the prior belief is likely to be that "they" initiate violence while "we" merely defend ourselves. Moreover, both the political leaders and ordinary people are strongly motivated to interpret apparently meaningless deaths in such a way as to give those deaths some sense or purpose. The bestowal of the label "martyr," however inappropriate, is one way of doing that—particularly in a context where militant Islam has largely displaced other nationalist ideologies. There is also an element of confirmation bias here in that such a bestowal construes deaths as providentially selected by Allāh.

Having joined the militants, Mushtaq is now sent to Pakistan. We are brought into the camp, and see the recruits praying before their automatic weapons (45) in an iconic image (see fig. 5) familiar from films such as *Roja*. Here, as in the case of the school, the visuals seem to stress the link between the violence and religious belief and the responsibility



Fig. 5. Militants pray with their weapons.

of Islamic leaders for the violence. In Pakistan, the "underbelly" of the revolution is exposed (46). Unsurprisingly, that underbelly is first of all a matter of separating family. As far as we know, Mushtaq does not have a wife or child. Thus, the illustration representing a mother and child may be taken to refer to Mushtaq's own mother—again stressing that he is a child. The Pakistanis have in effect taken these children from their parents, giving them the wrong parental guidance.

Having been denied the possibility of returning to his home for a visit, Mushtaq makes the apparently strange decision to join the revolutionaries in Afghanistan. Despite his partial skepticism about the Pakistanis and other groups of Kashmiri militants, he seems to have nothing but support for the Afghan revolutionaries. Moreover, he explains that "Their struggle reminded me of mine" (50), directly linking the Kashmiri insurgency with the Afghan revolution. The book was published well after the nature of the Taliban government had become clear. It is, therefore, difficult to interpret this parallel in a positive light.

Following this period in Afghanistan, Mushtaq finally returns to Kashmir. He is particularly pleased that he will return to his parents (51). During the border crossing they are discovered, and the Indian troops apparently open fire without warning and without constraint (52–53). Surprisingly, no one is killed—rather reminiscent of the open-

ing raid in *Roja*, where the Indian Army does not kill anyone despite massive firing.

Finally, Mushtaq does return home, and the novel touchingly portrays his reunion with his mother. Though he is now physically an adult, the visual representation of Mustaq and his mother (58) clearly recalls the earlier image of a mother and young child (47). The implications hardly need to be spelled out—he is still a boy. In the context of this mother-and-child reunion, he meets "the rest of the group." They are "young guys" too (59). The "leader," however, is parental, "an older looking man" (59).

Mushtaq explains that the police force was not functioning. As a result, everyone had to pay protection money to the militants; otherwise they would be "caught in the crossfire between the police and the freedom fighters" (61). Of course, paying protection money hardly guarantees that someone will not be caught in crossfire. The implication is that this is a euphemism for being assassinated by the "freedom fighters." In keeping with this, he goes on to explain, "More than freedom fighters, they were cold hearted killers" (62). As already noted, war tends to give rise to situations in which innocent people will be killed in crossfire. Colonialism tends to give rise to situations in which the colonizer will escalate violence—firing on unarmed crowds, rounding up and torturing innocents, and so on. Similarly, when revolutionary groups take up arms and blend in with the population, it is very likely that they will use those arms to get what they want from that population. Just as violence is likely to spiral with the colonial forces, so too is violence likely to spiral with the revolutionaries. Reliance on coercive force as a modulator of coercive force is likely to escalate coercive force—and corruption as well. Indeed, these are among the reasons why violence is misguided, even in response to real wrongs. The acceptance of violence almost inevitably leads to situations where greater wrongs are perpetrated.

In any case, the introduction of corruption and extortion among the militants leads to conflict. Mushtaq presents this as conflict between the corrupt "K force" and his own uncorrupted organization.[14] It seems unlikely that any militant group is wholly good. But there are likely to be some militants who oppose corruption and they may dominate one group while being a minority in a second group (e.g., Tankel reports

that, relative to other groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba's "cadres were less involved in . . . negative incidents" such as "extortion" [59]). Such uncorrupted militants are likely to enter into serious conflict with the extortionist elements in their own ranks and in other groups.

More generally, group dynamics in an insurrection readily give rise to conflicts. Different revolutionaries will have different goals and different self-interests. Militant organizations attract people who are genuinely outraged by the cruelties of a social situation. But one expects them to attract a number of people who simply like the idea of firing guns. Moreover, in the general population, there are presumably people who are outraged by social conditions but not attracted to the idea of shooting people. Men and women of this sort are unlikely to join a militant organization. (Clearly, people who support the status quo will not join an insurrection.) Thus, a revolutionary group is almost certain to have a skewed social composition relative to the population as a whole and even relative to the dissident population. Specifically, it is likely to include a disproportionate number of people with an unusually strong inclination toward violence and relatively few people who would act to inhibit that inclination. Moreover, the practice of violence and the ubiquity of weapons are likely to habituate participants to violence and weapons—including those who had no prior inclination toward violence. In this context, it is hardly surprising that there are sometimes fatal conflicts among revolutionaries.

In *Kashmir Pending*, this conflict among militants leads to the deaths of the bystanders and Aziz. Mushtaq blames himself for Aziz's death, and so do Aziz's parents. Though the reasons for this particular attribution are obscure, the reasons for some sort of self-criticism are clear. This is a moment when Mushtaq takes responsibility for his actions. As such, he becomes an "adult." The fact that he can be blamed suggests that he had some sort of almost parental responsibility for Aziz. As one would expect from the adolescent model, the change to adulthood is accompanied by the abandonment of militancy. Indeed, the connection is almost explicit in the penultimate chapter.

Specifically, Mushtaq encounters a roadblock. He has just reported that he no longer participates in "aggressive operations" (72). Though it is not clearly consistent with that claim, he is carrying explosives. He now has a choice—throw a grenade and escape, or turn himself in. He



Fig. 6. A Kashmiri mother and child, endangered by a possible militant action.

flashes back to his childhood and his "early . . . hatred for men in uniform" (75). He explains that he "never really knew why" he threw stones (76). The visual images emphasize the parallels between the stone-throwing child and the grenade-throwing militant. He realizes that throwing the grenade would "cost . . . many innocent lives" (78). To stress that this is an adult point of view, the visual image shows that the innocent lives at risk are a mother and the small child in her lap (see fig. 6)—for readers familiar with Western art perhaps somewhat reminiscent of the various representations of Mary and Jesus. To further the connection with adulthood, he explains that turning himself in (rather than killing innocents in order to escape) was true bravery (79). The bravery of the choice is intensified when he says that he refused to give the army any information (80). There is no mention of torture. He explains that the soldiers "were puzzled" (80). Perhaps surprisingly for a militant who does not give information, his sentence is only seven years long and, as already noted, he is relocated and apparently established in a business (82, 92). (Seven years is in line with some of the sentencing reported elsewhere. For example, Altaf reports cases of two, eight, and fifteen years; however, Altaf does not detail the precise charges in these cases or the degree of cooperation between the prisoner and the authorities.)

Mustaq goes on to condemn both the "rebels and the rulers," explaining that "neither of them would exist without the other" (84). The point is probably true in some sense. But the condemnation of

"[t]he politician" deceiving "the masses" (84) is overly simple—and it is overly simple in just the way we would expect, with falsely parental leaders misguiding confused youths. "Young men like Ali are too charged to see through the manipulation," he explains (84). This is when Ali becomes a suicide bomber.[15]

The novel ends with Mushtaq in his restaurant, finding it "difficult . . . to make peace with my conscience" for the "recklessness" of his "violent" past (93). There is no mention of government atrocities. Now, there is only the violence of the militants. The conclusion leaves us with Mushtaq's reaffirmation of leaving the revolution: "I do not want any more innocent lives to be lost in the cross fires of my war" (95). Of course, the opposition to the deaths of innocents is uncontroversial. But, once more, the suggestion is that the possibility of putting an end to innocent deaths is solely in the hands of the militants. Again, the violence of the state is simply given, immutable. It is up to the revolutionaries to produce peace. The point seems to be furthered by the peculiar reference to the insurgency as "my war." Of course, "our war" would have been problematic as well, suggesting a uniformity of Kashmiri views—"the perspective of the Kashmiri people," as Suhaan Mehta puts it (179). A more appropriate statement might simply have been, "I do not want any more innocent lives to be lost in the cross fires of this war"—or, better still, "of war."

In sum, *Kashmir Pending* does suggest many points about Kashmir that are missing from standard ideology on the crisis there. It sensitizes readers to the likelihood that colonized people will overestimate the worth of the colonizer's enemies (in this case, Pakistan) or victims (e.g., youths falsely detained by the government), that they will feel an intensified sense of cultural identity in opposition to the colonizer (here, focusing on Islam), that they will engage in confirmatory thinking that assigns disproportionate blame to the colonizer for even random tragedies. It also gives us a better sense of how, in the course of a revolution, group dynamics will tend to initiate or advance corruption and internecine violence. Last but not least, it effectively portrays some aspects of the human suffering in Kashmir.

Despite these values, however, *Kashmir Pending* in effect conveys a liberal colonialist ideology about Kashmir. It overrepresents killings by militants and underrepresents those by the government; it has the same

flaw in its general representation of violence. It implicitly identifies Kashmiri nationalism with militant Islamic nationalism. It models the Kashmiri nationalists on adolescents, thereby undermining their authority and any justice their cause might have, largely reducing Kashmiri nationalism to vulnerability to the bad parenting of Pakistan. In keeping with this, the work's narrative is partially shaped by a family separation and reunion prototype, which furthers the assimilation of militants to children. At the same time, it frames the conflict in such a way as to suggest that the only power of choice is that of the militants. If the violence is going to stop, then the Kashmiri militants need to make that decision—as if curfews, torture, warrantless searches, and wide discretion to shoot to kill were not policies but simple facts of nature. In some ways, the insights of *Kashmir Pending* serve to make these ideological points more acceptable to a liberal, but still colonialist, readership. This ideological effect is enhanced by the questionable claim of testimonial accuracy and the subtle suggestion that the target reader of the work is not a non-Kashmiri liberal colonialist, but a Kashmiri youth with militant leanings, a youth in danger, but who can still be saved by a good (liberal colonial) parent.

Close Call in Kashmir

Like *Kashmir Pending*, Bharat Wakhlu's *Close Call in Kashmir* has a complex relation to its implied readership. As one might guess from its title, this novel is written for a general audience seeking entertainment, not an academic audience. It appears in the Penguin India series MetroReads, defined on its website as "Fun, feisty, fast reads for the reader on the go!"[16] To make his novel appropriate for the series, then, Wakhlu had the unenviable task of making the situation in Kashmir fun and feisty. In fact, the novel is engaging and, at one level, easy to read. However, it has complexities that one might not recognize initially. I do not believe Wakhlu imagined his novel being analyzed by academics. Nonetheless, it has something of a dual audience. Wakhlu includes a degree of thematic subtlety in his novel that one might not expect from the "fun and feisty" imperative. Moreover, at one point in the novel, he invokes the hermeneutic concept of *ijtihād* (116), the process of effortful interpretation adjured in some Islamic jurisprudence. Wakhlu may overgeneralize the concept, since he indicates that those who advocate

ijtihād are right "in Islam" (116). (On some complexities in Islamic views of *ijtihād*, see, for instance, Fareed, or al-Atawneh.) Nonetheless, his view is in keeping with that of some schools, and does seem well supported by *hadīths* (traditions passed down from the founding of Islam, constituting the second main source of Muslim doctrine, after the Qur'ān; on the *hadīths* and *ijtihād*, see Waines 76 and 85.) In any case, the fact that he invokes and generalizes the concept suggests the relevance of effortful interpretation to his own novel.

This is not to say that the book presents a rigorous or compelling analysis of the situation in Kashmir, visible if one simply makes the interpretive effort. Like *Kashmir Pending*, *Close Call in Kashmir* is an ideologically mixed work. Nonetheless, unlike that graphic novel, its "surface ideology," as we might call it, is entirely in keeping with Indian government propaganda, much like *Roja*. Specifically, we might distinguish between the more overt and continuous ideological functions of a work and its more implicit and local *ideological complications*. Our thoughts on any complex set of concerns are rarely unequivocal and uniform; our ideas and emotions change with changing topics and circumstances. For example, as an author writes about an enemy, an out-group member, that author will at times have the out-group status of the character firmly in mind. At other times, however, the author will become involved with the particularity of the simulated character, perhaps feeling sympathy for that character's suffering and breaching the barrier of alienation erected by identity oppositions. Similarly, on political topics, most of us do not feel 100 percent supportive of a particular position. We may largely support one policy but recognize defects or have moments of doubt. To some extent, we may suppress—more technically, *regulate*—our spontaneous (often emotional) deviations from a standard view. In this case, we monitor our responses, "correcting" those that do not fit our ordinary opinions (e.g., a supporter of President Barack Obama might self-consciously reject spontaneous doubts about, say, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). But that does not make the inconsistencies in one's response disappear or render them inconsequential. In the case of an author, the inconsistencies may manifest themselves in the literary work itself.[17]

Again, Wakhlu's novel is largely continuous with dominant Indian ideology on Kashmir. Nonetheless, there are moments where this sur-

face ideology is disturbed—often, only to be reasserted through some readjustment. For example, early on, two of the novel's heroes are conversing. One, Shamsuddin, has taken a public stand against the militants. He asks his friend, "isn't my opposition . . . supported by the Kashmiri people?" The question in effect concerns popular opinion regarding the militancy. It is important to the general ideology of the novel that the Kashmiri people do not favor the militants, since that would acknowledge that this is a self-determination issue. We might expect the second hero to respond, "Absolutely!" Instead, the question receives the tepid response, "Possibly." Though very limited, this acknowledges that there may be a self-determination issue here. Only two paragraphs later, however, a new paragraph begins with the narrator explaining that "the Kashmiris . . . found Shamsuddin's bold stand against the militants deeply inspiring" (29). This serves to regulate the prior admission of a possible self-determination issue, asserting that the people are indeed opposed to the militancy. But what is interesting is that Wakhlu did not go back and revise the dialogue. The doubt remains, even if it is denied. Moreover, in the same sentence where he asserts Kashmiri opposition to the militants, the narrator characterizes Kashmiris as "volatile" (29), suggesting that the populace might change their views from time to time. Later, the attitudes of ordinary Kashmiris are broached again, but this time in relation to the Indian military. The narrator reports that "the local people would rather not have anything to do with the army" (140). The comment is neither elaborated on nor qualified.

A somewhat more developed example occurs in the middle of the novel. The narrator refers to "intimidation of common people by armed thugs and policemen." This is immediately qualified, but not entirely denied by the subsequent division between "the terror of the armed goons" or militants and "the high-handedness of the paramilitary forces fighting the militants" (116). Initially, we see the violence of the militants and that of the police condemned in the same way. This is, however, immediately altered. Militant "intimidation" becomes "terror," while police "intimidation" becomes "high-handedness"—though some admission of Indian fault still remains. This receives a further, indirect qualification when the narrator explains, "The policeman disguise was a well-known tactic that the militants used when they had to

look for someone to capture or kill. It made life so much easier to have eyewitnesses to say that policemen—in proper uniforms and with guns—had caught or killed innocent people" (138). Wakhlu is in all likelihood correct that this tactic is used by militants. But it is simply propaganda to indicate that this is generally the case when someone wearing a police uniform kills innocent people. For present purposes, perhaps the chief interest of the statement is that it is a somewhat distant regulation of the local break in dominant ideology, when the narrator admitted the possibility of police intimidation (subsequently downgraded to high-handedness).

Character, Morality, and Identity

These local deviations are not the only points where Wakhlu departs from standard ideologies, nor are they the most significant. A more noteworthy feature of Wakhlu's novel is that its use of identity categories is very limited. There are definitely good guys and bad guys. But these moral categories are largely not aligned with identity categories, particularly religious identity categories. Wakhlu is very careful to present good and bad Hindus and good and bad Muslims.

There is some use of national identity categories in that there are no good Pakistani or Afghani characters. This is in keeping with the dominant Indian ideology on Kashmir that blames the crisis on Pakistani governmental interference. However, even this is qualified by three factors. First, there are evil Indian and Kashmiri characters who in many relevant respects parallel the sinister Pakistanis and Afghanis. Second, the Pakistani characters in particular are peripheral to the main narrative. They are relatively shadowy figures with little salience. They are more like an abstract force than real enemies. Third, and perhaps most important, Wakhlu's treatment of the Pakistanis and Afghanis does not, I believe, cultivate dehumanizing disgust or even much anger. Those emotions are, rather, aimed at the evil Indian characters who betray their country. The point is in keeping even with the portrayal of sexuality, a possible trigger of disgust. The traitorous Hakeem's sexual exploits are—at least for me—rather repulsive, with their references to his "howling," which is "almost animal-like" (17). In contrast, the sexual behavior of the Pakhtun terrorist, Kandahari, seems more human and tender (e.g., his partner "lovingly rubbed oil on his war-weary body" [18]). There is an

element of hypocrisy when the prostitute leaves his bed and dons a burqa (19), but hypocrisy is human, and more a matter of society than of these particular individuals. Indeed, this is more than balanced by the traitorous Sharma's decision to send his wife to the Hindu holy city of Benares so that he can luxuriate in the embraces of his mistress (5).

More important, Wakhlu's treatment of Kashmiri militants is complex and humanizing. His novel has only two—Javed and Imran. Javed participates in the kidnapping that is at the center of the novel, but he is not implicated in any murder that occurs in the course of it. Imran is a more extreme case; though he has been involved in "violence" against "innocent people" in the past (121), he has realized the error of violence and has left the militancy. Thus, the reader does not see any Kashmiris engaged in murder, nor does the reader understand that any Kashmiris are responsible for the deaths of sympathetic characters. Wakhlu presumably recognized that, for practical reasons, it was important to minimize concrete blame directed at Kashmiris. In the context of military conflict, such blame would only serve to foster what is in effect racist antagonism toward Kashmiris from other Indians. This is a point, then, where Wakhlu may be evidencing some recognition of the brutality of the Indian occupation of Kashmir, and thus where there may be a small lapse in the general commitment to dominant ideology. If so, this case is somewhat different from those considered earlier. To use psychoanalytic terminology, we might say that the cases considered above are a matter of *manifest* ideological complication, cases where a contradiction with standard ideology appears directly. Here, in contrast, we find an instance of *latent* ideological complication, since the conflict with dominant ideology is not so much a matter of what the text says but of what it might have said but does not. Another case of this sort occurs in the murder committed by Kandahari. We know it occurs, but we are not faced with the act itself. I suspect that the reason for this omission is that Wakhlu did not wish to promote anti-Afghani feelings, enhancing disgust for and misunderstanding of people who are themselves the object of military violence. (Note that this need not have been a self-conscious purpose on Wakhlu's part. It may have been a matter of his unreflective emotional response.)

This is not to say that there are no bad Kashmiris in *Close Call in Kashmir*. There are. In fact, the two most repulsive villains are Hakeem,

the chief secretary of Kashmir, and Sharma, a professor of history at the University of Kashmir. They are both disgusting due to their sexuality, as already noted. But, even more significantly, they are morally disgusting due to their corruption. Both men are cooperating with the Pakistani secret service to accrue material benefits. They are, in short, simply criminals who advance the violent conflict in Kashmir for pecuniary reasons.

We will return to these characters' narrative role as traitors, but the key point to note now is that one is Muslim and one is Hindu. There is a similar pairing of Muslim and Hindu among the good characters. The main heroes of the novel are the half-American, half-Kashmiri Hindu, Zutshi; the Central Bureau of Investigation officer, Dalela, a Hindu; the Muslim cleric, Bandey; and the Muslim professor, Ali. Namrata Wazir, the Kashmiri Hindu woman kidnapped by the militants, is also a clearly good character.

In short, Wakhlu systematically avoids aligning moral categories (good and evil) with ethnic categories (e.g., Kashmiri) or religious categories (Hindu or Muslim). Indeed, he does not even align moral categories with government (the governor and Hakeem's predecessor are both good), intellectuals (Sharma is bad, but Ali is good), or the police and criminal investigators (Dalela is good, but there are corrupt officers working for Hakeem). The only hints of such an alignment occur with national categories, but even those are qualified. Nonetheless, Wakhlu largely recapitulates dominant, Indian government ideology on the Kashmir crisis. Except for brief moments of ideological complication, he does not acknowledge either Indian oppression or nationalist sentiment on the part of Kashmiris. The point is inseparable from his emplotment of the crisis.

Heroic Emplotment

Readers sensitive to standard character structures of heroic narrative may have noticed, even from the brief comments given above, that there is a further pattern to Wakhlu's distribution of characters. They fall into the roles of that standard, nationalist plot structure. Again, the heroic plot involves an external enemy, an internal usurper who betrays the home society to the invading enemy, and of course defenders of the home society. As noted earlier, it also often involves a sympathetic enemy or

collaborator, an inverse parallel to the internal betrayer. In this case, the external enemy is subdivided. There is the enemy government and the actual invaders. The enemy government is, of course, Pakistan, represented by General Jibril. The actual invaders are Pakhtun and Afghani mercenaries. The internal traitors are Hakeem and Sharma. In keeping with the usual structure, the main internal traitor is a figure high in the home government—here, someone second to the governor. The sympathetic enemy is Imran, who betrays the invaders to assist the escaped captive, Namrata Wazir. The heroic characterizations in this work are complicated by the fact that Wakhlu integrates a heroic narrative with a criminal investigation. In consequence, the heroes are not soldiers or political leaders but, in effect, detectives.

Wakhlu's changes in the heroic structure are in part the result of the ideology of the work and in part the result of actual, historical conditions. As to the ideology, the shift from heroic defense to criminal investigation is consistent with the dominant Indian view that the acts of the militants, though a form of war, are also simply criminal. Of course, terrorist acts are criminal acts. In many ways, treating them as such is salutary. Indeed, in the afterword, I will urge that the Indian government should consistently treat violations of law—by militants and by soldiers—as criminal acts. The problem comes in combining war and criminality and selecting one or the other according to ideological requirements. For example, treating the government as prosecuting a war may facilitate removal of government actions from normal legal constraints (as in shoot-to-kill policies). On the other hand, portraying all actions of the militants simply as criminal—with the usual criminal motives—may serve to conceal the state's denial of Kashmiris' legitimate political aspirations, thus their partially justified rejection of the legal system.

As to the actual situation, there is a difference between a revolution and an invasion. Thus, as was noted in chapter 2, the process of mapping the prototype onto the situation will produce changes in the prototype. Specifically, there are not clearly defined battle lines with well-demarcated combatants in a revolution. The point is obvious. Still, it is important to make the point explicit because it affects the heroic emplotment. If the default emplotment for nationalism is indeed heroic, then one expects governments to rely on the heroic emplotment in

the case of revolution. The tendency is enhanced when the revolution is regional (and thus a case of separatism), and when it involves features expected in an invasion narrative, such as the entry of armed personnel into the home country from an enemy nation. However, the nature of revolution is such that the standard version of heroic emplotment cannot be followed in all details. This is most obviously the case when the attacks of the revolutionaries occur within routine life in noncombat zones—thus when they constitute what is called "terrorism." This fosters the development of a terrorist version of heroic emplotment. In this version, the usual elements of the heroic plot remain—the external enemy, internal traitor, and so on. But the invasion is covert and the attacks of the enemy, transferred from the battlefield to noncombat zones, are readily assimilated to crimes. These differences foster the incorporation of the criminal investigation genre into the national emplotment. Again, this is precisely what we find in *Close Call in Kashmir*.

Of course, here as elsewhere, the general plot structure is not presented abstractly; it is particularized. In this case, it is developed into three interwoven stories. The perhaps central narrative draws, like *Roja*, on the model of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Indeed, it draws on *Roja*. Specifically, it concerns the kidnapping of Namrata Wazir, a Hindu scientist, by Kandahari and his militant group—which includes only a single Kashmiri, Javed. As we discussed in relation to *Roja*, such a kidnapping may be linked with heroic emplotment and, in an Indian context, is almost necessarily associated the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The relation to an invasion-based abduction is hinted at in Wazir's recurring concern that she will be taken into Pakistan (98). At the same time, a kidnapping is also particularly well suited to the assimilation of terrorism simultaneously to invasion and to crime. In keeping with this, Wazir's friend, Zutshi, operates in effect as a criminal investigator. In fact, he ends up joining with an officer of the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation, Dalela, in his search for Wazir (though the primary reason for their partnership concerns another story line). The relation of this story to the *Rāmāyaṇa* is to some extent enhanced by the Rāma and Hanumān–like partnership of Zutshi and Dalela. (Rāma is crucially aided by Hanumān in the search for Sītā. The prominence of the *Rāmāyaṇa* story in Indian tradition makes any partnership in search of a kidnapped woman reminiscent of this pair.) More significantly, following the *Rāmāyaṇa* prototype, Wakhlu

links the enemy with *rākṣasas*, or demons. Thus the good Muslim cleric, Bandey, denounces the "satanic ends" (37) of the (invading) Afghan mercenaries and the narrator, presenting the thoughts of the good defector, Imran, in free indirect discourse, refers to "the Afghan fiends" (121). Finally, even more than in *Roja*, the support received by Sītā from the demoness Śaramā is extended to Kashmiri women generally, suggesting that India has the support of Kashmiri women. Thus, Wazir is told by one woman, "You are my daughter and I will pray for your safe release" (62). Another manages to free her and give her money (105), despite the clear danger of such an act. Moreover, once Wazir escapes, the women generally feel "joy" and a "sense of power" (107). Thus Wakhlu elaborates the narrative structure in such a way as to suggest that Kashmiri women feel liberated not by assisting the rebels but by opposing them. (This is contradicted by the research of Kazi [140], Das [52–53], and others.)

The second narrative sequence is parallel. Just as traditional war stories often involved the abduction of people, they also commonly involved the capture of wealth. A conquered society saw its riches stolen. Wakhlu draws on a specific form of such theft—the stealing of artifacts. Indeed, we learn that Zutshi has lectured on the colonialist theft of national treasures (6). In keeping with the revised version of the heroic plot, the terrorist version, this cannot occur simply by the foreign troops conquering the society. The result is that the traitors—Hakeem and Sharma—arrange the theft. On the one hand, this is a simple crime, requiring criminal investigation. On the other hand, it is part of the militancy, since it is arranged by the traitors, not only for their personal benefit but for the benefit of the Pakistanis funding the militancy (at least in principle; in fact, they try to cheat the Pakistani intelligence services as well [209–10]). This theft of antiquities is what brings together Dalela and Zutshi initially as Dalela is investigating the case and seeks out Zutshi due to the latter's academic work.

It is important to note here how Wakhlu aligns the heroic emplotment with colonialism, in keeping with dominant Indian ideologies on Kashmir. It is undoubtedly the case that Pakistan has colonialist ambitions in Kashmir. But Wakhlu suggests that the imperialists currently harming Indian Kashmir are simply Pakistani, despite the fact that the role of the colonial occupier is far more aptly attributed to India (again, with the qualification that this occupation does not seem to involve

exploitation, such as the theft of valuable antiquities). At the same time, though it is a real issue in the history of colonialism, Wakhlu is using the theft of antiquities in a semiallegorical way. Wakhlu, like so many others writing on Kashmir, is suggesting that the current conflict is destroying Kashmiriyat. In his account, the heritage of the valley is being stolen by corrupt leaders in the service of themselves and of Pakistan. It may seem odd to analyze a popular work allegorically, since popular works are rarely if ever subjected to the sort of interpretive scrutiny we tend to associate with allegorical reading. Even so, I suspect that even casual readers may get a sense that, for Wakhlu, Kashmir is losing its heritage in a more general way than merely having artifacts stolen—even if they do not formulate the connection explicitly.

The third main story sequence involves an assassination. This too is an obvious point of overlap between the terrorist/heroic and criminal investigation narratives. The main events in a heroic work are deaths—the killings of "our" soldiers by the enemy and the killing of "their" soldiers by "our" heroes. In the terrorist version, explicit combat is replaced by covert killings, prominently the random violence of terror attacks or the select, but secretive violence of assassinations. Specifically, the Aishmuqam Shrine represents the living tradition of Hinduism-influenced, Kashmiri Ṣūfism. As such, it is a symbol of *Kashmiriyat* or Hindu-Muslim harmony in the valley. Shamsuddin Bandey is the cleric in charge of the shrine. He is also a forceful critic of the militants, including the Islamist militants. This leads to his assassination. In the more traditional heroic plot, he would be a martyr for the cause, either dying in defense of the homeland during the invasion or in the attempt to free the nation from foreign domination. In the terrorist version, however, he is assassinated. Though Ali makes some efforts at investigating the assassination, this is not fully pursued and the killer (Kandahari) is never identified.

In some ways, this is the most interesting and consequential of the three main plot lines in *Close Call in Kashmir*. (There are other, more abbreviated plot sequences as well, but they are largely irrelevant to the political concerns and likely consequences of the story.) Among other things, the sequence nicely illustrates the complex ideology of the novel. On the one hand, the murder of the cleric Bandey recalls the killing of some prominent Muslim religious figures. For example, it calls to

mind Qazi Nissar, the "mirwaiz (high priest) of the southern half of the Valley." Nissar "was shot dead in his home" by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen militants "after he publicly criticized them for a spate of murders they had committed of pro-Kashmir independence activists" (Bose, *Transforming*). It also recalls the case of Mirwaiz Farooq, "the leading cleric of Kashmir" who "was assassinated in his home by a terrorist of the Hizb ul Mujahedeen" (Habibullah 74). In this respect, the representation is in keeping with the violent conflict between different visions of Islam in Kashmir. At the same time, other aspects of Wakhlu's representation distort the real situation. For example, Bandey is not criticizing the murder of Kashmir independence activists, as was Nissar. As to Farooq, the police "opened fire" on his funeral procession, killing twenty-seven people (Habibullah 75); this Indian violence is conspicuously absent from Wakhlu's narrative. More generally, Kashmiri clerics were not, on the whole, Bandey-like antimilitants, as we see from *Kashmir Pending*. Finally, Aishmuqam itself was not a bastion of pro-India sentiment—quite the contrary.

To understand the significance of Wakhlu's ideological misrepresentation on this score, we must keep in mind the symbolic significance of Aishmuqam in the novel. Like the pillaged antiquities, the shrine at Aishmuqam represents a threatened heritage of intercommunal harmony, combining mystical Islam with mystical Hinduism as well as mystical strains of other religions. In this respect, the shrine is parallel with another shrine that figures in the novel, the Charar-e-Sharif shrine, with the tomb of Nooruddin Rishi, probably the most important Ṣūfī saint of Kashmir. This shrine, too, stands for an endangered heritage in the novel. Indeed, the shrine is the target of an attack by "the Wahabi-indoctrinated [roughly, fundamentalist] foreign mercenaries" and "their ISI [Pakistani secret service] handlers" (68), an attack aimed at burning the shrine (78; see also 121). Thus we find the same sort of parallelism here as we did in the first and second plot sequences—the killing of a religious person is paired with the destruction of a religious shrine just as the abduction of a person is paired with the theft of antiquities.

The actual events at Charar-e-Sharif—the real, historical events, to which Wakhlu refers—are difficult to pin down with any certainty. Basharat Peer explains that "the Indian army besieged the township of

Chrar" because militants were hiding there as "snow had made their mountainous hideouts uninhabitable." A battle, which included the shrine, resulted in a fire that burned 2,500 houses and the shrine itself (182). This at least appears to contrast with Wakhlu's presentation of Indian military trying to save the shrine and city from fanatics bent on its destruction. On the other hand, the account presented by Šumit Ganguly is largely in keeping with that of Wakhlu. Ganguly attributes the fire to the insurgents, and credits the army with trying to send firefighters, who were prevented from treating the blaze by sniper fire from the militants. However, Ganguly gives the fire's starters a different motivation from Wakhlu—"an effort to escape by diverting the security forces" (126). As Ganguly concludes, not without some hint of despair, "Like other events in the insurgency, the destruction of the shrine is virtually impossible to reconstruct with certainty" (124). In any case, it is clear that there is a problem with Wakhlu's representation.

Perhaps the most crucial points about the Charar-e-Sharif events are made by Wajahat Habibullah. The army did not involve the residents nor engage in any serious effort at negotiation. Their behavior was at best authoritarian. In consequence of this, and of Indian military practices more generally, "Even today, if a resident of Charar-e-Sharief is asked who set the shrine afire, he or she will declare that the army was responsible" (Habibullah 94). Wakhlu does allow himself a way of accounting for this popular view—by claiming that the news agencies are manipulated by the militants (see 67–68). Wakhlu is right that independent reporting is extremely difficult, often impossible, in Kashmir. Moreover, the violence of the militants is part of the problem. Indeed, one of the famous assassinations of a journalist by militants involved a distant relative of mine by marriage, Lassa Kaul, director of the Doordarshan television station in Srinagar in 1990 (see, for example, Gartner). But a greater problem is the censorship enforced by the Indian government (on, for example, assassinations by both sides, see Khalid). This is entirely absent from Wakhlu's account—as if the Indian military's operations are fully transparent and truth-seeking, while the militants alone engage in propaganda. A 2012 Freedom House report on freedom of the press explains that "local media continued to face threats from militants regarding coverage of certain issues," in keeping with Wakhlu's presentation. However, the same report more extensively criticizes gov-

ernment "harassment of local journalists, particularly as they attempted to report on repeated confrontations between protesters and security forces" and "pressure to self-censor at outlets that rely on state government advertising for the majority of their revenue." It explains, "Journalists in the state also had their special curfew passes seized and were otherwise harassed or beaten by police at checkpoints. . . . Jammu and Kashmir's local cable television stations, as well as pages on the Facebook social-networking site and mobile-telephone text messages, were censored during periods of unrest." Moreover, "authorities sometimes block certain foreign print editions from distribution due to content such as maps of the disputed Kashmir region" and block cable channels as a "security threat" (Freedom House).

Perhaps more significantly, the representation of the insurgency as contradictory with the heritage of shrines and the views of clerics is also distorted. Habibullah points out that Mirwaiz Farooq's son and successor—thus a parallel figure to Bandey's son in *Close Call in Kashmir*—"declared in his Friday sermon . . . that the siege [of Charar-e-Sharif] was part of a government strategy to target places of worship" (94), the precise opposite of the view presented by Wakhlu and attributed to the clerics in the book. Moreover, Peer explains that in the early days of the insurgency, "hundreds of thousands of people had marched to pray for independence at the shrine of . . . Nooruddin." Indeed, "All over Kashmir, similar marches to the shrines of Sufi saints were launched," including at Aishmuqam (17). It seems then that, at least in the view of many Kashmiris, the heritage represented by the shrines was not opposed to, but entirely consistent with, the insurgency.

On the other hand, there is a complication even here. In a social context where Islam is repeatedly linked with violence, associating Muslim clerics with nonviolence is perhaps not wholly objectionable. Moreover, the main concern of Wakhlu is a matter of the symbolic loss of heritage and, in relation to this, the development of a syncretistic and anti-communalist imagination of Kashmir. The book is propagandistic and harmful in misrepresenting the real conditions in Kashmir today, but in itself that does not discredit its vision of what is valuable in Kashmiri tradition and the possibilities for future communal harmony.

In connection with this, we need to consider the entire Aishmuqam story. In addition to personal danger, Bandey has a dream suggesting

that there is danger to the shrine. At a literal level, this is a physical danger. But, in the broader thematic context of the work, it clearly suggests a larger loss of cultural distinctiveness—in this case, the syncretistic, Ṣūfī heritage. Bandey remembers that the shrine contains hermetic documents that reveal how the shrine may be protected. The means of that protection seem to involve some sort of material wealth or perhaps a magical device. This leads to the novel's quest or riddle-solving motif as Bandey and Ali, then Zutshi and Ali (with help from Bandey's son) try to unravel the esoteric mystery of the secret documents. All the parties involved—including the sinister pair of Hakeem and Sharma—believe that they will find a hidden treasure. However, what they discover is a spiritual rather than monetary treasure, the treasure of an interfaith spiritual heritage. Specifically, once deciphered, the documents refer to various Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh mystics who inspired the religious syncretism of Dara Shikoh (spelled "Shukoh" by Wakhlu), unsuccessful heir to the throne of India in the seventeenth century. Wakhlu's implication here is clear: Threats to the cultural heritage of Kashmir can be defeated only by recourse to the integration of mystics from different religions—in our terms, by the substitution of a shared religious practical identity that subsumes and renders irrelevant the different categorial identities of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and so on. The decipherment of the document itself suggests the same point, for the riddle is solved only by the combined efforts of the Muslim Noor Ali and the half-Hindu, half-Christian Michael Zutshi. The point is important: a shared practical identity is valuable. As John Duckitt points out, in-group/out-group antagonisms may be diminished by cooperative work toward shared ends (98, 252, 256).

The reference to Dara Shikoh brings us to another aspect of Wakhlu's use of the heroic prototype. Up to now, we have considered only the threat/defense portion of the heroic genre, but its other major component is not absent from the novel. However, it is projected backward into history—a history that has direct consequences in its continued relevance for the Aishmuqam Shrine and the Kashmiri heritage associated with that shrine.

Specifically, Dara Shikoh was the eldest son of the Muslim emperor Shah Jahan. Though he was the heir apparent, he was defeated in battle by his brother, Aurangzeb, who became emperor of India. Aurangzeb

was a more orthodox Muslim who disapproved of his brother's syncretistic ways and sought to "save Islam" (as Wolpert put it [157]). As Stanley Wolpert points out, "The era of religious tolerance and Hindu-Muslim equality of treatment that had been initiated by Akbar was . . . abandoned" by Aurangzeb, who "outlawed" Hindu "religious fairs," denied "permission . . . to repair" Hindu temples or to build new ones (158), "reimposed the hated *jizya* poll tax" and "more than doubled the duty Hindu merchants were obliged to pay on the same produce bought and sold by Muslims" (159). It does seem likely that Hindu-Muslim relations in India would have been different had Dara Shikoh's syncretism triumphed rather than Aurangzeb's orthodoxy. In any case, Wakhlu implicitly presents this history as a usurpation that parallels the current situation where Wahabism is striving to overthrow Kashmiri Ṣūfī traditions. Indeed, in some ways the main political work of the novel is to foster a particular emplotment of Kashmiri history. In the resulting narrative, the usurpation of Dara Shikoh is a definitive turning point at which the enduring "treasure" of Kashmir—its syncretistic mysticism—was "buried." That usurpation has never been wholly reversed, though it has also never been wholly successful. The current situation is the result of that usurpation, and also a potential repetition. The response is rediscovering the buried treasure of "true" Kashmiri tradition.

In sum, Wakhlu draws on and particularizes the heroic genre largely in such a way as to support dominant, Indian government ideology. Part of this particularization involves a change in the prototype itself, a common change today in which some standard elements are revised to shift from traditional international warfare to terrorism and internal militancy. In particularizing this prototype, Wakhlu draws on the criminal investigation structure as well. In part, the ideology of the novel is a simple matter of the way in which he represents facts about Kashmir (e.g., regarding popular attitudes toward the insurgency). In part, it is a more indirect matter of the ways in which he applies the guiding genre principles (e.g., in its use of the invading enemy and internal traitor).

This dominant ideology is, however, qualified in several ways. First, there are local deviations from ideology—even if these are almost immediately rationalized and reexplained in a way that fits dominant ideology. Second, and more significantly, Wakhlu systematically disturbs

the alignment of moral categories with identity categories that is so central to the nationalist and related applications of the heroic genre. This is connected to Wakhlu's thematic purposes, which show considerable insight into the nature of identity categories and include an advocacy of shared practical identity in cooperative activity as well as a particular emplotment of Kashmiri history. The latter draws on the usurpation sequence of the heroic prototype to present religious syncretism and practical interaction as essential features of Kashmiri identity—or Indian identity, since Dara Shikoh would not have been emperor of Kashmir alone, but of India. Indeed, Wakhlu may not so much be suggesting that Kashmir should be part of India as that India should, so to speak, become part of Kashmir by assimilating Kashmir's tradition of syncretistic mysticism. (The idea is related to the view that Ṣūfī religious syncretism may be particularly valuable for the national integration of India; see, for example, Khizer 123.)

The Collaborator

In its ideological orientation, Mirza Waheed's novel *The Collaborator* is very different from the works we have considered to this point. Rather than presenting us with some variation on the dominant Indian ideological problematic, it presents us with a very different—in many ways opposed—ideology. In some cases, this serves to challenge dominant views in a valuable way. Often, however, it merely inverts the unfortunate tendencies we have been examining—for example, by taking up the same sorts of emplotment, but with a different mapping between the prototype and the target.

The novel concerns the son of the Headman of Nowgam, a village in Indian Kashmir near the Line of Control (L.O.C.). Growing up during the late 1980s and early 1990s, this nameless narrator sees his friends leave the village, crossing over the L.O.C. to Pakistan and a new life as revolutionaries. For complex reasons, prominently including concern for his parents, this young man—I will call him "Mirza"—never leaves to join the militants himself. Rather, he becomes a sort of collaborator. In short, he becomes the "good enemy" in what would be an Indian nationalist heroic narrative. More exactly, every night, the Indian Army shells the L.O.C. with the aim of killing militants trying to pass into Indian Kashmir from Pakistan. The result is a field filled with corpses.

Mirza has little choice but to take a job with the army, collecting identification cards and weapons from the dead bodies of those killed.

Like Basharat Peer's *Curfewed Night*, *The Collaborator* gives the reader a visceral sense of the horror of living under army occupation—particularly an occupation that is almost in no way constrained by the rule of law. In keeping with this, it has been very well received, particularly by the political left. Arundhati Roy endorsed the book (Waheed, front cover) and Pankaj Mishra mentions it as the single work of fiction depicting "Life under political oppression" in Kashmir (5), noting that there "are more works to come" (6) but significantly failing to mention *Shalimar the Clown* (we will see some of the differences between Waheed and Rushdie, and thus some possible reasons for this, below).

One striking aspect of the work is the insight it provides into widespread commitment of young Kashmiri men to the militancy. The numbers are initially unbelievable. As Arif Jamal reports, "According to one report, 2,200 fighters once entered Pakistani-controlled Kashmir to receive military training on a single day" (154). One might initially assume that the motivations of the young men were either directly nationalist or directly religious, the result of witnessing Indian brutality or being exhorted by admired religious figures. Undoubtedly, this was often the case. But Waheed's account of Nowgam is different. In *The Collaborator*, youth commitment to the militancy is fundamentally a network phenomenon. One becomes likely to join the militancy simply as a function of having direct or indirect links to the militancy. The more links one has to militants and the stronger those links are (e.g., if they are links to friends, rather than to distant acquaintances), the more likely it is that one will join the militants oneself. The general principle is well established elsewhere. To take a well-known example, the more one's network of friends is made up of overweight people, the more likely one is to gain weight oneself ("obesity spreads through social ties" [Hruschka et al. S295]). Waheed merely extends the point from eating habits and other behaviors to militancy—a perfectly plausible extension. As his friends gradually disappear over the border, he begins "to imagine myself as a member of an underground outfit, a militant, a freedom fighter" (114). This imagination is almost entirely a function of links with friends. It is so little motivated by principles or ideology that he chooses his preferred organization by determining which is "smart,

cool" (114). Later, he does consider the Gaw Kadal massacre, but he primarily finds himself resolving "to go wherever Hussain and others were" (118), following the lead of his network connections. Generalizing the point, he observes, "After all, thousands had left home and crossed over into Pakistan, that's what people did nowadays" (118). Though this is not the whole story of the militancy, it is undoubtedly a part. To some extent, the flood of young militants into Pakistan is the result of network connections reaching some threshold, with the consequent alteration of the social system. (This would also be consistent with Swami's contention that there were "entire villages where not one single person joined the ranks of the jihadists," even as there were "others where a majority of young men did so" [177].)

Despite being a fine novel, and providing some genuine political and social insights, *The Collaborator* suffers from some significant ideological biases. Two stand out particularly. First, Waheed creates a portrait of a village abandoned by Muslims, making this far more salient than the exile of the Hindus. There is nothing wrong with focusing on the suffering of the majority rather than that of the minority. Moreover, Muslims have certainly fled Kashmir (see, for example, Stern on the "Nearly sixteen thousand refugees . . . housed in camps throughout Pakistan-held Kashmir" [132]; note that this is only a fraction of the number of Hindu refugees). However, it is problematic to take the central disability of Kashmiri Hindus (loss of home) and, so to speak, appropriate that for Kashmiri Muslims, as if Muslims suffered more even in that respect. Moreover, he suggests that the Kashmiri Hindus may be taking their revenge through the police. Speaking of an innocent friend, Mirza reports a rumor that "he was tortured day and night by Kashmiri Pandit [and thus Hindu] police officers, bent on revenge" (186). Events of this sort have undoubtedly occurred. But there are at least two problems here. First, this communalizes the torture, blaming a largely powerless minority group. Second, it grossly misrepresents the conditions of almost all Kashmiri Hindus who, as refugees outside the valley, are clearly not in a position to be police officers (vengeful or not) in the valley.

More significantly, the novel is directly parallel with *Roja* in that the militants do not kill anyone. There is reference to "hit lists" (158) at one point, and thus there is an indirect acknowledgment that the militants do kill people. However, this killing is not presented directly in the

course of the novel. One Islamist group does mutilate a family of putative collaborators. I suspect that the purpose of this is to contribute to the author's tacit support of the JKLF over the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen or other jihādi organizations. In any case, it is an isolated incident and falls short of killing.

Once again, for our purposes, the key issue is story structure. Waheed takes up part of the heroic prototype, treating it in a narratively complex way. Specifically, we have a sort of invasion narrative from the perspective of Indian nationalism. Enemies are crossing the border, and the Indian Army is engaged in a sort of war to prevent that invasion. The first complication is the usual one for the terrorist version: That enemy is a mix of internal militants and foreign soldiers. Moreover, other than the L.O.C., the battle lines are shifting and uncertain. In connection with this, Mirza laments, "Why can't they just have another war instead—a proper, proper war—and get it over with" (129). This comment reflects the nonprototypicality of the situation, but also its relation to a threat/defense scenario.

This mixed condition leads to the second complication. The story in effect presupposes the Indian perspective in that it involves the threat/defense scenario. However, the telling of the story is from the perspective of the "enemy." Thus Waheed pays detailed attention to the experiences of people subjected to cordon-and-search operations, rape as a weapon of war, and other human rights violations by the Indian Army. One might go so far as to say that there is a sort of divergence between the story point of view (which is Indian) and the discourse—or, more specifically, narrational—point of view (which is Kashmiri). (Story is, roughly, what events and causal relations may be inferred from the narrative. Discourse is, roughly, how that story is recounted.)

This divergence is related to a third complication, the most important one. As already suggested, Mirza takes up the role of the good enemy, the character from "their" side who realizes the justice in "our" cause. But the ideological function of this role is undermined in three ways. First, underlying the story from the Indian perspective, there is always the hint of a story from a Kashmiri perspective. In the latter, the Indian Army is the invader. In that case, Mirza is the bad collaborator, the member of the home society who cooperates with the invading army. Second, and related to this, Mirza is not across the border in

Pakistan. He is in Indian Kashmir. Even in the heroic story from the Indian perspective, this means that part of the enemy is internal to the nation. Note that the point is not explicit in the story itself. In the story itself, Mirza is simply doing his national duty, supporting his own nation. But it is clear that he has the position of the good enemy for the Indians in the story (such as Captain Kadian[18]), whose perspective defines this as a threat/defense scenario.

The final aspect of this undermining is that this good collaborator does not accept the justice of "our" cause. Rather, he is coerced into his collaboration and cooperates with deep resentment—in fact, with very strong feelings of support for the "enemy." In the standard heroic narrative, the good collaborator serves to show that the in-group is right and the out-group is wrong. The justice of our claims is proven by the fact that the best of the enemy recognizes that justice. But here the collaborator does not recognize that justice. To the contrary, he incriminates himself by judging the actions of the Indian Army, with whom he is complicit, as barbarous. The result is that the usual ideological function of the collaborator figure is reversed. Indeed, Waheed's criticism of the Indian "defense" of Kashmir is given greater rhetorical force by being linked with the figure who commonly serves to justify the in-group's violence, its claims to justice.

The result of this is almost paradoxical. Waheed takes up the India-based heroic prototype, but in doing so he indicates that the reverse emplotment is correct. India is not the defender, but the invader. Mirza is not the good collaborator, but the bad collaborator. The cooperation of the home population does not indicate the justice of the current political hierarchy but marks it as a brutal usurpation. The problem with this (tacit) emplotment is not that it is wrong with respect to the Indian military. It is not. They have established themselves as invaders supporting a government that usurps the self-determination of Kashmiris. The problem is that it is wrong with respect to the insurgents—who, again, kill no one in the course of the novel.

The Collaborator also includes a more attenuated—and in some ways more politically troubling—version of the sacrificial narrative. This appears most clearly early in the novel when a Moulvi recounts the brutality of the Indian Army and the terrible sufferings of the people, then concludes that "Allahtaala is punishing us for our sins" (34). They must

therefore do penance and, at the same time, give up their sins—which is to say, "forsake the ways of the kafir" (34), the imitation of Hindus.

Elements of the sacrificial narrative recur throughout the novel. For example, it is never entirely clear to what extent the militants constitute heroic fighters and to what extent they are something more like offerings of self-sacrifice. In the prototypical sacrificial narrative, the punishment for sin commonly involves hunger, often famine. Famine as such is not a problem in Kashmir. There are issues of malnutrition in Kashmir (see Vaida et al.). On the other hand, this is a pan-Indian problem, somewhat less severe in Kashmir than in most of India (see Panagariya). In any case, hunger does make an appearance in the novel, and this appearance is based in part on regional food scarcity and, more important, on difficulties in getting food due to curfew restrictions (for a recent case from real life, see Sharma and Raina). But this appearance is also probably in part due to the importance of hunger in the sacrificial narrative. Specifically, Mirza tells the story of a town put under curfew by the Indian military. As a result of the curfew, the "people ate lawn grass after they had finished all the food in their houses" (151)—an artificial form of famine caused by military occupation, but a famine nonetheless. Later, women travel from a curfewed town, pleading for milk for their children. Otherwise, "our babies will die" (181) because "there's nothing to eat" (179).

As noted in the introduction to the present volume, there are two common versions of the sacrificial narrative, often combined. In one, the "pure" version, the sacrificial victim is innocent, like the youths who give their life for the future well-being of the community in *The Collaborator*. The other, "purgative" version targets some out-group corruptor who bears ultimate responsibility for the devastation of the in-group. (The snakelike Satan in the Judeo-Christian story of the Fall is probably the most widely familiar instance of such a corruptor.) In this version, the well-being of society is restored by the purgation of that figure. This purgative version is often associated with a strong cultivation of disgust for the corruptor, in some cases generalized to the entire out-group. For example, such generalization occurs in Nazi emplotments of German history, which characterize Jews in this way.[19] In the Nazi case, the cultivation of disgust was sometimes fostered by the assimilation of Jews to vermin—a common practice in the most extreme

forms of out-grouping, as we have seen in *L.O.C.* Toward the end of the novel, we find Mirza engaging in such development of disgust, as when he explains that "soldiers . . . poured out like rats" (226). Governor Jagmohan has a tongue "like a fat rat" (234)—a particularly repulsive image as it links the vermin with the mouth. In keeping with his disgust, Mirza "prayed, achingly" in "one of those from-the-bottom-of-my-heart moments" that Jagmohan and the soldiers would be wiped out in "a rain of bullets" (234). He feels "pleasure" at the thought that these men are "dead, dead, dead!" (235). Later, he looks at a Hindu icon with a coil of incense; "it looks like bird shit" (270), he remarks, expressing his disgust presumably at Hindu idolatry and not simply at the incense. Indeed, he even has a defecation-related perceptual illusion, for he sees what is presumably white smoke drifting above the coil as "spewing out" and "acrid brown" (270).

The collaboration spreads the disgusting vileness to Mirza himself. At a literal level, he begins to smell like the decaying corpses he must wade through when gathering weapons and identity cards. But metaphorically his association with the ratlike, rat-mouthed enemies imbue him with a "stink" that he "just can't wash . . . off" (259). This self-disgust is both physical and moral. By associating with people he does not see as human, he becomes inhuman to himself. This is presumably part of the reason that he ends his story the way he does. He burns the corpses, turning them into a sort of ritual sacrifice. In keeping with this, he recites the Bismillah, offering his act to Allāh. More significantly, he continues the recitation to include the entire first sūrah of the Qur'ān (304). Addressing God as "King of the Day of Judgment," he writes,

> You alone we worship, and You alone we ask for help.
> Guide us to the straight way;
> The way of those whom You have blessed,
> Not of those who have deserved anger,
> Nor of those who stray.
> *Aameen*.

There are only two sentences after this recitation: "The fires burn brilliantly now. It is time I left" (304). The suggestion is unclear. All along, Mirza has spoken of leaving for Pakistan. But he has just finished criticizing both India and Pakistan. In any case, it does seem clear that he

will leave for what he considers to be "the straight way," the path of the "blessed." It again suggests sacrifice—perhaps his own self-sacrifice in martyrdom (surely the straightest path to blessedness). Crucially, his going will be directly opposed to the actions of "those who have deserved anger" and "those who stray"—presumably the national enemy and those who fully collaborate with that enemy, respectively. This seems to suggest purging these enemies—enemies not only of Kashmir, but of God himself, a common alignment in nationalist emplotment. The only question is whether the purgation of those enemies of God will be performed at the Day of Judgment by Allāh, or now by Mirza.

In sum, Waheed has escaped—indeed, sharply criticized—the dominant Indian ideology regarding Kashmir. Unfortunately, he appears to have substituted a virtual mirror image of that ideology. This ideology in *The Collaborator* is parallel in some ways to that of *Roja* (e.g., in the militants' innocence with respect to killing) and in some ways to that of *L.O.C.* (e.g., in the assimilation of the out-group enemies to disgusting vermin). One could argue that it in fact conforms to the main principles of the dominant Indian problematic, but systematically shifts the mapping of ideological principles onto social conditions. Put differently, it shows us another sort of ideological duality, what we might call a *metaproblematic*. In a metaproblematic, putatively contradictory and directly opposed forms of ideology maintain the same oppressive or potentially oppressive function by applying the same narrative prototypes and cognitive models in the same nationalist manner. The difference between ideological alternatives in a metaproblematic is a matter of reversing the in-group and out-group identifications. Such ideological continuity across enemies is hardly surprising. It results from the cross-cultural generality of the underlying narrative prototypes, cognitive models, emotion systems, and group dynamics that we have seen repeatedly over the course of the preceding chapters.

5 Colonial Violence and Scapegoating

A Poem about Majorities and Minorities

In the preceding chapters, we have been concerned primarily with the cognitive, affective, and group dynamical features of the main identity groups defining colonialism—the colonial power and the colonized populace. However, the relation between the colonizer and the colonized has implications for more global and more local interactions. Thus there are both supra- and subcolonial identity relations and associated ideologies. The subcolonial relations are perhaps particularly important in their development of what might be called *embedded out-grouping*, the formation of in-group/out-group oppositions among those who are colonized. In part, this is simply the ordinary process of identity group formation. But that identity group formation now takes place in a colonial context.

Colonial conditions tend to repeat themselves. Indeed, they produce the conditions that foster such repetition. There is a fractal-like quality to the multiplication of colonialisms. In effect, the system as a whole produces images of itself at different scales, repeating global patterns in local situations. On the other hand, these embedded colonialisms—with their associated patterns of antagonism and oppression—are not precisely the mirror image of the embedding or encompassing colonialism. Rather, each embedded colonialism is a function of multiple contingencies—variable compositions of wealth, power, prestige, economic organization, political practice, and other matters. In short, there are different complex networks of social relations as well as different complex understandings of those relations. Those social and psychological systems make a difference as to just how the embedded colonialism develops—including what forms the related antagonism and oppression take.

We may distinguish two types of subcolonial identity group formation. Though interrelated in practice, the two are conceptually distinct. One is fostered by the colonizer; the other is a matter of relations among colonized people themselves. The former is often a matter of divide-and-rule tactics and has been widely discussed. Colonizers routinely establish some buffer group, often a minority, that stands between the colonizers and the bulk of the colonized—for example, mixed-race people in South Africa, whose social position was intermediate between that of whites and blacks. In terms of the criteria for identity category operation presented in the introduction, colonialism *functionalizes* some subcolonial identities (i.e., gives them systematic social consequences in the distribution of wealth or privilege). This fosters in-group/out-group divisions among colonized people. The development of subcolonial identity categories among colonized people themselves, on the other hand, is often a matter of scapegoating, which itself results from victim seeking. In the following pages, we will be concerned with the second sort of subcolonial identity formation. This is because it is an underdiscussed topic and because it appears to be more cognitively and emotionally complex.

More exactly, the first section of this chapter considers some cross-cultural psychological and social principles that guide subcolonial outgrouping. The second section turns to a poem by a Kashmiri Muslim poet that treats, in part, the place of Hindus in Kashmir and the nature of the exodus of Hindus from the Kashmir Valley. Here, I continue the project from chapter 4 of examining Kashmiri writers. However, rather than the more popular form of the novel, I consider academic poetry. One result of this change in literary form is that the political attitudes and interests of the works, including their relation to the various ideologies at play in Kashmir, are more difficult to ascertain, relying more on allusion and metaphor or the suggestions of imagery than on the narration of more politically straightforward events.

The Laws of Hate

As indicated by Leonard Berkowitz (19, 34), one important psychological process is victim seeking. Rage tends to make us wish to find a target, even an irrelevant one. Victim seeking is socially constrained in that it manifests itself only in cases where there are opportunities for

making someone a victim. Moreover, this is not a simple possible/impossible division. First, there is a gradient between "high-accessibility" and "low-accessibility" victims. There is also a gradient between "high-cost" and "low-cost" victims—or, alternatively, "high-threat" and "low-threat" victims. Both variables, accessibility and cost, are affected by social conditions, including those created by colonialism. For a colonizing group, conditions of colonization often greatly increase victim accessibility, while discriminatory social practices typically reduce victim cost. For example, for British colonizers in India, Indian victims were readily available and had little opportunity for retribution. The same point applies to other relations of social hierarchy, such as military versus civilian in military occupation (as in Kashmir) or guard versus prisoner (as shown by Zimbardo's prison experiment). The increase in dominant group victim seeking is likely to produce greater humiliation and rage on the part of dominated groups, thus greater victim seeking on the part of dominated group members as well. They are likely to find their victims in people still lower in the social hierarchy.

One of the most powerful literary treatments of these points may be found in Rabindranath Tagore's short story, "Punishment." The story concerns two farmers, Dukhiram and Chidam, who are taken away from necessary work in their fields in order to perform compulsory labor. They feel abused and humiliated—and also simply hungry because they have not been allowed to eat properly. When they return home, Dukhiram demands dinner. His wife, Radha, taunts him, asking if she was supposed to "walk the streets to earn" money for food (126). Enraged at this further humiliation, he impulsively stabs her with the knife he had carried from work, killing her.

Dukhiram is clearly enraged by the humiliation of the forced labor. He responds with victim seeking, and his victim is highly accessible and low-threat. Radha was there, available for victimization, and without any means of retaliating. But the crucial point here is not simply that she was unarmed. She was visible as a possible target in a way that, for example, Chidam was not. The reason has to do with status. In a patriarchal society, women are more likely to be the target of "downward" male violence than are other men. This is not simply because women are less likely to have weapons. It is because the discrepancy in social status tends to make them more salient as possible targets.

More exactly, it is in general difficult to tell who, individually, is a low-threat target. Thus we tend to judge the threat of possible targets by category. Note that this is part of a general cognitive inclination. A particular pet dog may be very dangerous, while a particular lion may be harmless. However, in general, we will be inclined to be more wary of any lion than of any pet dog. In other words, we have a broad tendency to respond emotionally or motivationally to categories. Individual information may displace category-based responses. But this occurs only when the information is "completely unambiguous and specific" (Rudman, Glick, and Phelan 88). Our first and most common inclination is to respond to individuals as instances of categories. Categorization guides our implicit and explicit explanations of such individuals' current actions and our implicit and explicit expectations about their future actions. In the case of people, the relevant categories are a matter of categorial identity, and thus national, religious, ethnic, or other group membership that we commonly see as defining something "essential" about people.[1]

Victim seeking, then, tends to select not so much by way of actual threat but by way of "category cost," as we might call it. Category cost is the degree of retribution—or conversely impunity—that is socially linked to violence against members of a given identity group. But this does not quite solve our problems. Sometimes, the level of category cost is relatively well established. For example, in areas of the southern United States before the civil rights movement, the Ku Klux Klan had relative impunity in lynching African Americans (i.e., African Americans were basically zero-cost victims). However, there are other conditions in which the level of category cost has to be established. It is also important to note that there are different types of category cost. Sometimes category cost is a function of the legal system; sometimes it bears on the physical threat posed by a potential victim. This, too, is largely a function of identity categorization. Racist European Americans might worry about being physically assaulted by Africans and intellectually swindled by Jews, but not the reverse. Thus, they would be unlikely to worry when facing a Jewish person in a dark alley.

Though victim seeking is general, it is likely to involve preferences as well. Here again, identity categorization enters. Other things being equal, it seems likely that an enraged person will prefer to harm a victim

of the same identity category as the initial source of the rage. For example, in the context of Indian military violence against Kashmiri Muslims, it is likely that victim preference will be guided in part by the category *Hindu*. In consequence, Hindus are more likely to become the target of subcolonial victim seeking within the colonized society.

It seems likely that people would deny both that they engage in victim seeking generally and, if they do engage in victim seeking, that it is based on particular identity categories. This denial is in part simply a matter of understandable pride. But it is also in part a result of misunderstanding the way something like victim seeking operates. The idea may be understood in terms of a relatively straightforward "neural network" or "parallel distributed processing" (PDP) model. PDP models simplify human brain processes to make highly complex neural phenomena more tractable. They comprise neuron-like nodes, with connections among the nodes and degrees of activation or inhibition passing among the nodes. One crucial aspect of PDP systems—and the human brain—is that patterns of activation are not constrained by concerns of logical relevance, or even one's personal beliefs. They involve complex sets of activation and inhibition patterns that may not be consistent with one's self-conscious attitudes. For example, suppose Jones (a white man) sees a black man in a dark alley. If he feels afraid, we are likely to say that he has a racist belief that the black man is likely to attack him. But this need not be the case. Jones may entirely reject the idea that black men are likely to be muggers. In any usual sense of "believe," it may be unreasonable to say that he believes the man is a mugger. Why, then, does he feel afraid? In a PDP model, all that needs to occur is that seeing the black man activates relevant nodes. For example, these nodes could include emotional memories of black men attacking innocent people in movies, novels, or news stories. That activation could be enough to produce the fear. Indeed, research suggests that something along these lines occurs, with fear-inducing amygdala activation (on this research, and for a fuller development of the unconscious processes of bias, see Amodio).

Now consider the colonial situation in Kashmir. The conflict involves the Indian military and some Kashmiris. The targeted Kashmiris are likely to be Muslim, and other Kashmiris are likely to know this. Moreover, most members of the Indian military are Hindu or Sikh.

(Muslims comprise only 2 percent of the Indian Army [Noorani, "Muslims," citing Khalidi].) Since Kashmiris know this as well, *Muslim* and *non-Muslim* identity categories are likely to be activated in the minds of many Kashmiris. Humiliating and rage-provoking violence by the Indian military against Kashmiris is therefore likely to be encoded (i.e., selected and organized in memory) as not only Indian versus Kashmiri but also Hindu versus Muslim. This renders the Hindu identity category relevant in victim seeking even for people who do not believe that a random Kashmiri Hindu is in any way responsible for the initial violence.

Of course, there is still a problem here. The relevant categories do not simply arise on their own. For example, soldiers tend to wear green, but it is unlikely that Kashmiris will think of green clothing as relevant to victim seeking, thus finding themselves with a preference for harming revelers on St. Patrick's Day. This is because certain types of category are more likely to have psychological force than others. As noted in the introduction, categories with greater motivational and cognitive consequences—thus, categories that are more likely candidates for defining essences—share a number of properties. For example, they tend to be salient, enduring (rather than ephemeral), and divided into a limited number of alternatives (such as Hindu/Muslim) rather than involving a nondiscrete continuum (such as that running from more to less religious). Hindu/Muslim divisions are significant on all three axes. They are long-standing divisions (unlike one's clothing color). They are discrete and limited in number (even the addition of Sikhs does not alter this condition significantly), and they are noticeable or salient. As Iffat Malik points out, there are differences between Hindu and Muslim Kashmiris in food, in eating practices, in wearing or not wearing a beard (for men), and in some vocabulary preferences (3).

On the other hand, it is important to note that a Hindu/Muslim identity division among Kashmiris is not inevitable. Kashmiriyat is also an option. Kashmiri/Indian or even civilian/military could be selected and operate in neural networks just as readily. After all, there are properties shared by Kashmiris that are not shared by other Indians. These include clothing, certain distinctive foods and drinks (such as pink tea), and, of course, the Kashmiri language itself (Malik 3; the last is stressed in Bhand Pather [see Raina, "The *Bhand Pather*"]).

Still, even if not necessary, the human mind seems to have a strong inclination toward subdifferentiation. Given "Kashmiri," it moves to "Muslim Kashmiri" and "Hindu Kashmiri." Given "Muslim Kashmiri," it moves to "Sunni Kashmiri" and "Shīʿah Kashmiri." In other words, there is a strong inclination toward fission, toward the recurring proliferation of minorities—with the resulting problem of "negat[ing] the rights of minorities within minorities" (in Ganguly's apt phrase [141]). This is in part a spontaneous tendency of human cognition. Shared Kashmiri language is likely to be salient and highly activated at the moment when Kashmiris are speaking with Indian soldiers in Hindi. But it is unlikely to be so when (Muslim and Hindu) Kashmiris are speaking among themselves. In the latter case, small vocabulary differences are far more likely to be salient and activated.

On the other hand, such subdifferentiation is not wholly the result of spontaneous psychological tendencies. It is in part social, the result of both group dynamics and self-conscious programs. The social aspect is discussed well by Navnita Chadha Behera, both in general and specifically in Kashmir. As she summarizes the issue, in "a plural society," the domination of a majority invariably leaves "the minority communities feeling alienated and marginalized. They therefore try to create alternative sovereign spaces." But "they merely reproduce the hierarchical social and political conditions they sought to escape," making still "smaller minorities" feel alienated and marginalized (105). This social differentiation is itself organized by political and other institutions that enhance certain identity categories and attenuate others. These institutions range from political parties to schools (both of which may take on a religious or other subcolonial identity). Even small cognitive and affective biases may be elaborated and intensified by various institutionally guided social practices.

In short, the preceding analysis suggests that colonialism is likely to produce a situation in which there is a tendency for colonized groups to fragment and for violence to multiply through victim seeking. The spread of violence is likely to be twofold. First and most obviously there is the violence between the colonizer and the colonized. But in addition there is at least some likelihood of that violence will go downward also, invading subcolonial or subnational divisions. This downward violence commonly manifests itself in the preferential targeting of

subnational identity groups that are highly accessible and low cost. This is *scapegoating*.

As noted earlier, subcolonial scapegoating often involves the establishment of some category relation between the subnational out-group and the colonizing out-group. For example, in the case of Kashmir it involves the assimilation of Hindu Kashmiris to the Indian military and government. This may or may not begin with some relation to facts. (Kashmiri Hindus were, on the whole, much more strongly in favor of union with India than were Kashmiri Muslims.) But, whether there is an initial relation to facts or not, once the assimilation occurs, it tends to be self-fulfilling. First, it tends to be self-fulfilling in fact. Once a national subgroup feels itself threatened by anticolonial forces, it is likely to align itself with the colonizer. Second, it tends to be self-fulfilling in in-group psychology. Once one has assimilated the subgroup to the colonizer (e.g., Kashmiri Hindus to the Indian government and military), the usual human confirmation bias sets in. This bias guides what one considers relevant facts, how one construes ambiguous actions or emotive expressions, how one explains events and behaviors, and so on.

Note that confirmation bias occurs on all sides. It is not somehow unique to subcolonial groups. Thus, in Kashmir, we are likely to find it among Hindu and Muslim Kashmiris as well as Indian soldiers, Pakistani intelligence agents, and others. In each case, the selection of facts, the construal of ambiguities, and the explanation of events are likely to develop in such a way that it is sometimes difficult to discern that all parties are treating the same phenomena. Each group is likely to construe ambiguous—or even unambiguously disconfirmatory—data as supporting their prior beliefs.

For example, everyone agrees that Kashmiri Hindus largely left Kashmir. But the precise understanding of those events is radically different across groups. As I noted in chapter 1, human rights reports cite threats and violence against Kashmiri Hindus and discuss the poor conditions in the refugee camps (see Gossman 17). If anything, Hindus see the danger more starkly. They vividly recall the relatives who were assassinated; the crowds chanting anti-Hindu slogans and the receipt of other messages of terror (e.g., anonymous letters, and posters [Kadian 34]); the loss of everything they owned, when militants burned their homes or when neighbors did them the "favor" of buying their homes at

a fraction of their cost; the other relatives who, once in the camps, tried to commit suicide (and sometimes succeeded) or who died prematurely of stress-related illnesses. They are fully aware of the vast ruin of lives. But many Kashmiri Muslims look at the exodus of the Hindus and interpret it as a conspiracy with the army, a way of allowing the army free reign in the valley. Malik seems to take seriously a version of this idea. He greatly downplays the threats to Hindus and stresses the encouragement given them by the Indian government. He reasonably criticizes governmental bias in the matter. He stresses that government salaries continued for many Hindu refugees (as Polgreen puts it, "Many [Hindus] worked for the government and kept receiving their salaries in exile"), whereas Muslim government employees often went unpaid in the valley (Malik 291–92; this is, in effect, a colonial functionalization of subcolonial identity categories, if one that occurs in atypical conditions). Moreover, it is true that the greatest human rights violations in Kashmir have not been perpetrated against Hindus (at least not in terms of sheer quantity; proportionate suffering is less clear[2]). Nonetheless, Kashmiri Hindus gave up their ordinary lives, their homes and properties, to rot in refugee camps, sometimes committing or attempting suicide. It is little short of bizarre to think that they did this not in response to threats backed up by assassinations but as supporters of somehow ridding the valley of its huge Muslim majority.

One of the most pernicious effects of self-confirming identity categorizations is that they sharply inhibit empathy. At the end of the cycle of selective information, biased construal, and limited explanation, we are likely to find fixed viewpoints that have excluded all the information that might have led to spontaneous empathic response. Specifically, these processes tend to exclude the sufferings of the out-group, while exaggerating the sufferings of the in-group, which are always likely to be more salient anyway. One is more likely to know about deaths in one's own community than in other communities, and one is likely to know about those deaths in greater detail and with a fuller sense of their consequences. The confirmation biases of identity categorization only worsen this situation by further prejudicing one's attentional focus on and rehearsal of information within one's already biased experience. (Though the preceding example concerned Kashmiri Muslim categorization of Kashmiri Hindus, it should be clear that the same tendency is

found everywhere, thus necessarily including Kashmiri Hindus and their response to the suffering of Kashmiri Muslims.)

Even more significantly, our spontaneous, emotional response to out-group members tends to be complementary rather than parallel (as I stressed in the introduction). Moreover, the larger affective situation is likely to discourage any effortful perspective taking with respect to other groups' experiences, and thus any response that might compensate for the lack of spontaneous empathy (on out-groups and effortful empathy, see Gutsell and Inzlicht 841). Most obviously, in-group/out-group divisions reduce one's tendency to think about individuals, as opposed to more uniform masses. As Duckitt points out, we view out-groups as "less complex, less variable, less individuated" (81). It is, of course, individuals that have experiences with which we might empathize. Moreover, institutional biases (e.g., those of political parties and many other social organizations) tend not to encourage adopting out-group perspectives.

In short, colonial out-grouping tends to produce humiliation and rage, which in turn foster victim seeking. Colonized people, faced with the power of colonizers, are likely to seek subcolonial victims who are more accessible and lower cost. If there is some subcolonial identity group with a link to the colonizer, that group is likely to become a preferred victim. The link may be a matter of colonial functionalization (e.g., the establishment of a minority buffer group by the colonizer) or it may be a matter of shared categorization (e.g., a shared religion). In any case, it is unlikely to be restrained by empathy for the potential victims.

But there is another aspect to this, a further complication related to the fact that subcolonial identity divisions commonly occur in conditions very different from those that govern colonial identity divisions. This is the interconnection of the subcolonial identity groups. This is what Salman Rushdie refers to when he writes that "Communal violence everywhere was an intimate crime. When it burst out one was not murdered by strangers. It was your neighbors . . . the people whose children your own children had been playing with just yesterday" (*Shalimar* 239). It is not clear that Rushdie is correct in general (e.g., Khushwant Singh's portrayal of communal violence in *Train to Pakistan* is very different, and Varshney's research ["Understanding"] indicates

that riots are vastly more likely in segregated than in integrated societies). However, Rushdie is right to stress that there can be a sort of intimacy involved in the spiraling rage of subcolonial violence. Here, we come to another key feature of subcolonial identity opposition. Once there is a situation of colonial conflict, and once there is a subgroup division within the colonized society, it is extremely likely that members of each group will feel personally betrayed by some members of the other group, members from whom they expect a form of loyalty that in effect constitutes a shift in identity categories. Specifically, a sense of betrayal is likely when there is an extended and intense intermingling of the groups, when there are intimacies between the group members, when they become close friends or lovers. Attachment bonds foster expectations of full identification, and thus a sense of betrayal when that identification is incomplete—when, for example, one's Hindu friend does not clearly favor one's own (e.g., Muslim) group, perhaps preferring coreligionists over friends.

Thus there is both an impersonal violence and a personal one. The impersonal violence is far worse. It is the violence of the Indian Army and of the jihādis. It kills with little remorse. Personal violence is different. It is often driven by a feeling of violated trust and broken attachment. It is hate mixed with love and a sense of shame over the betrayal and even sometimes a sense of shame over the hate and over one's own inadequacies that led to the betrayal.

How precisely does this sense of betrayal come about? It seems to be something like this. We have been considering the situation in terms of in-groups and out-groups. But there are complications. First, for individual people one knows well, there is always ambiguity. Those people (e.g., friends) are both instances of their identity category and just these individual persons whose uniqueness makes the category irrelevant. For Jones, who is white, Smith is a black man. But Smith is also just this individual person, Smith. It is as if one is looking at a double exposure. On the left, there is the black man; on the right, looking exactly the same, is this particular person. It takes very little to tilt one's perception toward one or the other—to make Smith all black or all Smith. Second, out-groups themselves are not the same. We categorize out-group members and have an astonishing array of prejudices toward them. This is true even when the out-group is temporary and ad hoc, created

arbitrarily by a social psychologist (see Duckitt 68–69, 85 and Hirschfeld 1). But we still distinguish out-groups from enemies. For a Muslim Kashmiri, the out-groups may be Indians, even Hindus. But Hindus are not the enemy. The enemy is the Indian Army and the Indian government. One's feeling of betrayal comes when a friend seems to align himself or herself with the enemy, going beyond mere out-group membership to advocacy—or, in some cases, when the friend fails to be an advocate for one's own group. As Hindus come to support the government—or at least not to oppose it—Muslim friends feel betrayed. As Muslims come to support the militants—or at least not to oppose them—Hindu friends feel betrayed.

A sense of betrayal may promote not only anger but moral disgust. It seems that this would be particularly likely in cases where there was already some tendency toward moral and physical disgust, as in response to out-group members (e.g., regarding sexual "rot," as in the case noted in the introduction). That enhanced disgust may quite forcefully inhibit any empathic responses that might have arisen otherwise (recall the research on disgust and dehumanization cited by Gazzaniga, *Who's in Charge?* 204). To make matters worse, research indicates that increases in anxiety lead to increases in disgust (Marzillier and Davey). The situation in Kashmir clearly intensifies anxiety on all sides, and in far greater degree than that induced in laboratory experiments. Moreover, the entire process of evaluation and response to threat and putative betrayal is inseparable from identity categories. In consequence, it is extremely unlikely that disgust at betrayal will remain confined to the particular individuals who are taken to be disloyal. Rather, it is very likely to be generalized to the identity category, which is in turn taken as the essence that explains the betrayal (i.e., one is likely to feel that the friend betrayed one precisely because he or she is a Hindu or a Muslim and that such identity as Hindu or Muslim explains the friend's disloyalty).

Once generalized, this sense of betrayal has further, complex effects. Subcolonial scapegoating is often related to precolonial histories of group antagonism, which sometimes involved violence or earlier colonialism. Betrayal may come to be seen as a retrospective justification for earlier cruelty, as well as a rationale for subsequent intergroup violence. It is like the stereotypical poor man who feels humiliated by his landlord or by the police and beats his wife, then feels betrayed when

she reports this to the police, then beats her again for the betrayal, which he sees as retrospectively justifying the first beating. Claims of betrayal often end up serving a justificatory function. As such, they become part of the ideology of the colonized majority. However, they are not part of the *primary ideology* that organizes and partially motivates the main colonial conflict. They are, rather, a *secondary ideology*, a set of beliefs and attitudes that rationalize troubling outcomes of the conflict, such as scapegoating. Such an ideology may even go so far as to make scapegoating self-righteous.

Thus spirals of subcolonial violence are fostered not only by identity categorization enhanced by confirmation bias, but also by a sense of betrayal, an emotional response of moral disgust at the betrayal, and an associated secondary ideology. So are cycles of betrayal itself. When continued long enough, such cycles can produce widespread polarization, a radicalization of the subcolonial population in different directions. We see this, at least to some extent, in the work of Agha Shahid Ali.

Ali: "I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight"

Ali was a highly accomplished poet and, until his death in 2001, he remained one of the most promising poets in the United States. His last collection of poems, *Rooms Are Never Finished*, was a finalist for the National Book Award. As Nawaz Gul Qanungo has noted, "Ali undisputedly is Kashmir's most celebrated modern poet." In my personal view, Ali was the finest mainstream Anglophone poet from South Asia.[3] Indeed, I devoted a chapter of my *Empire and Poetic Voice* to one of his poems, and I took another poem as a study text for the application of various literary theories in my book, *Philosophical Approaches to the Study of Literature*. I was also to some extent friends with him, and dedicated *Empire and Poetic Voice* to his memory.

Ali and I once had dinner at the Kashmir Restaurant in Hartford, Connecticut. He asked me what my wife thought about the situation in Kashmir, and I told him about her family's flight from the valley. He replied that many Muslims in the valley believe that the Hindus left simply to clear the way for the army to move in and mow them down (cf. Kazi 115). It seemed at the time that Ali was giving this idea more credence than one would expect. However, I largely ignored the com-

ment. It was, after all, only a report of what other people were thinking.[4] My own reading of his work showed it to be very anticommunalist. His early poems express a remarkable sensitivity to the sufferings of Hindus during the history of Muslim domination in South Asia (see Hogan, *Empire* ch. 6). Moreover, he is widely read as an anticommunalist poet.[5]

However, in retrospect, it is clear that Ali was not merely reporting a crazy opinion. He seems to have partially accepted this interpretation of events. He had gone from being deeply sympathetic with Hindus to blocking empathy for Hindu refugees. This change only became evident with his collection, *The Country without a Post Office*, published in 1997. The second poem in the collection, "Farewell," addresses Kashmiri Hindus (see the note on 377).[6] The third and fourth lines are, "When you left even the stones were buried: / The defenceless would have no weapons" (175). The "defenceless" are Kashmiri Muslims who do not even have stones with which to defend themselves. That is true enough, if hyperbolic (they do have stones)—leaving aside the militants, of course, who have no need of stones. Moreover, Ali rightly suggests that these weaponless people are being buried as regularly and heartlessly as one might bury stones. But another implication of the lines is shocking. They seem to blame Kashmiri Hindus for the vulnerability of Kashmiri Muslims and they imply that, rather than saving themselves, the Hindus should have become weapons for the Kashmiri Muslims. That is, after all, the logic of the sentence, which makes the weaponless state of the Muslims contingent on the absence of Hindus. But how could Hindus possibly be weapons? I can think of only two possibilities—as objects of threat (e.g., in kidnapping) or as what are called human shields. I suspect that Ali did not fully think through the implications here and thus that he did not self-consciously intend either alternative. But, if so, that lack of intention was part of a lack of reflection, a willful turning away from the implications of his own views.[7]

We have already noted what occurred to Kashmiri Hindus that drove them to leave their homes. But it is worth quoting some other sources in connection with Ali's views (which recur in the poem we will be considering). As Basharat Peer notes, "Along with killing hundreds of pro-India Muslims, ranging from political activists to suspected informers for Indian intelligence, the militants had killed hundreds of Pandits on similar grounds or without a reason" (22). Wajahat Habibullah

explains how "places of worship of the majority were continually used to blare strident threats . . . over loudspeakers—as every mosque was at the time—and . . . prominent members of [the Kashmiri Hindu] community had been murdered" (73). Arif Jamal notes that even before the rigged elections, in 1986, a rumor about Hindus killing Muslims in Jammu led "Muslim rioters" in Kashmir to attack Hindus. He describes looting and destruction of Hindu homes and temples, then in subsequent years the assassination of highly visible Hindus (172–73). Though the details in Jamal may be overstated,[8] the basic points are supported by Harinder Baweja, who explains that "Kashmir saw" an "eruption of communal violence in 1986 when scores of homes and shops were burnt and looted. It was in the midst of this frenzy, in which close to 350 houses were damaged, that the organised mobs also attacked and looted temples." Jamal goes on to explain, "Following the foundation of Hizbul Mujahideen . . . hundreds of Hindus were killed, many brutally" (173). Arundhati Roy notes that the independence movement in Kashmir "will always be stigmatized by, and will some day, I hope, have to account for—among other things—the brutal killings of Kashmiri Pandits in the early years of the uprising, culminating in the exodus of almost the entire community from the Kashmir Valley" (66; she also asks the question that must have occurred to every Hindu in the valley: "Will a free Kashmir do to its minorities what India has done to Kashmiris for sixty-three years? What will happen to . . . blasphemers" and to others "who do not agree with the 'complete moral and social code' [provided by Islam]?" [69–70].[9])

What is one to make of the view that Hindus left due to a sinister plot against Muslims? Taken at face value, it is difficult to see this as anything other than dehumanization based on disgust. The relation to disgust is particularly plausible in connection with the research reported by Lasana Harris and Susan Fiske. In that work, dehumanization did not entail a complete denial of mentality to the out-group. It allowed for members of the out-group to be simplistically "ill-intentioned," if also difficult to comprehend (124). This is precisely what occurs with the view that Hindus abandoned Muslims. Such abandonment is clearly imagined as ill-intentioned and, at the same time, irrational. (What are the Hindus supposed to be imagining—carpet bombing of towns and

villages, somehow leaving their property intact, and killing of 95 percent of the population?)

On the other hand, as already noted, Ali's poems suggest that there is another—more rational, though no less problematic—construal of this view, one that overtly denies the danger to Hindus (thus denies the legitimacy of their flight) but covertly affirms that danger by suggesting that Hindus could serve as weapons or human shields for Muslims. After all, it was precisely due to the credible threats against Hindus—backed up by real killings—that Hindus could serve as a "defense" for (some) Muslims and thus that their exodus could serve to make the Muslim residents defenseless. This sort of construal—with its imagination of Hindu lives forming a safety buffer around Muslims—fairly clearly manifests a commitment to a Muslim categorial identity along with a dehumanizing out-grouping of Hindus. In keeping with this, Ali's view at this point seems not to involve simply a multicultural acceptance of Islam as one of many traditions, but a recommitment to Islam as the truth.

The last point is likely to strike American readers of Ali as wildly implausible. It is worth giving one brief example before going on. In one poem of *The Country without a Post Office*, "Ghazal," Ali gives Hindu "idols" a voice. There is already a slight problem with referring to Hindu icons or statuary as "idols"; the term suggests that Hindus take the images to be God rather than representations of gods. But it is common to translate the usual term for an icon, *mūrti*, as "idol," so perhaps my response here is overly sensitive. More significantly, Ali has the idols cry out that God should not let them be broken (193). Most Western academic readers are likely to take this as incontrovertible evidence of Ali's mainstream multiculturalism. Moreover, when discussing the poem with Amitav Ghosh, Ali explained that parts of the poem were inspired by an opposition to Islamic fundamentalism. But there are not simply two options here: fundamentalism and Western multiculturalism. This becomes clear if we simply read the next line, where the idols explain why God should oppose iconoclasm. Specifically, the idols explain that they alone are able to "convert the infidel" (193). In other words, the reason to oppose iconoclasm is that it does not promote conversion to Islam. Ali is not celebrating multiculturalism. He is, rather, telling the

reader that breaking into people's houses of prayer, destroying what they consider sacred, and terrorizing worshippers are not good ways of enticing people into Islam.

Similarly, in another poem also titled "Ghazal," Ali presents what appears to be his response to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Specifically, he refers to the Qur'ānic story of the sacrifice of Ishmael. Ishmael calls on Abraham to rid himself of weapons and to pray in Arabic (225). Presumably, Abraham stands for the Jews and Ishmael for the Arabs here. The poem does not call on both sides to set aside their weapons. It calls on Abraham only, thus presumably Israel. Moreover, it does not call for Ishmael to pray in Hebrew, thus supporting multiculturalism. Rather, it calls on Abraham to pray in Arabic—suggesting, it would seem, conversion. The poem also asserts that Qur'ānic prophesies have "come true" (225).

I should stress that I am not criticizing Ali for these views. He was perfectly free to have his religious beliefs and to hope that others would come to share them. Among believers, he was clearly advocating a rational approach to conversion—though I do cringe at references to members of other religious communities as "infidels." My point is that the standard interpretation of Ali's late poems misreads his opposition to fundamentalism as a form of liberal multiculturalism; it is not. Rather, the people who maintain a website on "Islamic Poetry" have it right when they include Ali's poems—among them, the poem I will be discussing.[10]

On the other hand, Ali's commitment to Islam need not have involved such a blockage of empathy with Kashmiri Hindus. After all, the Qur'ān itself celebrates not only sympathetic feeling for Muslims but a more general beneficence for humanity (on these attitudes of *raḥīm* and *raḥmān*, the primary characterizations of Allāh, see Maulana Muhammad Ali 3n3). There may be a suggestion of the reasons for this blockage in two poems. First, there is "Farewell," which Ali describes as "a plaintive love letter from a Kashmiri Muslim to a Kashmiri Pandit" (*Country* 93). Despite the previous points, this is in many ways a beautiful, haunting poem that, along with its insensitivities, betrays a real sense of loss.[11] For our purposes, the crucial point is that it suggests a personal relation that has been severed by the Hindu exodus. Indeed, it suggests a sense of abandonment by a beloved. This sense becomes intensified to full-fledged betrayal in the subsequent poem "Some Vision of the World

Cashmere." There, the speaker finds his grandmother's home taken over by soldiers. The point is personal but also allegorical, the grandmother's home standing for Kashmir. The colonel giving orders turns out to be his "lost friend," a Hindu (188).

Of course, this sort of biographical inference is highly conjectural. But even if Ali had no lost friend who joined the Indian Army, the images themselves suggest a feeling of betrayal.[12] Moreover, the feeling is broadly justified. In his early poems, Ali was Kashmiri, but also Indian and, again, very sympathetic to Hindus. The behavior of the Indian government and the Indian Army—not to mention Hindu fundamentalists—was in a very real sense not only brutal in itself but a form of betrayal that must have felt highly personal to Ali, especially as he saw his family and friends undergo loss, humiliation, and even death.[13] The problem, of course, is the usual one of category-based thinking. The cruelty of some people in Delhi or Gujarat, who happen to be called Hindu, has no bearing on the suffering of some people in Kulgam or Umanagari, Kashmir, even if they too happen to be called Hindu—just as the same point applies to different people who happen to be called Muslim.

Before turning to "I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight" it is important to remark on the context in which the poem appears. It is the third poem in *The Country without a Post Office*, immediately following "Farewell." The title of the book refers to several aspects of the Kashmir conflict. Perhaps most crucially, it names Kashmir as a "country," not a "state." In naming it a country, Ali implicitly takes a stand on the national character of Kashmir. The articles of accession signed by Hari Singh gave India control of communications, and thus postal services.[14] The title tacitly criticizes that accession, affirming that Kashmir is a nation and, as such, should control its own communications systems. The issue of communications is particularly crucial since one point of many poems in the collection concerns the flow of information. Ali was rightly concerned that censorship was serving to conceal the brutality of the Indian government in Kashmir. The lack of a post office serves as a metaphor for the inability of Kashmiris to communicate their suffering to the rest of the world.[15]

Thus far, we could be dealing with secular nationalism, but it quickly becomes clear that this is not the case. The epigraph for the collection is

a quote from the Qur'ān, "The Hour draws nigh and the moon is rent asunder" (sūrah 54.1; see *Country* 13).[16] This is from Maulana Ali's translation, with a change in tense and capitalization of "Hour." The change in tense is straightforward; it simply means that Shahid Ali is referring to a current situation rather than one in the past. In other words, he is suggesting that the situation in Kashmir today parallels that presented in the Qur'ān. This should lead readers to ask just what the Qur'ānic passage concerns. Ali even gives us the precise sūrah and verse citation, encouraging us to open the Qur'ān and check. It seems that Western critics have simply failed to do this. The passage refers to a natural sign from Allāh that prefigures the military triumph of Muḥammad over the powerful and idolatrous Quraish who had oppressed him. It heralds "the destruction of the opponents of truth," according to Maulana Ali—the opponents of truth being, of course, the opponents of Islam. Indeed, the Quraish are simply one in a series of infidels punished by God, as the sūrah indicates. Maulana Ali explains, "The first section, after warning the opponents of the Holy Prophet, contains mention of Noah. . . . The second of . . . Lot's people. The third, after a brief reference to Pharaoh and his hosts, contains a prophetical reference to the battle of Badr, which was to humble the power of the Quraish" (1007). The implication is that there are repeated conflicts between the faithful and the infidels in the course of history and that God intervenes on the side of the faithful. Thus, later in the sūrah, we read, "The disbelievers will say: This is a hard day!" (54.8) and "On the day when they are dragged into the Fire upon their faces: Taste the touch of hell" (54.48). Note that the reference in these cases is dual. It concerns an historical defeat of the enemy and the condemnation of the infidel on the Day of Judgment. The second meaning is stressed by Ali's capitalization of "Hour."[17]

The bearing of the epigraph on Kashmir is clear. The Muslim followers of truth will triumph over the military might of the idolatrous Indians who have oppressed them. This optimism about eventual triumph is clear in a number of Ali's poems. For example, "Some Vision of the World Cashmere" ends with the Indian soldiers gone, the grandmother/Kashmir literally resurrected, a bright sun, and an expression of gratitude to Allāh as *raḥmān* and *raḥīm*, beneficent and merciful (in Maulana

Ali's translation [see 3n3]), or merciful and compassionate (as in Ali's *Veiled* 189).

Historically and politically, the epigraph is even more significant. It serves to link Ali not with, say, Amnesty International or some sort of international justice organization and not even with the semisecular Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), but with the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami and its military wing, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Behera explains that the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen "introduced" the idea of the militancy as jihād (154). In connection with this, their "motivational literature . . . used symbols and metaphors of Islam extensively. Carefully selecting militant strands of Islamic history, allusions were made to the heroic deeds of the Prophet Mohammed." Most crucially, " 'Badr,' signifying Prophet Mohammed's spectacular victory over Arab pagans of Mecca, was invoked to eulogize Islamic heroism, and exhortations to violence for another jihad were skillfully woven into references to the prophet's teaching." She cites one document that asserts "We will bring Islamic revolution in Kashmir. . . . The history of the battles of Badr and Uhud is going to be repeated. Victory is with us" (155). Thus, through his epigraph and its reference to Badr, Ali has directly connected his book with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and their militant Islamist view of the Kashmir crisis.

"I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight" begins with its own epigraph.[18] It is from W. B. Yeats's poem "Easter 1916," which concerns the transformation of a series of ordinary people into tragic heroes by virtue of their participation in the uprising of 1916 against British colonial rule of Ireland. Though the military offensive of the uprising failed, it is generally accepted that the uprising began the sequence of events that led to independence within a decade. The parallel is clear: Ali is using the model of the Irish militancy to comment on the Kashmiri militancy, suggesting the eventual independence of Kashmir as well. He makes particularly sharp use of the green imagery from Yeats's poem. In the original, it refers to Irish nationalism. In the context of Kashmir, in contrast, it refers to Islam. Here, then, we once again have the conjunction found in the title of the book along with its epigraph. There is a nationalist assertion, but also a clear connection of that nationalism with religious identity.

The title of the poem situates the speaker in New Delhi. The mountains surrounding the Kashmir Valley stand as symbols for the wall of censorship, something that prevents anyone outside from seeing what occurs in the valley. This is more or less explicit in the first stanza. The opening lines involve an imaginative transformation of the mountains to "glass" (178) so that one can see what is going on. In order to make the meaning clear, Ali refers to the fact that "news" does not come from the valley. This is a clear reference to the very severe censorship there. Writing in 1990, Meera Sharma explained that the government "withdrew curfew passes to all journalists . . . shut closed the Central Telegraph Office, confiscated all film rolls and finally ordered foreign media out of the state" (qtd. in Kazi 89). The first stanza also introduces the reason for "Midnight" in the title—the prevalence of curfews in the valley. We have already stressed the destructive effects of these curfews, such as their consequences for "health services" resulting from physicians' inability to "attend to medical emergencies" (Gossman 15, 16).

In the second stanza, we look through the glass to Zero Bridge in south Srinagar. We see a shadow pursued by searchlights. The shadow, we learn, is the soul of someone who has died. He is searching for his body. The reference here is to the people who have been "disappeared" by the Indian Army. These are people who are arrested, held incommunicado, then often killed extrajudicially, with their bodies disposed of in random places. The reference to searchlights of course concerns the patrolling of streets during curfew. However, it also operates as an image. If the soul is a shadow, then the searchlights of the army make even the soul invisible, since light on the shadow will make the shadow itself disappear.

In keeping with the poem's accurate and chilling depiction of Indian military brutality in Kashmir, the shadow leads us to the military area, farther south in the city. There the speaker and the shadow enter into the torture cells. The authorities are dripping burning rubber onto the skin of an apparently innocent prisoner. Here Ali alludes to some of the torture techniques used by the Indian security forces (see, for example, Gossman on "burning with heated objects" [14]).

Thus, the first canto establishes the censorship of information coming out of Kashmir. It goes on to point toward the practices of disappearances and torture. These were known to Ali not only from the

reports of international human rights agencies but also from the testimonies of people he knew in the valley.

Indeed, the second canto takes us to those personal connections. First, the spirit leaves the torture cells. Then suddenly Ali (more technically, the speaker of the poem) is no longer observing him from a distance. The two are together and the dead soul is asking Ali to console him. This suggests a personal relation between the two. The scene shifts farther north in the city, where the two can speak without being overheard. Suddenly, the speaker realizes that the dead soul is his friend, Rizwan, named for the "angel who has charge of Heaven" (Qasmi 71). The sudden experience of realizing that Rizwan is dead goes along with his having been disappeared. Thus there would have been no official death notice. Death in disappearance is also indicated by the snow-covered Rizwan's complaint that he has been cold for a long time. The image suggests his body has been abandoned by the military in a remote, snow-covered place, presumably in the mountains.

In keeping with the dreamlike quality of the sequence, Rizwan urges Ali to make Kashmir part of his dreams. The significance of the admonition is twofold. On the one hand, it implies that Ali should maintain such preoccupation with Kashmir that it enters his dreams at night (dreams that sometimes shape the content of his poems, as in "I Dream I Am the Only Passenger on Flight 423 to Srinagar"). However, it also means that Ali should make a renewed and, presumably, free (*āzād*) Kashmir part of his "dreams" in the sense of *hopes* or *aspirations*.

In the third canto, Ali follows the spirit through a landscape of colonial terror. He passes along a road covered with blood by mourners at a funeral who have been shot by the Indian military. This may refer to a well-known incident from 1990 that led to the recall of the state's governor (see Goldston and Gossman 14, 57–58). But events of this sort have occurred frequently in Kashmir (see, for example, Human Rights Watch, *World Report 1992* for a May 1991 incident of this sort). As already noted in chapter 2, the Disturbed Areas Act forbade the gathering of more than five people, and the Special Powers Act gave officers the right "to fire upon anyone contravening any law or order in force, in the disturbed area" (Malik 307). As they pass along, Ali hears mothers grieving for their dead sons. The mothers are inside the houses, presumably because the curfew prevents their exit, and because they could

not legally gather to mourn their children even during daylight. From here he comes to burned-out neighborhoods. This refers to the use of arson by the Indian military. Specifically, they seem to have reached Lal Chowk in downtown Srinagar. Again, the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) set fire to buildings and shot people who were trying to escape the flames (Gossman 8).

To this point in the poem, Ali has engaged in a clear and emotionally effective exposition of just what is hidden in Kashmir—the colonial brutality of the Indian military. Of course, he has ignored the brutality of the militants. But that seems insignificant, as one can hardly cover everything in a single poem.

Now he suddenly turns to another topic. The light of the flames shows Hindus taking the icons from temples. This already contrasts strikingly with Rushdie, who reports that the icons were stolen, then sold in Kashmiri markets: "In . . . Srinagar the things looted from temples and homes were being openly bought and sold" (*Shalimar* 296).[19] Rather, in Ali's poem the Hindus are planning their departure. Far from being threatened, they are quietly stealing their own statues. Moreover, they do this while everyone else is distracted by the BSF arson attacks, which provide the Hindus with a sort of cover. Spying these events, Ali pleads with the Hindus not to leave because their presence is the only protection the Muslims have against the Indian military. Again, recall the situation of the Hindus at the time of their flight. It seems fairly clear that Ali's construal of the Hindu exodus is profoundly lacking in empathy. He fails even to minimally acknowledge the threat they were facing. Instead, he indicates that the Hindus are the ones with no empathy, since they leave Kashmir with no consolation for the Muslims they are abandoning. The final words of the canto make the Hindus both infantile and crudely idolatrous: they are "clutching the gods" (180). Here Ali explicitly represents Hindus as holding the belief that a piece of stone really is, say, Śiva.

The final canto returns to Rizwan and the color green. Ali associates Rizwan with a Ṣūfī saint's tomb, further suggesting his high spiritual status, a status presumably attained when he was killed by the Indian military and thereby made a *shahīd*, or martyr. Ali also refers to boys killed and abandoned in the snowy mountains, thereby explaining the image of a snow-covered Rizwan in the second canto. He goes on to say

that he has tied a thread at a saint's shrine, invoking the saint's help. What he prays for is the return of Rizwan—presumably both the friend and the angel, a return that can occur only with the final triumph of the forces of truth over the enemy, as suggested by the epigraph to the book. The color of the thread is green (180). It recalls the "terrible beauty" associated with green by Yeats, a beauty that results from the violence of revolution.

In keeping with the specifically Islamic nationalism of the poem, the final lines return to the idolatrous Hindus who—the poem suggests—have abandoned, and thereby betrayed, their Muslim neighbors. Turning away from Kashmir, Ali now sees the Hindus coming peacefully, carrying their "gods" as if they were "children" (180). So, the fairly desperate flight of Hindus (often to wretched refugee camps) is turned into a calm passage (not to camps in Jammu, but evidently to Delhi); the desecration of temples is turned into Hindus systematically removing their own icons in a well-planned flight; and Hindus are again viewed as believing that icons are gods themselves. Finally, and most significantly, the plight of Hindus fleeing with actual children in their arms are turned into religious fanatics carrying their idols.

Once one analyzes the poem, Ali's choices here become even stranger. He does not treat the Indian military, the people who are actually responsible for the atrocities. Nor does he simply remain focused on the sufferings of the Kashmiri people, even Kashmiri Muslims. Rather, he stresses the subcolonial opposition between Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus. In some ways, this is astonishing—not only ethically and politically, but aesthetically. The turn to Hindus is a diversion from the powerful treatment of Indian colonialism in Kashmir, and a distraction from the emotions aroused by the depiction of that colonialism. On the other hand, it is in some ways just what we would expect from the preceding analysis, for it points toward precisely the downward spread of out-grouping and violence in colonial conflict, the associated fission of the colonized, and the sense of betrayal and moral disgust that often afflict all the resulting subcolonial identity groups.

6 Fractured Tales and Colonial Traumas

Disfigured Stories in Kashmiri Short Fiction

Though it may not be clear from the preceding analyses, the most important narrative prototype for Kashmir, after the heroic, is the sacrificial. As noted in the introduction to this book, the sacrificial narrative—with its depiction of seduction, then sin, leading to in-group devastation—tends to become prominent in nationalism when the condition of the home society is so weak (or devastated) that it precludes the possibility of any full military confrontation of the heroic type. The subnational predominance of heroic and sacrificial emplotments is consistent with findings in political psychology. Specifically, research "suggests two emotional routes to protest." The first is "an anger route" linked with a sense of "efficacy." The second involves a " 'nothing to lose' strategy" when "the situation is seen as hopeless" (Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg 785). The former correlates with the heroic emplotment; the latter, with the sacrificial emplotment.

More precisely, in nationalist contexts, the sacrificial narrative tends to be integrated into a more extended heroic emplotment. The sacrifice—either of the guilty parties or of an innocent victim—is what enables the struggle to advance toward a heroic confrontation. This is a component in some Indian narratives—for example, the story of Mohd Maqbool Sherwani, who sacrificed his life in the 1947 conflict, thereby allowing the Indian Army to arrive and partially defeat the Pakistan-backed uprising and invasion. A relatively recent version of "the martyrdom of Sherwani" may be found in a 2005 *Times of India* story by Rahul Singh, "Who Changed the Face of '47 War?" (For a literary treatment of these events, see Anand's *Death of a Hero*; on the historical facts of the case, see Whitehead 213–14.)

The sacrificial emplotment is more common on the Pakistani side, particularly among militants, such as Maulana Muhammad Azhar of Jaish-e-Muhammad. Specifically, jihādi leaders commonly specify the sacrificial narrative in terms of the ideal of the *shahīd*, or martyr. For example, early in his commentary on verses treating jihād, *Fat-hul-Jawwād*, Azhar writes that Jews and Christians are seeking "to mislead the Muslims" (26). This places Jews and Christians in the seducer role of the prototypical sacrificial plot. He goes on to state that, due to their imitation of Christians, "Muslims have grown weak" (34). This is the standard preface to a sacrificial emplotment, one that indicates the reason an ordinary heroic emplotment is not possible: the weakness of the home society will not lead to heroic victory. Azhar immediately supplicates Allāh, writing that it is "a great blessing . . . to be slain in Your way" and imploring Allāh to make "us" martyrs (34). Azhar's claims are fairly general. But Muhammad Jameel stresses the particular focus of Azhar on "the Hindu oppressions to the Muslims of Kashmir" (518–19).

Emplotment does not operate on its own. It is inseparable from the use of cognitive models for aspects of the nation. Prominent models include THE NATION IS A PERSON,[1] THE NATION IS A HOUSE AND ITS CITIZENS ARE A FAMILY, and THE NATION IS THE LAND AND ITS CITIZENS ARE PLANTS WITH ROOTS IN THE LAND (see Hogan, *Understanding Nationalism* ch. 3). These cognitive models are often embedded in narratives as metaphors. When this integration is consistent throughout a particular emplotment, we have an instance of national allegory. Given the importance of both modeling and emplotment to nationalism, it is unsurprising that national allegory should be a recurring literary form during periods of nation building (during anticolonial struggles, as in Kashmir, or after independence). The point is famously associated with Fredric Jameson's (overstated) claim, "All third-world texts are necessarily . . . to be read as . . . national allegories" (70). Indeed, we see some allegorical elements in the works analyzed in previous chapters. For example, the point of Tanveer Khan's film *Madhoshi* is not that a particular Kashmiri Hindu might have a particular hallucination. It is, rather, that a segment of traumatized Kashmiri Hindus (represented by a single character) might have the political delusion (represented by the character's hallucinations) that a powerful military response (represented

by the hallucinated antiterrorist militia) will rescue them by wiping out terrorism.

The preceding points obviously bear on the emplotment of the Kashmir crisis by Kashmiris as well as non-Kashmiris. In chapter 4 we considered the more or less complex emplotments found in Kashmiri novelists writing in English. We found fairly straightforward emplotments, whether they conformed to the dominant Indian problematic or an alternative nationalist ideology. Such narratives would be much more difficult to isolate in Agha Shahid Ali's poem "I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight," which was discussed in chapter 5. That work does seem to have sacrificial elements, and there are hints of a family separation and reunion structure. Nonetheless, despite its length and the stress on emotionally powerful events, the emplotment of that work is limited. That is in part a result of it being a lyric poem. But there may be something more going on as well, a sort of inability of any standard genre to represent and explain the events and their implications.

These suggestions of a disconnection or incompatibility between genre and experience are far more obtrusive and disorienting in many works by Kashmiri writers writing in Kashmiri—thus writing for other Kashmiris, not for an Indian or international readership. Repeatedly, the usual genre-based expectations of emplotment are not merely complicated but profoundly violated. Specifically, many writers from the Kashmir Valley—writers who have experienced the violence in their homes and are addressing their concerns to other Kashmiris only—do not have the same sense of optimism that is suggested by nationalist emplotments of heroism, sacrifice, and romance, or the same sense of clarity and comprehension expressed even in more pessimistic works. Nor do Kashmiri-language writers necessarily stress revenge, even in its self-destructive form. This is not to say that the cross-cultural genres are missing or that national issues are absent. The cross-cultural genres are still prominent, and they are taken up for national or subnational topics. But they often appear in strangely distorted forms, bereft of their usual national functions. As Basharat Peer has written, "There are no good stories in Kashmir. There are only difficult, ambiguous, and unresolved stories" (158). Perhaps Peer only meant that there are no happy stories. But he suggests something more profound—the fracturing of the standard genres, their twisting into almost unrecognizable forms.

To understand why this is the case, we need to consider some aspects of the operation of emotion and what happens to emotion in trauma.

Emotion, Trauma, and Disfigured Narratives

In the sacrificial emplotments mentioned in my earlier book *Understanding Nationalism*, the sense of social impotence was widespread. Moreover, there was a clear relation to the prototypical cases of devastation, such as famine. But the experience of devastation was limited and often indirect. Consider, for example, the case of the Easter Uprising in Ireland in 1916 (to which Ali alluded in the epigraph to his poem). This is a paradigmatic instance of political action based on a sacrificial prototype. Indeed, the leaders of the Uprising imagined it as a blood sacrifice (see Lyons 89–92). This sacrificial emplotment was facilitated by the historical salience of the terrible nineteenth-century potato famine, which has served as the paradigmatic case of devastation for many Irish nationalists. But that famine was not experienced directly by the poets and revolutionaries who initiated the Uprising. In contrast, there are societies in which devastation is widespread and immediate. Kashmir is one of those cases. It is a place where ordinary life has become highly threatening and uncertain. In short, it has become traumatic. Technically, the "traumatic stimuli" have been particularly intense and consequential because "the degree of predictability and controllability" have both been very low (Başoğlu and Mineka 184, on the two key variables bearing on the long-term effects of trauma; they are speaking generally, and not about Kashmir). The point is not metaphorical. When Peer arrived at the *Kashmir Times*, a "veteran reporter" explained to him, "Thirty-seven words is all you need to know to be a reporter here." These words are mostly obvious—"arrest, prison, torture," as well as "Indian security forces, separatists," and so forth. But they also include "fear . . . anxiety . . . . despair . . . rage" and "trauma." More significantly, Seema Kazi cites a study that found "40 per cent of children in the age group of 4–18 years suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders, fear psychosis and panic" (188n113). Wajahat Habibullah notes that after the insurgency began, "annual outpatient visits to the psychiatric hospital in Srinagar soared from 3,000 to 18,000" (140).

"Trauma theory" has become an important area in literary study today, and writers such as Cathy Caruth have explored the consequences

of traumatic experience using psychoanalytic principles. But it is not at all clear that psychoanalysis is the best approach to trauma, considering that it has been largely surpassed by cognitive and affective science. Both a psychoanalytic and an affective scientific account would agree, however, that memories are at the basis of trauma. In a cognitive account, these are specifically what are now called *emotional memories* (see LeDoux), and these are memories that may or may not call to mind particular "episodic memories," thus specific sensory images of or information about the past. Nonetheless, when activated, emotional memories revive the relevant emotion. A fundamental feature of post-traumatic stress is the repeated, intrusive and uncontrolled experience of strong emotions from emotional memories (see, for example, Banich and colleagues 621, 624–25). In some ways, trauma produces a disorder of emotional memory. As E. D. Kirby and colleagues point out, "Impaired regulation of emotional memory is a feature of several affective disorders, including . . . post-traumatic stress disorder" (527; see also Haas and Canli).[2]

Here we might try to work out some details of this general connection. The usual function of emotional memories is preparatory. The activation of emotional memories motivates one to anticipate possible outcomes of current events and to engage in relevant actions to exploit opportunities or avoid threats. Suppose I nearly have an accident when driving quickly on a dangerous curve on a particular road. When I approach the place again—or when I approach a similar curve elsewhere—the conditions activate the emotional memory. The emotional memory causes fear of the repeated outcome, motivating me to reduce my speed before actually encountering the danger. The operation of emotional memories is often embedded in larger, more narrative trajectories. Someone who has had bad romantic experiences may avoid initiating a romantic relationship, while someone else is encouraged to imagine a love story unfolding in the future. The same point holds for nations. It was a commonplace that the Vietnam Syndrome—in part, a complex of emotional memories—discouraged Americans from emplotting wars as heroic comedies leading to the triumph of (national) good.

More precisely, functional emotional memories have several properties. First, they are activated in narrow circumstances—the ones that are close enough to the initial condition that they are likely to present

similar threats or opportunities. Second, they are integrated into causal sequences—ultimately, narrative trajectories—that enable relevant sorts of action, thus avoidance of threats and exploitation of opportunities. Third, they are strong enough to motivate action. However, I might add, they are weak enough to be overridden in cases where they are irrelevant, and not so strong as to prevent appropriate action (e.g., disordered panic rather than avoidance of danger).

Trauma can produce dysfunction at each of these points. First, the emotional memories of traumas may be activated widely, thus in irrelevant circumstances. As Jessica Payne and colleagues put it, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterized by "excessive and uncontrolled memory retrieval," including "intrusive memories" and "flashbacks" (94). Second, these memories are commonly removed from causal sequences since it is difficult to make causal sense of the traumatic occurrence. Put differently, traumatic threats tend not to be regular, but anomalous, without clearly categorizable causal precedents. This lack of causal integration is part of what is involved in the often-noted fragmentation and incoherence of memories in PTSD (see, for example, Payne et al. 94–95). Perhaps more important, it is inseparable from the specific consequences of *unpredictable* stress (see Payne et al. 99). As Robert Kraft points out, "traumatic events" have their effects in part due to "an inability of existing schemas to predict outcomes" (355)—or, we might add, to predict even the onset of the event. Finally, the feeling provoked by the memory tends to be overwhelmingly strong, thus producing panic rather than action-motivating fear and overriding attempts at cognitive modulation.

It should be clear how an insurgency/counterinsurgency war leaving tens of thousands dead could produce trauma, particularly in the conditions prevailing in Kashmir. Severe harm, including death (e.g., of a close relative), has been sudden, unpredictable, seemingly random. It could come from any quarter. As Salman Rushdie put it, "It was getting to be a characteristic of the times that people never knew who had hit them or why" (286). As Rushdie indicates, there has been no clear way of anticipating or avoiding the blows. The harm has not been confined to certain places or times, or to certain groups. In keeping with this, the emotional memories could be activated at any moment in virtually any context. Moreover, these memories cannot be integrated into predictive

structures that would facilitate escape or mitigation. The interviews reported by Kazi present a picture of a widespread sense of utter helplessness, an inability to take any effective action whatsoever (see, for example, 104). Finally, these memories could not be overridden by reasoned inferences to likelihood. This is in part due to the emotional force of the memories themselves and in part due to the fact that inferences to likelihood are highly uncertain.

Trauma might in principle give rise to a compensatory affirmation of reassuring predictive structures, including story prototypes. However, its fundamental nature is such that it tends to undermine the validity of such structures. The heroic prototype seems pointless, even ludicrous. The sacrificial structure is, if anything, worse. It holds out the hope of divine salvation through suffering, when experience seems to suggest that sacrifice and suffering are likely to be the prelude only to yet more sacrifice and suffering. Indeed, what might have been imagined as sacrifice is now simply a desire for death. As Kazi notes, "In 1980, Kashmir had the lowest suicide rate in India; presently, it is among the highest in the world" (119). In traumatic conditions, then, the usual functions of emplotment—particularly its explanatory and predictive qualities—seem to be lost. In consequence, the use of story prototypes may be highly distorted.

This distortion is just what we find in many Kashmiri short stories. It is what I am calling "disfigured narrative." It is a sort of extension in the sense of Lakoff and Turner—a highly unusual or innovative use of a standard structure. But unlike the cases discussed by Lakoff and Turner, disfigured narratives violate the fundamental function of the structure in question, even reversing it. One striking feature of some Kashmiri short fiction is that it takes up the prototypical story structures in relation to national identification, but it so radically distorts the prototypes that they are barely recognizable, and its national function is more like a cry of despair than an imagination of nationhood. Such fiction may be said to move outside ideological alternatives. In this way, it is different from most of the work we have considered in previous chapters. But it does not exactly overcome distortive ideologies (as Rushdie largely does). Rather, it fails to satisfy the minimal condition for ideology—accepting the possibility of a coherent understanding of and a consistent emotional orientation toward social events and condi-

tions. In this way, these disfigured narratives tend to leave behind ideological alternatives. But they do so in much the same way that spiritual despair leaves behind religious alternatives.

Unsurprisingly, such disfiguring occurs not only with story prototypes per se, but also with metaphors or models. Indeed, in referring to these narratives as "disfigured," I have in mind one story that takes up THE NATION IS A PERSON. Anees Hamadani's "The Burnt-out Sun" concerns a man—metaphorically, Kashmir—who, though apparently healthy, is suddenly taken away by two men in an ambulance and confined to a cell. Eventually, surgeons come and divide his face in two, removing half. He is allowed to leave. But he finds that he cannot see anything anymore, because "my eyes had gone with the part of my face that had been removed" (137). THE NATION IS A PERSON is commonly used to present the unity of the nation. Here, however, it is used to present precisely the disunity, the division. Moreover, it does so in a way that makes no sense. A person does not survive if his face is cut in half. But this is not a lack of skill on the part of the author. Rather, it is a use of the standard metaphor to express one aspect of the trauma of Kashmir in 1947. The two men in the ambulance represent forces that are in some sense pretending to "save" the speaker, and thus Kashmir. These men suggest Pakistan and India—one in its "rescue" of Kashmir from the Hindu ruler; the other in its "rescue" of Kashmir from the Pakistani invasion. The result of this unnecessary, dual rescue is that the man is cut in two, just as Kashmir was divided between Pakistan and India. The ludicrous conclusion, announced by the two men, is that the speaker is "free now" (137)—just what Pakistan and India in effect announced to their respective parts of Kashmir.[3] This character's senseless disfigurement provides an apt metaphor for the distortions of both form and function that we find in some Kashmiri-language short fiction, particularly in its use of narrative genres.

Fractured Tales

When I was a child, there was a cartoon program called *Fractured Fairy Tales*. It presented rather distorted versions of common stories. I now imagine that the irony of these works was aimed at entertaining parents even as the vivid and strange tales themselves entertained children. There is an element of that in some works of Kashmiri fiction. They too

are, in a sense, fractured fairy tales—though in this case the fairy tales concern national identification. They are also pervaded by irony. In this case, the irony, though sometimes humorous, is most often too despairing even to rise to the level of tragedy. In these fractured tales, I have come upon examples of most genres in disfigured forms, but not the heroic. Perhaps a heroic emplotment is simply inconceivable for ordinary Kashmiris (as opposed to Indian or Pakistani officials), even if it is disfigured. In keeping with this, the sacrificial emplotment—the emplotment of the militarily weak—is most common, though the romantic, revenge, criminal investigation, and familial separation and reunion genres turn up as well.[4]

Akhtar Mohi-ud-din's "The Second Meeting" presents a nice instance of a disfigured romantic plot. It concerns the long separation of a Kashmiri man and an Indian (specifically, Bengali) woman. They had met once. She was the "Eternal Beloved" (110) and "Fear and doubt had been reduced to ashes, burnt down like the effigy of Ravana" (110). Twenty years later, he "happened to visit that country again" and "met her for the second time" (111). It is a time of "fear and mistrust" (110). Now she is old and lacks the charm of two decades before. She does not even remember him. They are both embarrassed when he discovers and reads "the superlatives [he] had chosen to describe her qualities and her beauty" two decades before (112).

The story takes up the separation of lovers, reunited at last after their separation (inevitable in the romantic genre). But the reunion is pathetic. There is no longer any feeling between the two, and their earlier enthusiasms now seem ludicrous. The significance of the story is suggested in the reference to the woman's country and the burning of "Fear and doubt" like "the effigy of Ravana." In the context of Kashmiri history, this hints that the first meeting was the initial response of many Kashmiris to the events of 1947, with fear and doubt arising due to the threat posed by a Pakistan-supported invasion (see Akbar 106). As noted in chapter 2, Pakistan is often explicitly or implicitly associated with the demon Rāvaṇa in Indian views of Indo-Pakistan wars, such as that in 1947. More significantly, the burning of the effigy of Rāvaṇa refers to the festival of Daśahrā. This fell on October 24, 1947,[5] thus the time of the uprising and invasion, almost directly coinciding with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India (signed on October 26

[see Habibullah 175], following the maharaja's appeal to India on October 24 [see Bose, *Kashmir*]). In short, the enthusiasm and love are the feelings of that early postindependence moment. But after decades, "fear and mistrust" have grown between Kashmir and the rest of India. Even those who were formerly enthusiastic about the association are only embarrassed by those feelings in retrospect.

While "The Second Meeting" recounts a Muslim Kashmiri's return from Kashmir to another part of India, Avtar Krishna Rehbar's "Anguish" presents the story of a Hindu émigré's return to Kashmir. The protagonist recalls a time when he had lost "his head and heart" on the steps of the Veth River, whose "running water would move him to ecstasy" when he was young (141). Here, the love story is more clearly allegorical and the beloved is more clearly an image of the nation, though in this case Kashmir rather than India. Here, too, the former beauty is lost. This is not a joyous reunion of lovers. Now the river is "toxic, polluted" (145)—an ecological fact, but also a metaphor in the story, for the people, too, have changed; their "hearts have grown cold" with "Fanaticism and greed" (144). The story ends with an allusion to the well-known myth of how the god Śiva saved the world by taking in a vast poison that would have destroyed everyone. The protagonist plunges into the filthy water, praying that he be given the power to suck up all the poison—the pollutants in the river, but also the poison in the hearts of the people—or that he die. There is no reason to expect that he will be able to drain the poison. Thus, the end is a sort of lover's suicide, an integration of the romantic and sacrificial structures. But it is a suicide for a beloved who is "cold" and who is, in any case, not really a beloved anyway. Whether he dies or not, neither nature nor Kashmir will be restored; no one will be redeemed. In short, it is not a tragic sacrifice, but a senseless pseudosacrifice.

The criminal investigation genre receives some minimal treatment in Nazir Jehangir's "The Boy Is Guilty." In the usual genre, it is not uncommon for there to be some miscarriage of justice (e.g., when an innocent person is temporarily imprisoned). But the conclusions of the investigation are rarely entirely arbitrary. In this story, a boy faints, then explains that his pocket has been picked. Two factions form, proposing slightly different explanations for how this occurred. In a prototypical criminal investigation narrative, an examination might

have led to the discovery and conviction of the pickpocket. That investigation might have temporarily imprisoned an innocent man, but it would be likely to find the true culprit in the end. Here, however, there is no investigation of the crime. Rather, the two groups proposing different explanations form different parties and engage in battles against one another. One party connects the theft with attempts "to tamper with the sanctity of Article 370" (105; as Mattoo explains, this is "an Article in the Indian Constitution which guarantees a special status to Jammu and Kashmir State" [*Stranger* 151]). This leads the police to fire on the crowds. In the end, the boy himself is "arrested on the charge of having started a riot" (Jehangir 105).

Here, again, we see both allegory and disfigurement. The parties represent conflicting political groups in Kashmir. The boy stands for the ordinary Kashmiri people. The different political parties claim to have the interests of Kashmiri people at heart. But they do not examine the causes of Kashmiri problems and try to solve them. Rather, they turn those problems into occasions for political sloganeering. The only punishment is exacted on the victims themselves. The entire criminal investigation structure leads not only to injustice but to the precise reversal of justice—and not for any comprehensible reason.

The revenge prototype is found in Amin Kamil's "The Grave Robber." In this story, someone repeatedly defiles new graves, stripping the corpses of their shrouds. Finally, the perpetrator, Gana Baba, confesses his crime "in his dying declaration" (119). This crime, with its potential for initiating retribution, fits with the revenge prototype in that it violates an attachment relation, the relation of the mourners to their dead relative or friend. (Commonly, a revenge story is initiated by harm being done to an attachment object of the revenger/hero, as when Claudius kills Hamlet's father.) But this violation is strangely unmotivated. We are never told why Gana Baba did it. Though in itself baffling, the situation is continuous with the traumatically disturbed processes of death and mourning in Kashmir. The corpses of loved ones are often defiled—returned with mutilations, in pieces, or only in part. In the case of the disappeared, they are often unburied. The nakedness of the corpses in "The Grave Robber" is an attenuated form of this impropriety. In the real-life cases, too, the motive of the defilement is often, perhaps most often, unclear. "A young man" is taken from home, an "only son" per-

haps, like the first victim of the grave robber (115). There is some suspicion, some distrust on the part of the security forces or the militants. Then he is dead. Inquiries about the cause prove fruitless.

What follows in the story introduces further disfigurement. In the prototypical revenge plot, the revenger may mistakenly punish one or more innocents *before* finding the true culprit. Here, however, the reverse happens. Gana's grave is defiled, presumably by someone who "had taken revenge" (119). But then, following this revenge, graves continue to be defiled. The revenge does not stop with the culprit. Revenge against the criminal is, rather, only the beginning of an evidently endless series of defilements. The point makes gibberish of the revenge structure. But it fits the inscrutable cycles of defilement and death in Kashmir all too well. Moreover, the story suggests that the cycles will continue even after their initial cause has ended.

The family separation and reunion prototype is taken up in Abdul Gani Beg Athar's "The Enemy," though this work also draws on the sacrificial prototype for an embedded story. "The Enemy" concerns a man who is separated from his brother due to the establishment of the border between Pakistani Kashmir and Indian Kashmir. The allegorical significance of this is too obvious to require comment. Hearing that his brother is dying, the protagonist decides to cross over into Pakistani Kashmir, where he is arrested and beaten by the Pakistani military.[6] He tries to object, "I am not an Indian. Neither am I a Pakistani. I am only a Kashmiri" (30), but the soldiers torture him as an Indian spy. Ultimately, his brother dies. He tries to get permission to see the body. But in a Kafkaesque ending, no one can ascertain who has the authority to grant such permission. The man is therefore never able even to see his brother's corpse. The family separation prototype is in some ways more ambivalent than other prototypes. It reunites the family, but commonly in a way that is temporary and not entirely satisfying. But here the reunion is not only never realized—it is actually impossible to determine what would have allowed the reunion to occur. The allegorical suggestion is that there is not even a way of imagining how Kashmiris could be reunited.

As already noted, there is a small sacrificial plot embedded in "The Enemy." Specifically, when the protagonist is beaten unconscious, he dreams that his brother is about to die and, like Jesus on the cross, asks

for water. The protagonist is manacled and cannot reach water. However, he is bleeding. He gathers the blood in his hands. He will revive his brother with his own blood—suggesting that the Kashmiris in Indian Kashmir will help to revive the Kashmiris of Pakistani Kashmir through the sacrifices of their own blood—presumably so that both can struggle for an independent, united Kashmir. But this is all too absurd. The brother dies when the protagonist cannot reach him. Moreover, drinking his brother's blood is at least as sinister an image as it is salvational. Finally, this blood sacrifice is simply a dream that would have no real effects anyway. Once again, the prototype is rendered ludicrous, multiply false. The point is only enhanced by its embedment in an equally ludicrous and multiply false family reunion prototype.[7]

A particularly effective use of the sacrificial prototype may be found in Nayeema Ahmad's "I Am Still Alive." This story begins with a woman asking passersby where they are going. They do not know what to say, for everything was "chaos and anarchy" and all these people were "adrift, cut off from one another" (73). This clearly represents the traumatized condition of the Kashmiri people. They do not know where they are going in the sense that they do not know what their goals are or what they can possibly achieve (separate nationhood, autonomy within India, union with Pakistan, or perhaps something else). But who is the woman? the reader may ask. She is the narrator's "own lost self" (75). When the narrator meets this woman, she suddenly feels her "life . . . return." She reflects, "This is she—yes—the one in whose search I have been lost for so long" (74). The woman is evidently the "self," not in the personal and individual sense, but in the collective sense. She is the group identity, what they are all together. In that sense, she is Kashmir or some aspect of Kashmir that would foster identity and direction for these people who are "cut off" and "unaware of their own selves" (73). That is why she can later address all the people, pleading, "Why are you all mourning your individual losses? Why don't you all raise one collective cry?"

To this point, it may appear that the emplotment is making sense of the historical events and perhaps even suggesting possibilities for the future—"mak[ing] one collective cry." But this appearance does not last. Shortly after the woman's admonition, the "gaunt skeleton of an old man" rises "from a grave" (75). Far from a saving sacrifice, the old

man—perhaps recalling the dead nationalist leader, Sheikh Abdullah—merely laments that "crows and vultures feed upon my body" (75). If the old man is indeed linked with Sheikh Abdullah, the crows and vultures would appear to suggest what has happened to his nationalist legacy after his death—its self-interested use by those who, so to speak, feed off its remains.

What occurs next is very much in keeping with the incomprehensible developments that particularly marked the time of this story (written in 1992[8])—prominently including protestors being killed as soldiers and police fired into crowds of demonstrators (see, for example, Peer 118–19 and Jamal 136). Specifically, "a throng of people" runs "blindly, as though chased by armed marauders" (76). Then, just as suddenly as the near riot begins, everything stops. The man is dead once more. All the people are motionless, "two-dimensional bodies that lay plastered on the roads where thousands of vultures had gathered." Clearly, the crowd has been shot down by the army or police, a scenario wretchedly familiar to readers at the time. As Peer notes, referring to a time shortly before the story was written, "Srinagar was a city of massacres" (120). He goes on to explain that "the men who had been killed by the Indian forces . . . were no ordinary dead. They were seen as martyrs" (121). In the story, too, this "throng" has apparently become a group of martyrs. Their martyrdom is suggested by the woman's comment, "Those you imagine to be dead, are alive" (Ahmad 76). But their sacrifice has not revived society. Perhaps even worse, they themselves have not achieved the joy of salvation promised to martyrs. The woman goes on to say, "They are the people who are condemned to live for a thousand years" (76). At the end, the speaker wishes that she too could "lie there in peace" (76). But there is neither revival of society nor peace for the fallen. All are, it seems, "condemned." In this story, then, even despair is disfigured, for there is no peace, even in death.

Given the importance of the sacrificial prototype in Kashmir today, it is unsurprising that a disfigured version of that prototype is such a prominent feature of Kashmiri short fiction. Again, most of these disfigured narratives are utterly despondent about possibilities for understanding and possibilities for action. We may conclude with another strange and affecting sacrificial story, which nonetheless points at least toward some possible comprehension—"The Voice," by Ghulam Rasool

Santosh. Like "The Enemy," this story also combines family separation and reunion with sacrifice, both of course disfigured. The story concerns a man named Karima who had been abandoned as a child and raised by a man who, in turn, abandoned him. This sets us up for two possible family reunion stories—Karima with his birth parents and Karima with his foster father. Then Karima discovers another abandoned child. Here we have a third family reunion possibility. None of the three comes to anything. Indeed, rather than being reunited with his birth parents, this boy is brutally separated from Karima as well—when Karima kills him.

That killing brings us to the sacrificial narrative. In contrast with the usual sacrificial structure, there is no society and no devastation. Karima and his foster son seem to live an almost ideal life. But, just as Ibrahim in the Qur'ān heard the voice of Allāh asking for the death of his son, Karima begins to hear a voice calling on him to kill the boy he has raised from infancy. Eventually, like Ibrahim, he agrees. However, unlike the Qur'ānic story (Qur'ān 37: 104–05), he is not stopped by Allāh, but goes through with the act. After the boy is dead, he cremates him and smears his own body with the ashes. Sitting in meditation, he recalls the ash-covered god of yoga and destruction, Śiva, the primary deity of Kashmiri Hindus.

The story clearly undermines the pretense to salvation that is part of the sacrificial narrative. As such, it may at least suggest that sacrificial killing involves a sort of delusion. This is where some glimmer of understanding may enter. Specifically, the story hints that, by its appeal to a higher principle than human compassion and affection, religion—Muslim or Hindu—can drive us to do things that are not only cruel, but that we ourselves do not even wish to do. We return here to Rushdie's observation, voiced by Pyarelal Kaul: "Man is ruined by the misfortune of possessing a moral sense" (Rushdie, *Shalimar* 91). Though still disfiguring the sacrificial prototype, "The Voice," then, seems to have a positive element in this respect. It suggests a way of understanding some of the violence that has become so commonplace in Kashmir. On the other hand, it is a positive element that hardly suggests any possibility for concrete action. It does not point toward any enabling emplotment that would begin to overcome the traumas of this "postcolonial" colony and its disfigured stories, except perhaps in seeking to reject the sacrifi-

cial narrative—and a range of associated ethical norms—so often enjoined by religions and nations.

In sum, nationalist narratives operate in part by making sense of the past and projecting a desirable and attainable future, thereby motiving pursuit of national or putatively national goals. Trauma produces an emotionally, thus motivationally disabling condition in which it is difficult to make sense out of past events or to pursue or even envision an appealing future. When the trauma is broadly social, this is likely to affect national emplotments, producing at least some disfigured versions in which the national stories are not merely tragic but senseless. Such disfigured narratives seem particularly common in the work of Kashmiris writing in the Kashmiri language. These writers do not have to concern themselves with the practical issue of addressing a foreign (Euro-American, Indian, Pakistani, or other) readership. Their audience shares their own *Kashmiriyat* ("Kashmiriness")—though, whatever it may have been before, that shared *Kashmiriyat* now seems to have become little more than the common experience of purposeless suffering. The one hint of resolution we have glimpsed in the stories suggests the problems with narratives that appeal to "higher" moral principles, norms that supersede human compassion. However, that does not mean a simple appeal to compassion would solve any problems. We have earlier seen how in-group and out-group divisions strongly bias empathy, and thus compassion. The same point can be made about other factors, such as salience—we feel compassion for the suffering we see, not for unknown suffering. (For a range of factors that bias empathy, see Prinz.) For these and other reasons, it is clear that spontaneous compassion can hardly be an adequate solution to the crisis in Kashmir or other social conflicts—though perhaps it is still more of a solution than the moralisms of religion and nation. Indeed, problems with the latter suggest that, in certain respects, the disfiguring of standard narrative genres may be not only a symptom of traumatic despair but a salutary reminder of how at least certain of those genres—particularly the heroic and sacrificial structures—contribute to traumatic conditions initially.

Afterword

Ending the Trauma: What Can Be Done?

The Kashmiri stories considered in chapter 6 are disfigured for two reasons. One concerns the past; the other concerns the future. First and fundamentally, the authors' distortion of narrative prototypes results from their sense that the events of recent Kashmiri history are incomprehensible. Narrative structures that we would ordinarily use to make sense of those events simply do not apply. At the same time, part of the reason such structures do not apply is that they extend from the past into the future. They imply resolution, even if it is a tragic resolution. However, these authors for the most part cannot envision anything other than an unprogressing repetition of past traumas.

The first purpose of the chapters in this book was to make some sense of the crisis in Kashmir and particularly of the various imaginations linked with that crisis, either as ideological sources or—as in the case of secondary ideology and disfigured narratives—as outcomes. This has involved reference to identity categorization and its variables, along with group dynamics; the central emotions evoked by colonial relations (such as humiliation and rage), as well as such associated occurrences as trauma; the nature of ideology and problematics; and above all, the forms of emplotment that both manifest and organize the conditions of the crisis and their imaginations.

Initially, I intended to stop there, treating the past, not the future. But, of course, in considering a current conflict such as that in Kashmir, one would also like to be able to contribute in some degree to resolving the problems or at least reducing the terrible human suffering. Indeed, I suspect that few readers would be satisfied with a book on Kashmir that had nothing to say on that topic—especially one that stopped so abruptly with unresolved traumas found in Kashmiri-language short

fiction. I have therefore added the following recommendations, based on the cognitive cultural analyses of the preceding pages—prominently the treatment of the conditions that foster antagonistic identity oppositions.

The ideal situation would, of course, be to have no Indian troops and no militants in Kashmir. However, the likelihood of the Indian government withdrawing troops seems to be about zero. Moreover, given the development of the insurgency and the presence of armed militias, it seems that simply withdrawing troops would promote a situation of lawlessness. (I take it that the chance of the insurgents simply withdrawing or giving up their arms is, so to speak, less than zero.) One might argue that even lawlessness would be better than the rule of a brutal law. But the actions of various militias in Kashmir (e.g., Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed) are almost certain to involve serious human rights violations even under the most humane and popular government. In any case, the most realistic option is to try to improve the situation while withdrawing troops slowly. (In saying this, I should note that I remain open to arguments that simply withdrawing troops is the best option.) The following recommendations derive from that presumption.[1]

These recommendations also focus on Kashmir itself and the conditions in the state. But it is clear that conditions there do not occur in a vacuum; a major contributing factor is the existence of communal conflict in the rest of India. The reduction of anti-Muslim communalism in India would have salutary effects in Kashmir. Indeed, the reduction of anti-Muslim violence elsewhere in the world would be likely to have effects in India, with beneficial consequences for Kashmir. There are also policy issues concerning the relations between India and Pakistan (on Pakistan's interest in sustaining conflict in Indian Kashmir, see Tankel 180–81), as well as U.S. relations with both countries, and developments in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Despite the importance of these regional and global factors (which in effect make the well-being of Kashmir rest in part on the broader well-being of the larger world), it seemed most useful at the present moment to focus these recommendations more narrowly.

Recommendation 1. Bring the occupation of Kashmir into line with international law. Thus, put an end to all internationally outlawed military

activities, such as torture. This is, of course, a fundamental obligation of political activity. There are, however, also prudential reasons. As Werner Stritzke and Stephan Lewandowsky point out, "state-sponsored torture arguably serves as a powerful recruiting tool for terrorist groups . . . and ultimately undermines counterterrorism efforts" (2). The same point holds for killing civilians. Speaking of Afghanistan, one U.S. military source estimated that "every civilian killed creates an additional twenty insurgents" (Dreyfuss 26).

Recommendation 2. Institute procedures that assure routinely (not only occasionally) free and fair elections. Such procedures are more likely when the elections are judged by international observers and have as much community involvement of the electorate in the electoral process as possible. That involvement would include, for example, community observers at polling places as well as public discussion of the polling operation, dates, and so forth. Something along these lines is, of course, an obligation, but it also begins to foster cooperation across identity categories (see recommendation 16). Admittedly, the security situation has often made this difficult. The point is that, if elections are disrupted, it should not be the fault of the government.

Recommendation 3. Treat criminal acts (e.g., terrorism) as criminal acts rather than as acts of war (even while acknowledging that the motives for such acts may relate to legitimate political concerns). This applies both to the criminal acts of government employees (e.g., soldiers) and those of militants.[2]

Recommendation 4. Issue an official, governmental self-criticism, admitting and condemning the policies that fostered atrocities while also systematically punishing those crimes that went beyond national law and policy, and at the very least removing from the government and military those individuals who violated international law, even if they conformed to national law and policy.[3]

Recommendation 5. Stop humiliating people. End all practices that serve to promote shame—even for convicted terrorists. This will reduce the crucial humiliation/rage sequence, which is so important in the emotional force of identity category oppositions and victim seeking. Additionally, putting an end to humiliation may enhance openness to intergroup reconciliation.[4]

Recommendation 6. Institute reconciliation procedures to deal with the shame and consequent rage produced over the preceding twenty-five years. This might include something along the lines of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) that would hear the testimonies of those who have been abused in this period. As Robert Kraft points out, "Clinical psychologists who work with survivors of trauma promote the therapeutic value of talking about the trauma, allowing the victimized to examine their emotions in detail and to regain control of their own individual narratives" (366). On the other hand, this is not a simple matter. Thus, Kraft also notes, "Lengthy testimony can revive dormant memories of horror, which can remain active long after the testimony ends and create new emotional disturbance" (365), in effect retraumatizing the speaker.

Since trauma is inseparable from a sense of helplessness (cf. Kraft 355 on the impossibility of flight from traumatic events), it seems likely that beneficial outcomes are more likely to arise in contexts where the speaker feels that his or her testimony is not simply emotional expression. The testimony should instead constitute a positive response to the traumatic situation, a concrete way of taking action to alter the conditions that provoked the trauma or that sustain its effects. The cases of failed "catharsis" (365) treated by Kraft—archival Holocaust testimonies delivered to two interviewers for a video recording—seem to be prime instances of cases where there are no significant ameliorative consequences. In contrast, more positive results might occur in other settings mentioned by Kraft, such as "instructional programs for teaching young people" (366).

It is important to stress that, as the preceding example indicates, a speaker's sense of empowerment need not come from procedures aimed at retribution—either formal punishment or, worse still, some sort of putatively compensatory shaming of others. Rather, a feeling of overcoming helplessness may be fostered by positive and beneficent actions, such as teaching. In this respect, it seems that occasions for such testimony should go well beyond the TRC model. Indeed, perhaps the TRC model should not even have a particularly prominent place. In any case, not everyone would be comfortable giving testimony in the same contexts. Thus, a variety of outlets for personal testimony would probably

prove most valuable—some perhaps modeled on the TRC, and others related to work, education, or other communities.

Of course, it would be important that such testimonials be both honest—not stage-managed by political leaders—and at the same time not conducive to the exacerbation of identity conflicts. Testimony will only reduce the affectivity of divisive identity categories if the witnesses can be encouraged to speak as specifically as possible about the incidents rather than blaming broad groups (e.g., "Indians," "Hindus," or "Muslims"). Moreover, for the same reasons, in any given case, it would be valuable to have a range of participants who represented different sorts of trauma perpetrated in the name of different identity groups (e.g., there should be some sense of traumatization by militants even if the majority of testimonies concern Indian government atrocities, or a sense of suffering experienced by Muslims even when a particular testimonial occasion is focused primarily on the Hindu exile).

Recommendation 7. Make adequate and affordable medical care available to those who have been harmed by the fighting. As part of this, make psychiatric care available to those who have suffered traumatically due to the conflict, whether through torture, injury, loss of loved ones, or other causes.[5]

Recommendation 8. More generally, in keeping with the Naya Kashmir program, maintain a strong social safety net with programs to provide economic security for the poor, thereby reducing the economic benefits of militarization (e.g., having a child with a position in a militant organization). These programs need to be formulated specifically for the needs of Kashmiris and administered in such a way as to avoid the notorious corruption of the state government. The India Human Development Survey (from the University of Maryland) indicates that, relative to other states in India, Jammu and Kashmir is doing well on food distribution (at least in terms of apparent coverage), but poorly on maternal and child benefits and old age and widow pensions (see Desai et al. 206), the last being tragically ironic in the context of extensive widowhood due to decades of violence. In connection with this, it is important to evaluate even well-funded programs critically. A World Bank report indicates that the success of programs in Jammu and Kashmir is not necessarily proportionate to the amount spent (see Besley, Burgess, and Rasul 80). (In fairness to India, it should be noted that,

according to the World Bank's statistics, Jammu and Kashmir state spends more than other states of India [as a percentage of gross domestic product] on most social safety net programs—a point in keeping with the anomalous character of Indian colonialism there. See Besley, Burgess, and Rasul 70.)

Recommendation 9. In part as a complementary pursuit to recommendation 8, vigorously pursue gender equality, first in terms of basic health and well-being. Jessica Stern points out that "countries with a high ratio of males to females . . . are significantly more prone to violence" (284). The 2011 Census of India shows that Jammu and Kashmir State has a ratio of 883 females to 1,000 males—a decline since the beginning of the insurgency, despite the numbers of young men killed over those decades.[6] (For comparison, India as a whole has 940 females for 1,000 males and the United States has 1,025 females for 1,000 males [Chandramouli 79]. Clearly the same gender equality policies should be pursued elsewhere in India as well.) Such a disproportion is presumably due to a higher mortality rate for girls than boys. Ideally, such equality would address ideological issues as well. Often the rage-provoking humiliation suffered by young men involves a sense of gender inadequacy ("wounded masculinity"; see Stern 286). The best response to this is not, I believe, making men feel more manly, but instead working to destigmatize "feminine" traits so that a man's association with femininity is not humiliating and the default response to humiliation of other sorts is not an assertion of hypermasculinity.

Recommendation 10. Train Indian troops to speak Kashmiri and to address local people in Kashmiri; similarly, educate troops in Kashmiri customs, which they should then respect. This will reduce the saliency of Indian/Kashmiri and Hindu/Muslim identity categories in Kashmir.

Recommendation 11. Actively recruit Muslims into the security forces to disalign the military/civilian division and the non-Muslim/Muslim division.

Recommendation 12. Rehabilitate exiled Kashmiri Hindus, with both compensated housing and employment opportunities.

Recommendation 13. At the same time, provide Kashmiri Muslims with benefits parallel to those provided to Kashmiri Hindus (e.g., if Kashmiri Hindus are assured payment of government salaries, then

Kashmiri Muslims should be given the same guarantees). In addition to being fair, this should reduce the functionality of divisive identity categories.

Recommendation 14. Improve the amnesty program for former militants in order to facilitate their transition to civilian life. This includes streamlining immigration procedures for spouses and children who are currently citizens of Pakistan or other nations (see Ganai; on some other problems faced by former militants, broadly addressed by recommendations 7, 8, and 15, see Altaf). This too will reduce the functionality of divisive categories.

Recommendation 15. Link amnesties with strict measures for prevention of future violations of law and with prosecution (through due process) of postamnesty violations. Given the extent of criminality on both sides, amnesties are clearly necessary and will undoubtedly have to be extended to some Indian military personnel also. However, without a strict legal distinction between pre- and postamnesty violations, one risks producing "a climate of assured impunity" in which violence is likely to continue or increase (as in the case of El Salvador; see Godoy).

Recommendation 16. Develop employment opportunities in Kashmir, both for returning Kashmiris (whether refugees or amnestied militants) and for those who have remained in the state. This will respond to what 94–98 percent of Kashmiris see as a key problem in Kashmir today (Bradnock 6). It will also reduce some of the economic motivations of the insurgency.[7]

Recommendation 17. Create cooperative projects toward concrete goals shared by Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Empirical research on prejudice indicates that intergroup bias may be reduced by cooperative activity in pursuit of shared goals (see Duckitt 98, 252, 256; see also Varshney, "Ethnic" and "Understanding"). These cooperative projects could range from physical labor to intellectual programs; they could involve ordinary people and military personnel. For example, having soldiers cooperate with civilians in rebuilding damaged homes would be intrinsically beneficial and would foster cross-identity cooperation. From the government's point of view, this should have the advantage of reducing antagonistic identity oppositions from Kashmiris to soldiers. From a human rights point of view, this should have the advantage of reducing antagonistic identity oppositions from soldiers to Kashmiris.

This would, of course, have to be genuine cooperation—not, for example, the military ordering the civilians. Most important, a range of Kashmiri civilians would have to be incorporated into the authority structure so that it was not a matter of Indian government representatives dictating a particular sort of cooperation. Indeed, the authority role of Indian government employees should be minimized, with the direction of the projects taken over by representatives from relevant Kashmiri organizations.[8] In addition, the structure should be such that it allows "the development of friendships through meaningful and repeated contact"—one of the features that characterize more successful programs (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 905).

Recommendation 18. Include a wide range of ordinary Kashmiris in discussions of how to reduce violence in the state. The discussions should not be primarily a matter of the two colonial states (India and Pakistan). They should include trade unions, village representatives, women's groups (both secular and religious), and other associations in order to provide as diverse a set of discussants as possible. This should help reduce the opposability of identity categories and foster cooperation across identity groups.

Recommendation 19. As far as possible, do not organize discussions regarding peace, elections, or other issues according to the usual procedure where each individual makes the strongest case for the perspective of his or her group. Research reported by Emily Pronin, Carolyn Puccio, and Lee Ross indicates that such an approach tends to foster polarization and entrenchment. Polarization is particularly problematic, since at least some sorts of out-group antagonism "are triggered by *perceptions* or *beliefs* in profound value differences" (Green and Staerklé 868). The most productive technique is to have participants "express the best arguments they saw on the 'other side' " (Pronin et al. 653). A serious working group should be willing to take up at least some form of such a "politics of Otherness" (as we might call it, in opposition to identity politics).

Recommendation 20. Encourage as accurate and complex a reporting of events in Kashmir as possible, with as full humanization of all parties involved as possible, and as full acknowledgment of the chain of prior causes as possible (rather than treating atrocities as if they were simply initiated without precedent by the enemy). "Humanization"

does not mean "sanctification," and should include acknowledgment of crimes. This will reduce the ease with which events may be emplotted in heroic or sacrificial narratives. This recommendation is obviously aimed primarily at journalists. However, it also bears on individuals relaying information interpersonally or through social media. Indeed, in some respects, individual connections may be more consequential than major news outlets. (On the importance of communications from "friends and relatives," see Valentino and Nardis 560; for a fuller discussion of the effects of personal networks in political views and attitudes, see Huckfeldt et al.).

Recommendation 21. In keeping with key provisions of *Naya Kashmir*, continue and extend educational initiatives to implement universal and genuinely free education, including food, transportation, and school supplies, with the needed quantity and quality of teachers, as well as adequate materials and housing for the schools.[9] Stern reports one militant's view that "'free secular education for all' leading to an 'increase in the literacy rate' is the gravest threat to the survival of the jihadi groups in Pakistan" (230). Presumably, the situation in India is not entirely different—particularly in Kashmir, where the literacy rate is relatively low. The Directorate of School Education, Kashmir, reports that "In the National Educational Scenario, J&K [Jammu and Kashmir] State is subsumed as educationally backward in reference to the established indices namely literacy rate, teacher pupil ratio, dropout rate and the absorption pattern of the educated persons."[10] Ideally, the initiatives would be expanded beyond primary and middle school.

Recommendation 22. Initiate community-based arts and literature courses in which Kashmiris can produce art and literature and study Kashmiri and other South Asian works from a range of groups.[11] Painting or writing poetry could complement the testimonials of people who have suffered in the course of the past quarter century. At the same time, reading the works of Muslims and Hindus, women and men, Sunnis and Shīʿahs, and writers working in different languages (English, Hindi, Kashmiri, and Urdu) should foster perspective taking with respect to a range of out-groups. For example, "identifying one's own childhood experiences with the experiences of a diverse group of others"—as can obviously occur through literature—experimentally reduced "outgroup hostility" (Pyszczynski et al. 173). It may seem that

imaginative engagement with out-groups would be ineffective. However, research indicates that "simply imagining a conversation with an out-group member resulted in participants having significantly lower levels of prejudice than those who had not imagined such contact, and further, participants viewed the out-group as more variable in the imagined contact situation" (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 908; this suggests that the reading of literature may be supplemented by specific sorts of responsive exercises). This may be particularly valuable when the exemplar of the social group in question is "counterstereotypical." Even "asking participants to visualize a counterstereotypical exemplar" of an out-group "decreased bias in both the short term and over longer periods of time" (Al Ramiah and Hewstone 910). This is part of the general tendency for "a reduction in prejudice" to occur in relation to "a sense of shared or common humanity" (Pyszczynski et al. 172). This perspective-taking would perhaps be most valuable for soldiers.[12]

Recommendation 23. (The following is a recommendation to religious groups.) Insofar as it is compatible with articles of faith, stress compassionate elements within important religious texts. This recommendation follows empirical research showing that a religiously "authoritative source" with "compassionate content" produces "decreased support for violence" among believers (Pyszczynski et al. 171). For example, rather than focusing on militant works, such as the *Bhagavad Gītā,* Hindus might wish to stress texts such as Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra*, with its emphasis on *ahiṃsā* (nonviolence, or not causing harm).

Recommendation 24. (The following is a recommendation for secular educators.) Rather than cultivating faith in a particular view, seek to foster a critical attitude toward a range of views—particularly dominant views. As Lewandowsky and colleagues report (182), there is a close relation between people's support for violent policies (such as preemptive war) and their beliefs about facts (e.g., whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction) and motives (e.g., about why the government of President George W. Bush invaded Iraq). The key point here is that support for violent policies may be bound up with misinformation (such as that about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction). This occurs even when the relevant claims are shown to be false. A "crucial variable that determines the efficacy of corrections," which is to say the degree to which people are able to discount claims shown to be false, is "suspicion

or skepticism." If people "are not suspicious, the original misinformation persists" (180). In short, a critical attitude is profoundly important for limiting the effects of propaganda. Of course, the key point here is that skepticism needs to be trained on in-group leaders and claims. Everyone already distrusts out-group leaders and claims. Cultivating skepticism in their regard is not merely unnecessary but also likely to exacerbate biases.

Recommendation 25. Finally, present the people with a plebiscite in which they may choose full integration with India, relative autonomy under India,[13] or independence.[14] This would presuppose that the state is divided in such a way as to allow some part of the current state to become independent (e.g., the Kashmir Valley) without other areas (e.g., sections of Ladakh or Jammu) being forced to join that independent state. It should also involve some sort of provision for minority rights in any independent successor state. In order not to infringe on the sovereignty of such a state, the provisions might be crafted simply to conform to international standards, with perhaps some temporary provisions for a transition period (e.g., regarding security for minorities or compensation for lost or destroyed property). Obviously, these provisions would have to govern all parts of the state, whether independent, partially autonomous, or fully integrated into India. I do not mention union with Pakistan here, as that would be an option available to a free state. If independent, Kashmir could negotiate with Pakistan as a sovereign state; it is not the business of India to negotiate with Pakistan for Kashmir.[15] Moreover, polls suggest almost no support for this option in Indian Kashmir (Bradnock 15).[16]

Notes

Introduction

1. Currently, Kashmir is divided into a Pakistan-administered region and an India-administered region. Discussions of the Kashmir issue almost entirely ignore Pakistani Kashmir. Unfortunately, the present study will continue that trend. There are strong nationalist feelings in Pakistani Kashmir, with a 2009 poll revealing that 44 percent of Pakistani Kashmiris support independence; though that is below the 50 percent who favor union with Pakistan, it is not greatly so (see Bradnock 15, 17). However, conditions in Pakistani Kashmir have not given rise to a militant movement, international danger, or—it seems—a significant tradition of popular or elite narrative (though there has been some limited activism; see Puri 96–99).
2. In contrast, Pakistan does appear to have exploited Pakistani Kashmir, at least to some degree. Specifically, it has drawn electricity from its Kashmir dam to supply some 65 percent of the country's electricity (Behera 189). At the same time, Pakistan has ignored the needs of Kashmiris themselves and has been even less democratic in Pakistani Kashmir than India has been in Indian Kashmir (see Behera 184–89). In connection with this, it is important to note that Pakistan has behaved as a prototypical colonial power in Kashmir in other ways, also. For example, it has engaged in oppression. A 2006 Human Rights Watch report ("*With Friends*") states that "though 'Azad' means 'free,' the residents of Azad Kashmir are anything but. Azad Kashmir is a land of strict curbs on political pluralism, freedom of expression, and freedom of association; a muzzled press; banned books; arbitrary arrest and detention and torture at the hands of the Pakistani military and the police; and discrimination against refugees from Jammu and Kashmir state" (6–7; see also Puri's chapter, "How Azad Is Azad Kashmir?," 33–55).
3. On the other hand, these benefits have been reduced by the corruption of the ruling elite in Kashmir. On corruption in Kashmiri government, see Habibullah 46–49.

4. Though largely ignored for some years, the centrality of emotion to political psychology has been increasingly recognized in recent decades; see, for example, Brader and Marcus.
5. There is a second problem with many discussions of narrative and nationalism in general and narrative and Kashmir in particular: overstatement. For example, Zutshi claims that nationalist narratives are "primarily responsible" for the "intractability" of the problem. The intractability results from many factors, including systemic options, broad principles of group dynamics, the current structure of the nation/state system (globally and in the region), and other nonnarrative factors. From the perspective of the present study, emotional states and causal cognition—including emplotment—are, of course, crucial. Moreover, the emotions are to some extent bound up with the emplotments. Nonetheless, emotions are also a function of more direct experiences as well as causal features of the world that are not simply emplotments (actual killings, torture with its physical and emotional residues, experiences of curfew, and so on). Put simply, the rage and despair of someone who has been tortured is not simply the result of nationalist narratives or even the specific emplotment of the torture.
6. On the difference between the prototype for a pet dog in the context of a farm and in the context of a city apartment, see Kahneman and Miller 140.
7. Writers in political psychology have recognized some of these variables. For example, Fisher, Kelman, and Nan note that "the effects of social categorization . . . appear to increase as the distinguishing characteristics of groups—for example, in language, manner of dress, or skin color—are clearer and more marked" (496), which is to say more salient. Huddy more directly refers to the importance of "the situational salience of a group identity" (740). The particular form of affectivity linked with fear is, of course, widely recognized—as in "realistic group conflict theory," according to which "threat causes awareness of in-group identity" (Fisher, Kelman, and Nan 499). Anger too has been connected with "strengthened group identity" (Huddy 756).
8. An unusual and interesting case may be found in Vijay Anand's 1963 film *Tere Ghar ke Samne* (In Front of Your House), where two lovers are separated because their families, though building neighboring houses on a divided plot of land, are in effect at war. As the story develops, one begins to sense an India-Pakistan allegory in the film's thematic insistence on the importance of reconciling with one's neighbors, especially when the recent Sino-Indian War is alluded to. Ultimately, the plan for

the families' reconciliation is hatched by a soldier who has come home after being stationed in Kashmir. This plot is somewhat unusual—it treats international, rather than subnational, division—but the basic story structure is the same.

9. On the difference between symmetry and asymmetry in relation to intractable conflicts, see Bar-Tal and Halperin 935.
10. On some complexities of the topic, see the subsequent discussion, including Lankford's response, in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 37.4 (2014): 351–93.
11. The following chapters will repeatedly make use of brain research. However, it is important to note that, like all other types of evidence, neurological evidence is highly interpretive and should be evaluated in relation to other forms of research. In short, as Slaby, Haueis, and Choudhury argue, it is important that "neuropolitical" analyses be tempered and critical.
12. Another possible illustration of disgust may be found in a letter reported to have been published in The Daily Alsafa News for January 20, 1991, where a self-described "non-communal Muslim" from Srinagar characterizes Kashmiri Hindus as a "cancer" (2; see the June 2006 issue of Kashmir Sentinal, available at http://panunkashmir.org/kashmirsentinel/pdf/2006/june2006.pdf).
13. See Habibullah 73, Peer 22, and Jamal 172–73. For a different view of the situation, see Essa, "Kashmiri Pandits." For a discussion of Muslim attitudes toward the Hindu exodus and an assessment of different points of view on that exodus, see Essa's interview with Mridu Rai ("Kashmir").
14. This is not a deterministic law of nature, however. In some cases, an author's attitude may even be the reverse of what one would expect from identity categorization. For example, Sanjay Kak's name indicates that he is of Kashmiri Hindu background. Nonetheless, his film *Jashn-e-Azadi: How We Celebrate Freedom* is an almost entirely uncritical celebration of the militancy. It largely ignores killings by the militants, in effect treats the influx of foreign jihādis as a simple act of solidarity and resistance, blames the Indian government for the exodus of Hindus from Kashmir, and on the whole takes a more uncritical stance toward the militancy and Pakistan (and more thoroughly condemns all aspects of the Indian presence, stretching back to 1947) than the work of any Muslim writer I am familiar with. It is admirable that Kak has sought to overcome in-group bias in his film. However, he seems to have substituted an extreme form of out-group bias, ultimately making his film as much a work of propaganda as, say, *Roja*. One might partially qualify this

criticism by understanding Kak's film as "counterpropaganda" aimed at the mainstream misrepresentation of the situation in Kashmir. In addition, in presenting only Indian atrocities, it is closer to the truth than works that present only militant atrocities, since evidence indicates that the former are significantly more extensive than the latter. Nonetheless, a viewer leaving this film with little other knowledge of Kashmir will have a grossly distorted image of the situation and its history.

15. Needless to say, India is not the only source of propaganda regarding Kashmir. Tankel notes that "all Pakistanis are exposed from a young age to intense propaganda about Kashmir" (84), a point not without consequences for the militancy in Indian Kashmir.
16. Ironically, Indian films that draw on the heroic genre may have inspired not only Indian nationalism but anti-Indian, Islamist militancy. Swami refers to one informant who "pointed to the role of Indian popular film in promoting recruitment to the jihad" through its stress on "heroism" (180, citing Rana 95). This is unsurprising, since the fundamental organization of heroic narratives is one of in- versus out-groups, and these can be shifted readily from one particularization (e.g., Indian versus Pakistani) to another (e.g., Muslim versus Hindu).
17. There are about five and a half million Kashmiri speakers (see Government of India), and almost 70 percent are literate (up from 55 percent a decade ago; see "Jammu and Kashmir"), though literacy here does not necessarily mean literacy in Kashmiri.

1. Understanding Kashmir

1. A small part of the problem here is with the term "postcolonial." For discussions of this term, see, for example, McClintock; and Shohat.
2. For a perhaps related point, see Stadtler's discussion of how *Shalimar* "engages with the repressions and exclusions that the postcolonial state imposes on its periphery" (191).
3. For some incidents of communal violence in Kashmir from before the insurgency see, for example, Jamal 38, 74, and 116; and Swami 158.
4. This assessment is consistent with the experience I had in Kashmir in July 1988 as the militancy was beginning. My relatives were consistently afraid to wear clothing that was identifiably Hindu when they went out in public. When they did, they were subject to clear hostility from some members of the majority community—not by any means the majority of that community, but enough to be alienating. Again, this cuts both ways. For example, I have heard relatives make derogatory generalizations about Muslims. In short, while I did see some Hindu-Muslim friendship

at the time, Kashmiriyat was not greatly in evidence, even among the Hindus and Muslims who were not overtly hostile to one another.

5. The issue of controlling territories and indeed of simply defining and organizing political domains is obviously important in the novel. For a discussion of this topic, see Tygstrup.
6. Opinions also differ on the precise sequence of events. See, for example, Lamb's books, and the responses in Joshi and Jha.
7. Some critics have taken the view that *Shalimar* has significant allegorical components (see, for example, Morton). Though there are certainly points where Rushdie uses allegorical techniques in this novel, it does not appear to be pervasively allegorical in the manner of, say, *Midnight's Children*.
8. For more recent information on human rights in Kashmir, access the Amnesty International website—http://www.amnesty.org/en/library>—and search for "Kashmir."
9. Talbot and Singh are referring to the years 1990–95. Official Indian government figures for 1990–2011 (see Bose, *Transforming*, on "official statistics") indicate a three-to-four ratio of militant to government killings (rather than a two-to-four ratio). However, as Bose points out, "the number [of civilians] killed by militants is probably substantially inflated and the number killed by security forces substantially deflated."
10. Rushdie also passes over the doctrinal differences between Lashkar and the Taliban (see Tankel 108–9 on the attitude of Lashkar toward the Taliban). However, the differences are in many ways inconsequential outside of militant Islamic fundamentalism.
11. Of course, the Islamist groups often intensified the conflict through sometimes "vicious anti-Hinduism" (Tankel 37) and the view of some that "Hindus are the worst of the polytheists and that the Prophet Muhammad singled out India as a special target for jihad" (Tankel 41).
12. Victim seeking—the attempt to find targets of aggression—is likely to increase in conditions of "uncontrollable traumatic stimuli." This is due to the fact that "aggressive encounters" during traumatic experiences "can dramatically attenuate the stress" produced by those experiences (Başoğlu and Mineka 192).
13. I take Rushdie's implicit point to be insightful about human nature. For an alternative view, see Eaglestone 21.
14. This is not the same thing as saying that Rushdie is himself anticolonial. An author's self-conscious political views need not be the same as the sympathies he or she develops in the course of a literary work. When writing and revising, authors simulate characters, situations, actions, and events. They then judge whether or not a passage or sequence feels right in

relation to the simulated propensities of the characters' minds, the conditions in which they find themselves, and so forth. This is a complex process that is often only partially congruent with the author's self-conscious moral or political judgments as to who should or should not be supported in real life. (The general point has been made by many authors; see, for example, Lukács 40. On its relation to principles of human cognition and literary creation, see Hogan, *Narrative* ch. 3.) For this reason, the present analysis takes Rushdie's own explicit, public political statements to be largely irrelevant. There is also the problem that explicit, public political statements are made for all sorts of reasons; they need not accurately reflect even the self-conscious views of the author. For a discussion of the novel that takes Rushdie's self-conscious politics into account, see Morton.

15. In saying this, I partially echo the title of Kung's essay.
16. Expressing a similar idea, Zutshi contends that the "anachronistic" assumption of Kashmiriyat has distorted historiography, resulting in "significant lacunae" (4).
17. The relation of Boonyi to Sītā, and the novel's commentary on the *Rāmāyaṇa*, suggest feminist concerns that could be productively related to issues raised by Chattopadhyay. The broad humanity of the novel is not confined to communal divisions but bears also on gender and sexuality.
18. As the preceding points suggest, the tradition of the Bhand Pather sets it against both Indian colonialism and revolutionary communalism. For example, as to the latter, Swami reports, "Jihadist groups had deemed their satirical, sometimes bawdy, performances un-Islamic" (206). He cites one terrible case, "the 1993 murder of Shamima Parveen, the first woman to perform in the traditional Kashmiri satirical dance-drama form, the Bhaand Paather. Parveen was sexually abused and tortured before being shot for her refusal to abandon her theatrical work on television" (167).

2. Dominant Ideologies and Their Limits

1. There is a complication here. In terms of practical associations, diverse conflicts often reduce to bipolar conflicts, at least for certain periods of time and in certain conditions. This is a result of the dynamic principles of the system (see Ball ch. 12). It may be difficult to maintain the stability of a system with many partially conflicting groups. Even slight changes in conditions may result in the absorption of smaller groups into larger ones. However, this pragmatic development does not entail other sorts of confluence. The ideas and attitudes of the participants remain diverse,

and that diversity may have consequences when conditions change (e.g., if the conflict results in defeat of the other side). As Ball points out, citing a particular historical example, "Cromwell's army represented a complex mixture of different interests, but it disintegrated into fighting factions only after the common enemy, the Royalists, no longer threatened it" (284). Indeed, one peculiarity of the Kashmir situation is that rebel groups have to a surprising extent resisted the dualizing tendency of social systems. This may be due to the involvement of various non-Kashmiri groups that are part of other social and political systems.

2. In keeping with this, some researchers have argued that, "the primary targets of . . . aggressive discrimination are . . . more likely to be out-group males than out-group females" (Sidanius and Kurzban 224; for the experimental research supporting this view, see 224–27).
3. The simplification that comes with dominant ideology is highly consequential. Writers in political psychology enumerate some properties of such simplification—"narrowed information search, discounting of information inconsistent with preexisting views, encoding information into fewer and starker categories, holding views with certainty, and reliance on a single schema and action-script when determining responses to stimuli" (Dyson and 't Hart 409). In contrast, the recognition of "complexity increases the chances of a crisis being resolved through negotiation rather than violence" (410).
4. Research by Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson indicates that test subjects are likely to have decreased compassion for unknown people—specifically, they are likely to subject those people to more painful punishments in experimental settings—when they merely overhear someone characterize those people as animals. The systematic dehumanization of an out-group, its elaborated characterization in subhuman terms (as represented in *L.O.C.*), is only likely to have more serious effects. The point holds not only for the fictional soldiers in the film and the real soldiers on which they are partially modeled (insofar as they too employed or were the audience for such dehumanizing rhetoric); it applies also to the film's real audience members who are hearing these characterizations.
5. The influential Indian producer, G. P. Sippy, once commented that Indian films regularly bring in Rāma and Rāvaṇa, weaving the story around them (see Derné 51).
6. Almost two decades after *Roja*, Ratnam made *Raavan*, a much more explicit revision of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and one that is in many ways the polar opposite of *Roja*. It constitutes, to my mind, a devastating critique of the

standard view of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and of the epic's deployment in the service of state militarism. Indeed, *Raavan* critically supports the revolutionary practices of oppressed minorities. In this film, Ratnam is not only a fine artist but a powerful and progressive political analyst. (Leaving aside the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the political attitudes of a number of Ratnam's films are very different from those of *Roja*.)

7. It is, however, worth noting that "of the more than 100 million war deaths in the 20th century, something less than 2 percent came at the hands of Muslim-majority nations" (Rendall and McCloskey 8). Moreover, "While the European Union's population is 4.5 percent Muslim . . . 'less than 1 percent of terrorist acts in the continent were committed by people from that community' from 2007 to 2009" (9, citing the University of Michigan's Juan Cole). Thus, the characterization of Islam as peaceful is perhaps not entirely mistaken, at least relative to other religions.
8. For a psychoanalytic interpretation of the film that claims the ending involves a suppressed "realization" of "impossibility," see Kabir, *Territory* 48.
9. The idea recurs in Indian national propaganda, including other films about Kashmir, sometimes in more overt forms. For example, in Tinu Verma's 2002 film *Maa Tujhhe Salaam* (possible translations include "A Salute to Thee, Mother"), one officer explains that he is canceling his leave because he must give up seeing one mother to serve his other mother (the nation). In this case, the transfer from family to nation is particularly important for the film's ideological function since the officer in question is Muslim. Later, another Muslim explains that it his "mother's milk" (*mām̐ka dūdh*) that compels him to fight for the nation. The film culminates in the title song, which hails "Mother," identified as "Bhārat Mām̐" (Mother India).
10. Kazi reports 500,000–700,000 soldiers were in Kashmir in 2004 alone (97). Given turnover, this indicates that 0.01 percent—89 out of 890,000—would be a considerable overestimate for the entire period.

3. Breaching the Ideological Boundaries

1. On the location of the action in Visconti's film, see Caldiron and Hochkofler 59–60.
2. See the website of the handicrafts section of the Jammu and Kashmir state government on the importance and nature of Kashmir carpets, http://jkhandicraftscorporation.nic.in/carpet.htm.
3. After initially interpreting the film as an indirect commentary on Kashmir, I discovered that Vidhu Vinod Chopra, the director and

coauthor of the story and screenplay, was raised in Kashmir and that after making *1942: A Love Story*, he made *Mission Kashmir*. This seems to confirm the bearing of *1942* on Kashmir, at least making the general connection less conjectural.

4. The fourth logical possibility is that the Kashmiri militants have betrayed an Indian national revolution that was already problematic. This seems less plausible than the other possibilities. If one is going to speak of betrayal at all, the original revolutionary movement should have been admirable enough to merit loyalty.
5. The profile of ambiguity is the set of plausible interpretations of a text along with their rough degrees of likelihood. A work is usually characterized neither by a single plausible interpretation nor by a limitless range of equally likely alternatives. Texts generally manifest a more limited range of plausible interpretations with different kinds and different degrees of textual and contextual support. (On the idea of a profile of ambiguity, see Hogan, *Narrative Discourse* 13–14.)
6. This association derives from Gandhi's use of the term "swaraj" in such works as *Hind Swaraj*; see Parel.
7. On the origin of the quotation, see Quote Investigator, "An Eye for an Eye Will Make the Whole World Blind," http://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/12/27/eye-for-eye-blind/.

4. Kashmiri Alternatives

1. In keeping with the orientation of the book as a whole, the concern of the present chapter is with the ideological implications of the novel, what it is likely to convey to readers about the political and military situation in Kashmir. For this reason, the analysis focuses almost entirely on aspects of representation and emplotment. Such a focus necessarily leaves aside many key features of graphic fiction in general and of *Kashmir Pending* in particular. Readers interested in a discussion of the visual qualities of the work may wish to consult Desai, who presents a nuanced and sensitive treatment of the novel while also examining some of its ideological weaknesses in ways that converge with the present analysis. Indeed, even readers not interested in visual artistry may wish to read Desai's valuable essay, which is complementary to the present study.
2. On the historical effect of *Maus* in forming a particular readership for graphic fiction, see Gordon and Loman. The target audience for graphic novels has been widely discussed in the critical literature; see, for example, Baetens and Frey 10, 55. Several readers of drafts of this chapter have also mentioned Joe Sacco's *Palestine*. The connection makes sense.

However, Desai makes a good case that the politics and rhetorical effectiveness of *Palestine* contrast strikingly with those of *Kashmir Pending*.

3. One referee for the earlier, article version of this chapter expressed concern that I have criticized readers of *Kashmir Pending*. I should therefore clarify that I am not criticizing real readers. I am, rather, setting out to analyze the narrational structure of the work. In connection with this, it is important to stress that neither the rhetorical implied audience nor the actual implied audience is the same as the real reader. Here, as in other works, real readers may or may not conform to the tacit simulations of the authors, their (usually unself-conscious) projections of a reader.
4. See Hogan, *Culture* ch. 4 and Nandy, *Intimate* 11–18; for a clear overview of some more general treatments of cognitive modeling, see Johnson-Laird, one of the major figures in cognitive modeling theory.
5. Indeed, some child militants are not even adolescents. For example, Stern points out that the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba has "Eight-year-old boys . . . taking part in the jihad" (210). She quotes Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander Salahuddin as saying, "We prefer to recruit children at the age of eleven or twelve," though they are "usually not ready to fight until age eighteen or twenty" (201).
6. It is worth noting that modeling Kashmiris on children and Indians on parents has direct behavioral consequences. For example, in some ways, the most damning scene in Sanjay Kak's *Jashn-e-Azadi* occurs when the army gives out radios to some Kashmiri men. The paternalism would almost make the viewer weep for the humiliation of the Kashmiris, who are in effect given toys to distract them from the gross violence to which they and their families have been subjected.
7. Writers on graphic memoirs have been very concerned with the issue of authenticity. For example, El Refaie emphasizes "the impossibility of ever establishing the historical facts" (166) and contends that "Under the influence of postmodernism, the concept of a single, straightforward Truth has been dismantled" (136). I too find the idea of authenticity to be questionable. Moreover, El Refaie usefully treats the ambiguity of the term and insightfully examines the rhetorical complexity of conveying a sense of authenticity. (Other writers have helpfully discussed such related topics as witnessing; see the essays in Chaney.) However, my point here is not that there is "a single, straightforward Truth," but rather that some things have happened in Kashmir and some things have not happened, that there are patterns to both, and that the facts and the patterns matter. Of course, we can never *fully* establish the particular facts or the general

patterns. However, we can determine that, in light of the evidence, some views are more plausible than others and some works or some aspects of a work are or are not likely to be misleading.

8. On ideological narrowing of focus, see Hogan, *Culture* 59–67.
9. This sort of conflict is celebrated by some critics as part of the "radically fragmented and unstable" nature of graphic fiction, in Hatfield's phrase (36). In keeping with poststructuralist trends that were current not long before, some graphic fiction theorists see aspects of style as carrying political implications. For example, Hatfield contrasts the "roughhewn" graphic with the "Clear Line" tradition; the former, in this view, presents a "subversion of the cultural and ideological reassurances proffered by" the latter (61). It may well be the case that, as a contingent historical fact, roughhewn graphics present more ideologically challenging politics. However, it is very difficult to imagine that roughhewn graphics as such have the effect of challenging the reader's acceptance of mainstream politics, or that clear lines as such reinforce the reader's ideological acquiescence. Since I see no reason to believe there are ideological consequences to such stylistic features, I will leave aside this common approach to the politics of graphic fiction.
10. Ahmed is right to emphasize the violence by militant groups against one another. Jamal points out that "Hizbul Mujahideen operatives harassed, beat, and murdered potential rivals, and the scale of violence was enormous." One Hizbul Mujahideen commander estimated seven thousand assassinations; another claimed that "the actual number is many times higher" (155; see also Swami 178 and Tankel 52).
11. Early on, the National Conference set forth a progressive program for an independent Kashmir. See its 1944 New Kashmir principles at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Naya_Kashmir. Bose characterizes this as "the most important political document in modern Kashmir's history."
12. Kadian 21–22 points to some innocuous features of the celebration of Pakistan. However, these fall far short of the sanctification portrayed by Ahmed.
13. Again, it is important to note that militant groups do manipulate children. As a 2006 Human Rights Watch report explains, "Militant groups have drafted children in Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, and Pakistan. Recruits may be volunteers or abductees. The militants have engaged in active recruitment of children into their forces" ("Everyone" 145). Without reference to Kashmir particularly, Lankford reports that in Pakistan, "teenagers have been kidnapped and beaten by their captors, who attempted to break their spirits, make them suicidal, and then funnel

them into suicide attacks" (358). The problem here is not that the novel attends to the situation of children—which is, rather, laudable—but that militants are modeled on children even when they are not children. It is also worth noting that Indian forces mistreat adolescents by arresting and imprisoning them as adults (see Amnesty International, "Protect").

14. "K Force" may allude to groups such as the Muslim Jaanbaaz Force or the Jehad Force (on these groups, see Bose, *Kashmir*) or the Kashmir Resistance Force (see Tankel 140). Alternatively, it may take the initials "K" and "F" from JKLF.
15. This links him with Pakistani pan-Islamist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, that practice suicide attacks (see Peer 203 and Behera 159); this form of suicide bombing may be more linked with the latter group (see Tankel 64 on different sorts of suicide mission or, more properly, "fidayeen attacks," which may involve lack of concern for one's life rather than positive commitment to dying).
16. See Penguin's MetroReads, http://www.metroreads.in/home.asp.
17. On the internal contradictions in authorial political intention, and the relevant empirical research, see Hogan, *Narrative Discourse* ch. 3.
18. Waheed seems to have drawn the name of his protagonist's fictional nemesis from the author Rajesh Kadian. Kadian's *Kashmir Tangle* is actually a sensible book on the whole, unusually informative on some aspects of the crisis, due perhaps to its reliance on personal interviews (see 197). However, Kadian supports a thoroughly militaristic response to the crisis, even considering the benefits of "military and economic counter-terror by the state" (151).
19. On these types of sacrificial narrative and their political operation, see Hogan, *Understanding Nationalism* ch. 6.

5. Colonial Violence and Scapegoating

1. Just to be clear, I should note that I do not accept the metaphysics of essences. Rather, I take it that ordinary human cognition is implicitly guided by what is in effect an attribution of essences.
2. According to the numbers reported in Behera for 1988–2005, there were about 41,000 total fatalities, of which about 1,600—about 4 percent—were Hindus (Behera 51; this does not count Hindus who were part of the Indian military). It is difficult to calculate just what this means in terms of relative threat. Even so, Hindus do appear to account for a somewhat disproportionate percentage of fatalities. Behera reports that Hindus in Kashmir dwindled from 15 percent in 1947 to 5 percent in 1981, then to 0.1 percent after the exodus. Without an average figure for the

entire period of 1988–2005, one cannot draw precise conclusions. Still, it seems fairly clear that this average would be less than 4 percent for the period (1988–2005). The disproportion is only made worse when one removes the figures for "Indian forces," "Terrorists," and "Counter-insurgent Militants." This puts Hindu deaths at roughly 11 percent of noncombatant deaths. These calculations are complicated by several factors, however. First, the percentage of terrorists is probably overstated (leaving aside the issue of whether all militants should be counted as "terrorists"—as opposed to, say, "soldiers of national liberation") and the figures for deaths of Hindus include incidents in Jammu with a much larger Hindu population (thus changing the relevant proportions). In any case, the figures at very least suggest that the numbers killed *by militants* include a disproportionate number of Hindus—further explaining the Hindu fear of living in a society dominated by such militants, should Kashmir become independent.

Bose (*Kashmir*) presents different figures. Indeed, he rather dismisses Hindu complaints. However, his numbers are, if anything, more damning. Having asserted that Hindus make up no more than 4 percent of the Kashmiri population, he states, "The JKLF's campaign of selective assassinations claimed some Pandit [Hindu] lives between September 1989 and February 1990, although Muslim victims numbered three times as many." In other words, according to Bose, Hindus were 4 percent of the population, but 25 percent of the victims of militant killings prior to the exodus.

3. Needless to say, there are other Kashmiri Anglophone poets who merit attention, from various communities and social groups. Though I am perhaps not a neutral judge, I particularly favor the work of Lalita Pandit (my wife).
4. Versions of this general view, sometimes in a less extreme form, seem to be widespread. Given the preceding analysis, this is perhaps unsurprising. This is not to say that either Kashmiri Hindu or Kashmiri Muslim out-grouping is constant. It is likely to occur, but also to fluctuate for any given person, depending on immediate context and other factors. Take, for example, Nyla Ali Khan's *Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir*. This is a scholarly and insightful work that I would recommend to readers of the present text. It sincerely and vigorously stresses anticommunalism and involves sensitive engagement with the poetry of the great Kashmiri poet Lal Ded. Yet, even Khan's treatment of the Kashmiri Hindu exodus is problematic in this way. Specifically, she claims that "The representative organization of dislocated Kashmiri Pandits, Panun Kashmir

Movement . . . now acknowledges that the exodus of their community in 1990 was orchestrated by the government of India" (112). If one follows the citations, one is brought to an ambiguously phrased article in *Greater Kashmir* (a journal from Indian Kashmir, Pakistani Kashmir, and Pakistan). This article (see Bhat) discusses the president of Panun Kashmir referring to a document produced by his group (*Kashmir Documentation: Pandits in Exile*) and blaming the Indian government for the exodus. Does this mean that the president of the Hindus is testifying that the exodus was a government plot? First, a small point—it is somewhat of an overstatement to refer to Panun Kashmir as either "the" organization of dislocated Kashmiri Hindus and as "representative" of that group. It is difficult to say how much the group's leadership speaks for Kashmiri Hindus generally. Much more significantly, if one looks at the document in question, one finds that it blames the exodus on "the failure of the Government of India to take effective and firm measures against the terrorists" (149). Far from confessing collusion of the government with Hindus against the Muslim population, the document claims that the government of India is to blame for not providing Hindus with adequate security against separatist violence. (I should note that *Kashmir Documentation* is a work of propaganda, like so much else written on Kashmir, by all sides. But no one is taking this publication to be progressive and anticommunalist, unlike some work—such as Ali's poem—that either denies Kashmiri Hindu suffering or blames Kashmiri Hindus for that suffering and, in some cases, for Muslim suffering as well.)

5. For example, Ghosh clearly accepts Ali's assertions that he is opposed to communalism ("The Ghat" 314). Similarly, Sareen and Sengupta assert Ali's "longings" for "a pluralistic, non-exclusive Kashmir." I should note that Ali is not at all unique in being seen as anticommunalist, despite the expression of communalist views. Consider, for example, Yasin Malik, leader of the JKLF, a figure sometimes associated with Ali by Kashmiris. Malik is widely seen as an anticommunal leader, despite his involvement with the JKLF at the time of the violence against Hindus; see, for example, Sharma's report on a 2004 speech in Mumbai where Malik called for Hindu-Muslim unity among Kashmiris. But Sanjay Kak's documentary *Jashn-e-Azadi* includes a speech delivered by Malik in Kashmir, apparently in the same year. In that speech, Malik identifies the "enemy" of Kashmiris not as Indian imperialism but as "Brahminical imperialism," and thus not the imperialism of a state but of a specific Hindu group, Brahmins. It cannot have escaped the notice of the Kashmiris attending his talk that the sinister group behind the brutality of the army, according

to Malik, was precisely the group to which Kashmiri Hindus belong. Indeed, Kashmiri Hindus are commonly referred to as "Pandits," which is to say, as Brahmins.

6. Unless otherwise noted, citations of Ali refer to his collected poems, *The Veiled Suite*.
7. In a strange reading of this poem, Kabir asserts that Ali takes some "responsibility" for the Hindu exodus because he writes, "I lost track of you." She goes on to assert that the contrast between the speaker's "memory" and the Hindu addressee's "history" shows "Pandit [Kashmiri Hindu] control of language" (174). In fact, it seems relatively clear that, as a group, Kashmiri Hindus have the least voice in the current conflict. (Though one must add immediately that ordinary Kashmiri Muslims are almost entirely unheard as well.) This makes it particularly bizarre to tax Kashmiri Hindus with "control[ing] . . . language." Moreover, I am not sure this is what Ali had in mind. Rather, in earlier poetry, he showed great sensitivity to the history of Muslim discrimination against Hindus and he may be alluding to that history here. Whatever Ali meant, Kabir herself evidently accepts the idea that Kashmiri Hindus "control . . . language," which strongly suggests out-grouping.
8. The Kashmiri Hindu case has been damaged due to the exploitation of Kashmiri Hindu suffering by Hindu nationalist and fundamentalist organizations, who have often exaggerated or simply fabricated atrocities against Hindus. For a striking case, see the discussion of temple destruction by Baweja. (On the other hand, Baweja's article may not be entirely consistent. He seems to say that Hindu temples have largely been safe since 1986. But he than says that "just as [sixteen] mosques have been damaged in Muslim-dominated Kashmir, so too have 22 temples and dharamshalas." The latter is a peculiar exoneration. It suggests that Hindu holy places have been damaged at somewhere around twenty times the rate one would expect from the proportion of Hindus in the population. Even so, it is clear that there has been gross, self-serving misrepresentation of atrocities against Kashmiri Hindus by Hindu nationalists. The key point here is that the propaganda of the Hindu Right hardly justifies the dismissal of Kashmiri Hindu suffering by others—including progressive Hindus who sometimes seem to assume that, if something pleases the Hindu Right, it must necessarily be entirely false (on the indifference of many progressives to Kashmiri Hindu suffering, see also Nandy, "Negotiating Necrophilia" 171).
9. The embedded quotation is from a Kashmiri nationalist leader who stated that Islam would provide that complete code for Kashmir (67).

10. Agha Shahid Ali, "I See Kashmir from New Delhi at Midnight," http://www.friendsmania.net/forum/islamic-poetry/19425.htm.
11. Indeed, parts of the poem are entirely consistent with Ali's earlier, anticommunalism. This is unsurprising. Ali's attitude toward Hindus, like all our social attitudes, was necessarily complex and to some degree variable, both cognitively and emotionally. Given the contingencies of mental operation, we would expect many people to experience shifts between communalism and anticommunalism or related attitudes. As Packer, Kesek, and Cunningham explain, referring to racism, "the same individual can be said to possess multiple 'real' evaluations of the same stimulus" (155).
12. This and other concerns broached here may be profitably related to the nostalgia stressed by critics. See, for example, Woodland, and Tageldin; see also Ghosh on "the loss of paradise" ("Greatest" 89).
13. In connection with this, I should confess that I feel somewhat betrayed by Ali's radicalization. My feeling is wholly unjustified; Ali's categorial identifications had nothing to do with me, and there is no reason he should have been grateful to me for any of my writing on his work. But it suggests again how the destructive emotions produced by colonial conflict can ramify throughout populations in unpredictable ways.
14. See the section on "Communications" in the "Schedule of Instrument of Accession" at <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/instrument_of_accession.html>.
15. There were also literal problems with postal services in Kashmir that Ali addresses in a number of poems. As Gossman and Iacopino point out, "The conflict . . . has disrupted regular mail delivery throughout the valley" (34). Kadian reports that in late 1989, "postal delivery became virtually non-existent" (23)—a real hardship for familial and professional relations in a time before e-mail.
16. For some reason, the editor of Ali's collected poems shifted the epigraph to the first poem, thus diminishing its force. As the epigraph for the entire collection, it provides a context for all the poems, not simply for the initial poem.
17. Critics have largely ignored the epigraph. Mattawa remarks on it, but only to affirm Ali's "hybrid literary genealogy" (1594). However, speaking about Ali and two other Muslim poets, Mattawa does rightly comment, "The Islamic allusions they incorporate are integral to their poetic visions," though "most of their audiences are slow to decipher their allusions" (1595).

18. I should perhaps note that I will not be considering formal aspects of Ali's poem, a recurring topic in the criticism. On some possible thematic concerns related to form in Ali's work, see Woodland. Discussions of Ali's formal practices, as well as other topics, often stress "hybridity" (see, for example, Zaidi), a theoretically vague but highly influential idea.
19. The disappearance of Hindu statuary was probably not simply mercantile, as the quotation from Rushdie's *Shalimar* might seem to suggest—nor the result of Hindu deceit, as Ali may indicate. It appears to have been part of the ideological commitment of some Islamist groups. For example, Swami reports that the parent organization of Lashkar-e-Taiba passed a resolution "calling on cadre 'to capture Hindu temples'" and "'destroy the idols'" (181; the embedded quotations are from Raman, though Swami's phrasing appears to suggest that they are from the resolution). Though this refers to a time four years later than Ali's book, it suggests that iconoclasm was neither a thing of the past nor entirely unrelated to the insurgency. (I should note that Swami's source citation does not appear to be accurate. I found the quoted passage in an article by Raman with a slightly different title in a different outlet. It is referenced in the Works Cited list.)

6. Fractured Tales and Colonial Traumas

1. It is a convention in metaphor analysis to use uppercase for the large, conceptual structure shared by particular metaphors. Thus, Uncle Sam and John Bull are instances of THE NATION IS A PERSON.
2. Putting the idea somewhat more sensationally, Kindt, Soeter, and Vervliet write, "If emotional memory could be weakened or even erased, then we might be able to eliminate the root of many psychiatric disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder" (256).
3. In a more literal treatment of the story, Kabir sees the surgery as manifesting "the orthopedic regimes of the modern State" ("Cartographic Irresolution" 150).
4. On the prototypical forms of the last three genres, see Hogan, Affective Narratology, chapter 4.
5. See MyGuru, http://www.myguru.in/yearly_calender-1947.htm.
6. Kabir, in one of the very few discussions of the story in English, links such events with the Foucauldian idea of "biopolitics" ("Cartographic Irresolution" 61).
7. One interpretation of the story would see it as systematically reversing the national identities of the characters. In this account, the "true story" or

historical referent would concern Pakistani Kashmiris crossing over into India to save their dying brothers by sacrificing their blood. This seems a plausible reading of the story given the danger the author might face by condemning the Indian Army. For our purposes, however, the key point is that the same disfiguring occurs either way.

8. I am grateful to Neerja Mattoo for this information.

Afterword

1. These recommendations are not intended to substitute for those of human rights organizations (see, for example, the recommendations in Human Rights Watch, "Everyone"). Rather, they are intended to complement the latter in most cases. My suggestions may, however, be less stringent with respect to prosecution of past crimes. This reflects my strong preference for preventive rather than retributive justifications for punishment. In keeping with this preference, it is important that any leniency be tailored to discourage future violence, as stressed in recommendation 12.
2. On the effectiveness of policing in response to terrorism, see McCauley. On the importance of a trustworthy policing system for discouraging terrorist violence to begin with, see Louis 142–43 and Moghaddam 107. On the importance of community involvement in policing, see Couper (though see also Vitale on factors that inhibit the effectiveness of community involvement; Vitale is writing about U.S. cities, but the points he raises apply if anything with greater force to Kashmir). Finally, on preventive approaches to policing terrorism, see Clarke and Newman. In giving these citations, I do not wish to imply that the violence by militants is a more serious problem than that by the government. It is not. Rather, the citations reflect the fact that research has focused on inhibiting nonstate (e.g., militant) violence, not state violence. On the other hand, militant violence is frequently a danger to cooperative initiatives in which members of the community may risk retribution by "collaborating" with the enemy on commissions or in public works. In this sense, adequate policing is important even for such conciliatory efforts to begin.
3. Fisher, Kelman, and Nan cite the case of Egypt and Israel, maintaining that an admission of past "hostility" may significantly enhance "the credibility" of an announced "change of course" (493). More generally, Bar-Tal and Halperin note the value of "an unexpected conciliatory, trust-building action" (941). Bose makes much the same recommendation when he writes, "An acknowledgment by the government of India that large-scale abuses have occurred, and that these are regretted, would help heal deep psychological wounds" (*Kashmir*).

4. The research of Ginges and Atran does not indicate that humiliation increases violence, but it does indicate that humiliation increases resistance to "inter-group compromise" (281). It is not clear what conditions produced the outcomes in Ginges and Atran's study, as opposed to the research suggesting the development of rage out of shame. It may be a matter of the ambiguity of the word "humiliation." I am taking the term to refer to the public exposure of an experience of someone else's disgust that gives rise to a sense of shame. Ginges and Atran refer to "a loss of power in a public context" (282), a related but distinct idea. It is at least prima facie plausible that a feeling of powerlessness would decrease support for rebellion (what Ginges and Atran find), whereas a feeling of public shame in the face of disgust would provoke rage, and thus violence. Lindner suggests that it may be a matter of distinct stages of response in particular social and ideological contexts. Thus, she writes, "The first reaction to a humiliating situation may be depression. The next may be the desire to retaliate with aggressive counterhumiliation" (132). Scheff cites systematic research (subsequent to Ginges and Atran) that "strongly supports" the view that "violence is caused by shame," but he also notes that there are social variables and that shame more frequently leads to "withdrawal" (455). In this way, the work of Ginges and Atran may not show that shame is unimportant for violence. It may be consistent with an account that makes violence one result of shame, much less frequent than withdrawal and limited by additional circumstances. Combining the two strands of research suggests that humiliating a subject population is likely to drive some into violence while hardening others in their opposition to compromise.
5. On some models for rehabilitation, see Van Willigen. On some issues in the diagnosis and treatment of torture survivors, see Bøjholm and Vesti as well as Mollica and Caspi-Yavin. On the spreading of psychological effects beyond torture survivors to their family members, see Somnier et al. 64. On the traumatization of both victims and perpetrators, see Maguen and Litz, and McNally 235.
6. See Census of India, "Provisional Population Totals Paper 1 of 2011: Jammu & Kashmir," http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/prov_data_products_J&K.html.
7. Stern discusses the ways in which the development of militancy and counterinsurgency give rise to economic interests which work against resolution of the conflict (79–80, 292–93; see also Behera 254). For example, if a conflict ends, many militants will lose their jobs. (On "regular salaries" and "cash bonuses," see Stern 188; see 213 and 216 on the

relative value of these salaries.). As Stern writes, "holy wars persist only when organizations and individuals profit from them" (236). Speaking of Kashmir, she notes, "The fight is kept alive because organizations depend on it and because, on both sides, people are making a living. Smuggling goods. Selling arms. Lending money. Running camps. Running 'charities'" (235). Related to this, Kadian links the start of the insurgency to the pool of the unemployed, maintaining that the numbers of unemployed had increased fifteenfold in the preceding two decades.

8. The last provision is important, as it would counter the problems isolated by Maoz in which cooperative projects fail to address "inequalities" due to "very low to no representation" of the nondominant group "in the different levels of management and decision making" (442; Maoz is speaking specifically of Israeli-Arab programs in Israel).
9. On these initiatives and their progress thus far, see the Directorate of School Education, Kashmir, "Schemes" (http://dsek.nic.in/schemes.html) and "Educational Plans" (http://www.dsek.nic.in/schemes/plans.html); on some problems—for example, with school buildings—see Muddasir Ali. The situation may be rendered particularly urgent by the competition of secular schools with religious institutions. Militant religious organizations may provide free education, including "free books, housing, and board," while "Children who attend public schools may have to buy books or pay for their transport" (Stern 293), which poor families may find unaffordable. Stern's reference here is to Pakistan, but the point is generalizable. Writing in the early years of the insurgency, Kadian stressed the importance of Islamic religious schools, noting the appeal of "free education and free food" (13). He indicates that these schools contributed to the erosion of Ṣūfism, with its more conciliatory relation to Hinduism.
10. Directorate of School Education, Kashmir, "Educational Policy," http://dsek.nic.in/policy.html.
11. This is not to say that the effects of literature are simple and straightforward. On some of the complications of cultivating empathy through literature, see Keen. For a broader account of possible political consequences of literary study, see Bracher.
12. Unfortunately, it would probably be counterproductive to bring soldiers and civilians together in such courses at the present time, since the presence of soldiers would stifle civilians' freedom of expression. Ultimately, however, such integrated groups would be best.
13. This would perhaps be the sort of "multi-tiered autonomy" outlined in Bose, *Kashmir*. Relevant to this, Noorani makes some valuable recom-

mendations for reversing the erosion of Article 370 (the constitutional provision on the autonomy of Kashmir). First, subsequent restrictions on that autonomy would need to be overturned. Second, the article itself must be revised to "provide cast-iron guarantees against recurrence" of "abuse." He explains that this "is best done by terminating the president's power to make any further orders under Article 370" (*Article 370* 16–17). He also stresses the importance of "a Head of State elected by the State itself and not one imposed" by the national government (26–27).

14. Given the multiple options, such a plebiscite may have to involve two rounds in places where no option received an absolute majority.
15. Readers familiar with Bose's *Kashmir* will recognize that this is a point of sharp disagreement between us. Bose sees India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris as having legitimate interest in the future of Kashmir. His outline of a possible solution to the crisis stresses the importance—indeed, it seems even primacy—of India-Pakistan negotiations on the issue. He is undoubtedly correct that no solution will actually work without the cooperation of India and Pakistan. However, that does not mean that they have a legitimate stake in the future of Kashmir. The fact that two thugs have beaten a hapless passerby to a pulp does not mean that they have a legitimate interest in guiding or negotiating about what that passerby does next—though, as a matter of fact, pacifying the thugs may be a practically necessary condition for the passerby doing anything at all.
16. The mention of a plebiscite necessarily raises the issue of the right to self-determination. There is a large body of literature on the topic, which I clearly cannot address here. Nonetheless, it is worth remarking briefly on Chandhoke's analysis, which focuses on Kashmir particularly. Chandhoke argues that there is a right to secession. It begins with "institutionalized injustice" (211), which we certainly find in Kashmir. But, "If the violations of core moral rights [are] not irrevocable, and if formal democracies offer opportunities for reversal of historical wrongs and for the institutionalization of justice, then this right does not hold" (213).

    Chandhoke's analysis is rigorous and illuminating. Even so, I believe it fails to distinguish the right to secede from a justification for secession. It may seem that rights and justifications are the same. But they are not. A U.S. citizen has the right to vote for a Republican candidate, however inferior that candidate might be to his or her opponent, and thus however unjustified the vote might be. Moreover, in practice, the absence of a right to secede would seem to be paired with a right of the existing state to prevent the secession. It is not clear to me that a state has the right to prevent secession even when it has not been oppressive. In a case where

the state has been oppressive, positing such a right seems absurd. In short, I take Chandhoke's argument to indicate only that it would be better if India began to act justly and democratically in Kashmir and if Kashmiris then chose to remain part of India (with the sort of autonomy indicated by Article 370). That may be correct. But it does not follow that, if the government mends its ways, Kashmiris no longer have the right to secede.

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